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The following

voter turnout.

project attempts to connect one type of campaigning, direct contact,
to

Direct contact

is

defined as any type of campaign communication that

directed from the campaign at an individual voter.

Most

direct contacts are either

telephone calls or direct mail pieces. The working assumption

is

matter in determining voter turnout apart from the demographic,

that

campaign

political,

psychological characteristics of individual voters. Four congressional

1994 and two from 1996, are chosen for
efforts

analysis.

Data

is

is

then coded onto voter

files

activities

and

districts,

two from

collected on the direct contact

of the eight campaigns taking place within the four congressional

direct contact information

is

districts.

The

containing the actual turnout

information, age, and party registration of each voter. Using logistic regression, the

effects

of direct contact are analyzed while controlling

party affiliation.

V

for past voter history, age,

and
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CHAPTER

1

WHY STUDY VOTER CONTACT?
Why

should

we

care about political campaigns'^
Clearly, people do.

elections are frequent, expensive, noisy,
and controversial.
roles spend the better part

of their adult

Democracy. The following example

two on

is

Various actors with different

lives studying elections, participating
in

campaigns, or commenting on the electoral process.
elections will begin with a sentence or

American

Most books on campaigns and

the importance of elections to

typical:

Elections are important because they allow us freedom
to actively
participate

Nowhere

m

selecting our leaders.

in the

responsible participation
States.

.

.

They

are the core of democracy.

world are more people more

freely

engaged

in active,

the choice of leadership than in the United
.[T]he political election campaign is an essential element of a
in

democratic system.'

Most Americans
commonplace
'Nowhere

in

will

agree with the assertions above. Indeed, they are so

as to be uninteresting.

the world are

Still,

there

more people more

participation in the choice of leadership than

mean

voter turnout which

is

lower

in

is

some ambiguity

freely

engaged

the third sentence

in active,

the United States".

in

in

responsible

The authors cannot

the United States than in most other industrial

democracies. If not voters, then the authors must be referring to the large number of
citizens involved in the electoral process itself ranging

from donors to candidates.

presents a picture of a relatively large number of involved citizens and a mass of

comparatively indifferent voters.

‘

Trent. Judith and Robert V. Friedenberg. Political ('ampaign Coiiiinunicaiion

Praeger, 2nd

Ed 1990) Page

3.

1

(New York,

This

The following study addresses
by looking

at the

one campaign

effort

campaign contacts, and measuring
turnout.

Direct contact

is

the question of campaign effects

on

participation

most closely related to voter turnout,

that activity's effects

any campaign

effort

aimed

direct

on the probability of voter

at individual voters for a specific

purpose. This definition differentiates direct contact campaigning from the
electronic

media

in that

TV

and Radio, even when targeted, cannot be aimed

only masses of people, a preponderance of whom
characteristics.

Although the advent of cable and

may show

at a specific

voter but

the desired demographic

satellite television

has greatly

increased the range of targeting available to candidates using the airwaves, electronic

media

is still

only aimed at groups, not individuals.

direct contact effort

is

is

an enhanced

usually direct mail, phone

calls,

file

The source of voter names

of registered voters. The delivery system used

or door-to-door contact.

specific voters with a targeted message, direct voter contact

campaign techniques designed

As
is

a

method

only one of many

Thus, direct contact

is

best viewed as a

of campaign communication. Until quite recently academic research has

ignored campaign effects and focused research energy on demographic,

psychological and institutional voting determinants.

paradigms for the analysis of voter turnout and
question which introduced this chapter from,

the

more

for reaching

to influence voter perceptions and turnout through the

provision of campaign controlled information.

specific type

for a

specific

"Why

These studies produced powerful

participation.

"Why

social,

However,

to change the

care about political campaigns'^" to

care about the effects of direct contact on voter turnout?"

requires the addition of campaign actions to the voter turnout model. This addition, and

2

the implications

it

entails, is

of great

interest to reformers, scholars,

and practitioners

alike.

Campaign reformers pursue

more

participatory.

"Fairness”

content while "participation"

model

is

enough

may

that the

is

is

money goes

the dual goal of making the system

defined in terms of voter turnout.

into a set

An

analysis of

spending of campaign money may increase

the allocation

is

much

not so

and

The

usually unstated

of messages and practices which are unsavory

campaign

efforts to increase turnout

require a shift in the reformist model by showing that
in

it

fair

generally defined in terms of money and
message

to depress voter turnout.

point out that

more

some circumstances

political participation.

Likewise,

it

may

amount of money being spent by campaigns

the

among competing campaign

the

as

is

it

technologies which deserve the analysis and

attention of those involved in implementing and reforming electoral
policy.

Researchers

many of the same

will

be interested

of direct contact on voter turnout for

reasons as reformers but for a few reasons of their

research on voter turnout

produced by the

in the effects

-

and

social sciences

it

—

own

as well.

is

one of the most consistent bodies of research

is

derived from panel studies and surveys.

Most

When

they

focus on campaigns they tend to concentrate on Television. Direct contact allows the
study of the actual voter record, avoids many of the

makes

of survey research, and

available millions of potential cases for comparison and isolation.

direct contact

files

pitfalls

makes use of county voter

files.

It is

voting

in this

activity,

always possible to acquire those

and enhance them with campaign contact material to ascertain a

or as direct as one might get

As an

direct connection,

type of research, between a campaign stimulus and a

act.

3

Most candidates and

consultants assume that direct
contact affects turnout but

would welcome confirmation, ponder
the heft of data to their intuitions.

campaign techniques.
no

denial,

No

one wants to spend money on ineffective

The question of the

less than the attempt to link

and make use of any suggestions that
add

effects

of direct contact on voter turnout

is

campaign stimulus to the positive policy outcome
of

increased turnout

American campaigns have always made use of direct
voter
introduction to his study on electoral culture

following description of a

rally

and

in

contact. In the

the northeast Michael

GET-OUT-THE-VOTE (GOTV)

McGerr

gives the

effort during the

1876 presidential campaign.
Early one evening

October 1876 groups of young men wearing
and capes and carrying kerosene torches in the shape of
rifles gathered in the sixth ward of the city of New
Haven, Connecticut.
The men were members of the “York Escort”, the “Shelton Escort,” the
Bradley Guard,” and the “H.G. Lewis Guard,” marching companies
in

military-style caps

formed for the presidential campaign that year and named in honor of four
of the city’s leading Democrats. ... By seven o’clock, the companies had
formed into line and lit their torches. On orders from the commanding
officers, the men set off, a brass band at their head, through the darkening
streets of the city. Returning to the sixth ward at eight o’clock, the
companies found three or four thousand people filling the street around a
at a main intersection in a working-class neighborhood.

temporary platform

Gas

lights

buildings.

and Chinese lanterns

As

played and fireworks

Rallies,

brilliantly illuminated the

surrounding

the companies marched and counter-marched, the band
lit

the sky.

^

marches, and the accompanying door-to-door canvassing illustrated the

intense partisanship and public nature of political activity.

The

political

excite partisans through both public display and individual contact.

and individual attention were the primary tools available to
^

McGerr, Michael.

The Decline of Popular

Politics:

York, Oxford University Press. 1986) pp. 3-4

4

goal

was

to

Partisan excitement

political elites to increase

The American North 1865-1928. (New

turnout.

Republican campaign schools claim
Lincoln once said

our voters, then
to

make

we

need to

talk to

we need

them, then

them

to visit

we need

Direct voter contact, either as mail
or

GOTV,

running a Freak Party campaign for
Mayor

of his strange campaign to

their

GOTV

in

is

is

less

their direct contact efforts.

eveoovhere. Even Hunter Thompson,

Aspen Colorado,

script

to find

on election day

all

sure they turn out to vote".
Whether Lincoln said anything like this

important than the Republican's desire
to claim him for

you.

"First

"Get off your

attributed the closeness

ass,

you bastard!

We

need

Get out and vote!”^
Differing

in

degree but not necessarily

Congressman Steney Hoyer’s 1992

in

kind from the Freak

reelection effort.

District covers three rural counties in Southern

reflected in a break

between the more conservative

effort

was

Maryland’s 5th Congressional

Maryland as well

suburban Prince George’s and Anne Arundel Counties.

Power

Its

as large parts

of

suburban-rural divisions are

and the

rural voters

liberal

democratic voters centered around College Park, home of the
University of Maryland,

and reinforced by the
district.

largest concentration

Perceived divisions within the

of the national committees but
district

of federal workers

district

in reality

have always kept

enough

to beat

any

it

US

raise

Congressman Hoyer.

congressional

on the swing

the Democrats are strong here.

produces a Republican challenger strong enough to

attention but not strong

in

1990 made the

district

money and

attract

Congressman Hoyer had

more conservative and he began

but

to face a

succession of tough Republican challengers. In 1992 he defeated Lawrence Hogan,

Thompson, Hunter
(Ballantine Books,

New

S.

“Freak Power

in the

Rockies” reprinted in The Great Shark Hunt,

York. 1979) Page 157
5

list

Generally, this

originally earned his job by winning a tough Democratic primary in 1981.

redistricting in

seat

Jr.

53%

to

44%. Hogan was thought by

experts to be one of the toughest
challengers

,n

the nation that year,"^

Hoyer's professional campaign team was
headed by a general consultant from

New

Mexico named Chris Brown.
and

identification

Among

GOTV program for the

his

many

duties

Brown

5th Congressional District. In a series
of

meetings with campaign staff and other professionals
Brown

Approximately 50,000 people were targeted based on

demographic
voters

in

The goal was

characteristics.

swing precincts as

possible.

devised a voter

their party, voter history,

to identify as

Issue questions

out his plan.

laid

many

were

and

favorable and undecided

also developed.

responses were cross tabulated against the names of undecided
voters.

Issue

These voters

then received personalized mailings.

Brown designed
calling

the target universe, calling scripts, and follow-up mail.

was done by an Oregon

from an electronic

(VCS), a firm with

file

The

named Telemark. Voter names and numbers came

firm

compiled from original county tapes. Voter Contact Services

offices in in Hawaii, California, and Massachusetts,

employee order the Maryland

tapes.

processed by computer technicians

in

The tapes were shipped

had a Honolulu

to California and

both Santa Clara and Honolulu. The processing

included appending phone numbers, gender codes and ethnic identification. Although
the technical

and

script

employee

work was handled on

the

West Coast,

development were handled by the

in

Massachusetts.

By

New

political issues

Mexico consultant and a

the time the computer

file

was ready

280,000 registered voters and included voter history going back
District description

American

Politics:

such as targeting

it

VCS

contained

to the 1988 primary

and history taken from Michael Barone and Grant

Ujifnsa.

The Almanac of

1994 (New York. Macmillan publishing, National Journal Books. 1995) 583-585.

6

and general elections as well as

birth date, registration
date, gender, party affiliation,

precinct, jurisdictional information,

VCS

phone number and

created the target universe

where employees using

file

ethnicity.

of 50,000 voters and mailed

predictive dialing equipment

made

it

Telemark

to

the calls in three days.

Predictive dialing technology allows
phone numbers to be loaded into a central

computer and continuously
computer

terminal.

dialed with each answer directed to
an

employee

Disconnected numbers are eliminated from the

machines and busy signals are placed

at the

file

end of the queue for future

at

an open

while answering

calling.

Such

technology greatly increases the number of calls a single
employee can make per hour

and allows greater supervisory control over the
calling

file.

was completed

were

the results

sent to

now more

VCS

issue piece to print.

print

of favorable voters were sent back to Telemark for

race involved consultants and personnel

Hoyer campaign spent $1,584,271
1

in

described above. The 1992 data were

Mid- 19th century
all

rely

rallies.

on reaching voters with

underlying desire

is

in

know how

A few

days before the election

GOTV calling.

The Maryland

seven states across five time zones. The

more

a smaller scale, the voter contact

moved forward and matched
efficiently in the

Freak Power

tickets,

a specific message.

the same: to

shops would

1992 while challenger Hogan spent $265,065. In

994 the Hoyer campaign repeated, on

so the process might be repeated

the

Mailing tapes and labels were generated within 24

hours and sent to various mail shops around the country.
lists

When

workers.

and added back to the Hoyer voter

Counts for each response were generated so the

many of each

efficient

move

to a

program

new

file

1994 and 1996 elections.

and modern congressional races

The technology

varies but the

selected voters to the polling place.

7

voter

Still,

despite commonality of purpose,
distinctions

between a

it

would be

local motivational rally,
organized along strict party lines

volunteers, and a phone bank organized
and
professionalization and complexity of
in

a mistake to ignore the technological

managed by paid

The

professionals.

modern campaigns represent

by

qualitative changes

electoral techniques.

Campaign research has taken
and the

as

its

starting point the decline

of the candidate centered campaign.

rise

Some

of political parties

studies, using

measures of

"consultant team presence and quality" suggest the
mere presence of consultants
increases a candidates final vote share.

hillings in congressional

1992

—

move from

®

between the

New Haven

rally

a party-centered effort to a consultant

illustrates that the electorate has

were

Certainly politicians think so. Consultant

campaigns jumped more than $60 million between 1990
and

an increase of 32%.
If a contrast

^

to be motivated.

campaigns take place

become

In Maryland, they

in

and the Hoyer race

managed campaign system

less predictable.

needed to be

an era where there

is

no

illustrates the

In

New

identified

faithful to

it

also

Haven, partisans

first.

Modern

be taken for granted.

We have moved from locally based party organizations,

designed to gain and

hold the mechanism of government and organized along stable electoral cleavages, to a
professional political

not so

^

much

elite,

nationally dispersed,

to take over the

Guerrieri, Mark.

still

intent

mechanisms of government,

on winning public
as to earn

money

office but

in a

newly

"Can a Dream Team make a Difference?" Unpublished paper delivered

at

Northeast Political Science Conference, November 10-12, 1996 Providence RI.

®

Morris, Dwight and Muriel Gamache.

Quarterly Press, Washington

DC

Handbook on Campaign Spending: 1992. (Congressional

1994.)
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minted profession

-

a profession, like others,
heavily

dependent on the expertise

inherent in the use of new technology.^

What impact do

current technologies have on
voter turnout^

and candidates the success or

failure

of communication techniques

is

For consultants
either victory or, at

the very least, a showing that exceeds
expectations. For our political culture
at large
the evaluation of any given campaign
technique
participation and turnout

is

is

more complex.

Certainly voter

an important measure of systemic
success, and

the current electoral structure

often viewed as a failure.

is

Low

it

is

voter turnout

here that

is

often

seen as a function of bad candidates and empty,
negative campaigns. The argument
claims that such electioneering creates a
jaded public more likely to stay
to the polls.

Voter turnout

78%. Voter turnout

in

1

in

is

was

was 56%.

the campaign technology most closely associated
with

turnout. Unlike electronic media, direct voter contact,
or

encourage specific individuals to vote.

campaigns to move voters to the
until quite recently,

than go

1876, the year of the rally described by McGerr,

992, the year of the Hoyer race

Direct voter contact

home

much of it,

Despite the effort and

polls, the

academic

literature

is

money

used to

spent by

on voter turnout had,

focused almost exclusively on social and psychological explanations

for the voter decision. While this research has greatly increased

behavior and turnout a number of paradoxes have emerged.

knowledge of voting

Why,

for example,

has

voter turnout decreased while one of the main determinants of voter turnout, level of

See Larr>’ Sabato.

The Rise of Political Consultants:

York: Basic Books 1981) and David Rosenbloom.
1973).

Shea.

For a discussion of the changes

Campaign

in

The Election

campaign

Craft: The Strategies, Tactics,

New Ways of Winning Elections. (New

tactics

Men (New

York: Quadrangle Books

from a communications perspective see Daniel

and Art of Political Campaign Management

Press, Westport Connecticut. 1996)
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educat,on, .ncreased dramat.cally.

Why

has voter turnout decreased
despite numerous

simplifications in voter registration‘s**

Although there

is

now

a substantial

body of research

studies political

mobilization effects, most of that
research focuses on the aggregate
effects of the
political climate

is still little

such as the race

explored very

articles linking attack

little.

at best, a public that is

take the relationship as gospel.

models

There

of negative advertising on

often sick of the political process
tends to

also a

is

effects

voluminous

literature built

around

detailing the social, psychological, and
institutional factors affecting voter

These

turnout.

room

There

ads to reduced turnout the relationship
has been

Although research on the

inconclusive

is

the top of the ticket, issues,
or the economy.

research on the mobilization effects
of campaign activities themselves.
Aside

from journalistic

turnout

at

for

studies,

campaign

by

effects

tar the

bulk of the

work on voting

on voter turnout.

It is

behavior,

as if all of the

leave

good reasons

little

for

voting, or not voting, are taken and those striving
to affect turnout directly are viewed

with some condescension,

effects inexorably

and demographic
received so

**

in

much

in the

push the turnout stone up and
factors,

down

the

in a

hill.

cave while true social

It is

ironic that social

which are mostly beyond the reach of public

policy, has

attention while campaign activities, which are well within the

New American

American Enterprise

The American

Votes?

Political System.

Institute 1978).

political participation.

Who

drones working on shadows

For an early discussion of the voting paradox see Richard A. Brody, "The Puzzle of Participation

America"

Stokes.

like

Edited by Anthony King. (Washington D.C.;

There are also many excellent summaries of the

literature

on

See Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E.
Voter.

(New Haven Yale

(New York: Wiley

I960);

University Press, 1980.);

Raymond Wolfmger and Steven
Ruy

(Westport. Conn. Greenwood Press. 1987)
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Teixeira.

J.

Rosenstone.

Why Americans Don’t

Vote.

framework of public

policy, have been slighted.

spending has received has been divorced
from

What

their

attention

campaign

activity

avowed purpose of winning

elections and focused on general
assertions of over spending or
vote buying.

never

is

the question asked,

drive voter turnout?

term "too much"

is

is

the

money

Instead, the claim

never established

in a

Almost

providing information to voters'?
Does

is

that "too

much" money

Larry Sabato

s Political

.

and the electoral process

campaign

effects

highlights a

be reviewed

is

being

filled.

more depth

A recent

Hansen and Steven

J.

later in this

Rosenstone

available

is

little in

common

with direct

There are signs that the gap surrounding

growing body of literature on
in

now

The most

Sabato's chapter on direct mail consists of

descriptions of fundraising direct mail, an industry
that has
mail done for persuasion or turnout.'

help

comparative sense.

political consultants

Consultants

it

spent although the

is

Direct contact eftorts are especially
underrepresented in the literature.

comprehensive book on

and

survey of the political participation

political mobilization.

This literature will

paper but a quote from authors John

will suffice as a

field

Mark

summary. These authors argue

that

voter turnout can only be partially explained by social and psychological factors and

have made a strong case
conscious

'

activities

that political behavior, broadly defined,

of political

is

influenced by the

elites.

Sabato, Lariy.

The Rise of Political Consultants.

Lcighley, Jan.

Attitudes, Opportunities,

Political Research Quarterly, Volinnc 48,

and Incentives:

Number

1,

March

A Field Essay on

1995.

Political Participation.

They

claim:

The reigning

theories of participation

may seem, do

not have

much

in

American

to say about politics.

amazing as

politics,

it

Instead they trace

activism to the characteristics of
individual American citizens to
their
education, their incomes, and their
efficacy.

determine behavior.

involvement over the

Campaign

last

polling and

specific efforts

demographic research

the electorate into likely and unlikely voters
into persuadable

that attitudes

asked to account for changes in
citizen
half century these explanations
largely fail. "

The following work examines whether
voter turnout.

They assume

When

,

by

political elites affect

directed at dividin"

is first

and then, categorizing the

and unpersuadable voters. Research strategy,
and technology come

together to form ever finer divisions for the delivery
of diverse messages
building a winning coalition.

party behind

The

question becomes

political

me? and more, "How might

I

message delivery system, which

same

succeed‘d

is

the

less,

exploit cleavages in

Although electronic media can be targeted,

the

likely voters

it

is

"How

my

in

might

direct contact

is

1

get

my

district?"

direct contact, with

modern embodiment of political

found to help increase voter turnout, or

its

specific

targeting and, at

time, the primary tool of the political elite tor influencing turnout.

If

the hopes of

Does

it

alternatively, if we

find that direct contact provides information primarily to those already participating
and

ignores the information needs of more alienated voters, then discussions of campaign
finance policy needs to concern itself with

"money and

elite effects

on participation as well as

strictly

politics" issues.

" Roscnstonc, Steven

J.

and John Mark Hansen. Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy

America. (New York, Macmillan

199.3)
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in

Among

the specific questions addressed
will be

1)

Do

2)

Who

3)

If direct contacts

direct contacts increase turnout?

receives direct contacts from
campaigns'^

do work, how many does

it

take for an appreciable increase

in voting‘s

4) Again,

it

direct contacts

work, which types work the

5)

Do some

All

of these questions are quite

empirical questions.

types of voters respond better than others
to direct contact‘d

Can

specific, but they directly

political elites consciously affect

voter groups excluded from their efforts?

normative policy implications.
points.

First,

best‘d

My

address more general

voter turnout‘s Are

Such empirical questions have strong

argument can be summarized

to evaluate voter turnout

the sphere of influence of public policy.

we must

in

the following

be able to concentrate on efforts within

Second, campaign behavior

is

such influence. Campaign finance regulations are particularly powerful
incentives for campaign behavior. Finally,

have an

effect

some

if

particular

on voter turnout such behaviors need

susceptible to

in

forming

campaign behaviors are found

to

to be encouraged, or, at a

minimum, not discouraged, by the campaign regulatory system.

1.1

Data and Methodology
1

and

1

use multiple sources of data for the following study.

996 congressional

First,

data from the

elections are used to select four districts for study.

1

994

Second,

interviews with campaign operatives and an examination of campaign finance records
are used to reconstruct the strategic and tactical direct contact choices

campaign.

made

in

each

Third, a previously ignored but potentially useful data source, actual county

13

voting records,

coded with the campaign contact
information. This weds the

is

campaign information with a
and past voting

history.

file

The

rich in individual level

result

is

a data set that

demographic data including age

combines

all

direct contact information with the
political information contained

voters.

of the campaign's

on

files

of registered

Logistic regression equations, incorporating
campaign contacts as a variable, as

well as control variables, are run to
ascertain the effectiveness of campaign
direct

contact efforts

1.2 Dissertation

increasing voter turnout.

Plan

Chapter

In

examination

will

theory from a

recently

in

This study

will

1

will

review the academic literature on voting behavior.
This

concentrate on the development of voter turnout and
participation

field

begun

2,

dominated by the standard socioeconomic model to one

to explore the effects of political elites

In

in

of fhe

3,

1

will

examine the uses to which

influence

direct contact

is

put by various

Using information from campaign periodicals, as well as campaign

expenditure data, direct contact

will

formulation of testable hypotheses.

framework

more aggregate measures of political

level

the mobilization work.

Chapter

campaigns.

participation.

look to expand the literature on mobilization by using individual

campaign contact data instead
generally used

on turnout and

that has

be defined

The

in fine

enough

detail to

allow the

analysis of direct contact will provide a

for the choice of case studies and a

method

for categorizing

and analyzing

direct voter contact.

In

Chapter

4,

1

will

describe the background, strategy, and direct contact efforts

of the eight campaigns under study. The eight campaigns, representing four
14

races, will

be taken from both 1994 and 1996.

Special attention will be patd
to the targeting of

subgroups within the voter population

at large.

One of the

chief differences between the

party centered campaign and the
candidate centered campaign

is in

the degree of

While turn-of-the-century campaigns
might be described as targeted

targeting.

they focused on their
that design

own

partisans,

modern campaigns

in that

are heavily targeted enterprises

messages for numerous subgroups of voters.
Targeting by party

is still

important but to win an election, much deeper
demographic divisions must be found and

Each

exploited.

individual contact will be

examined and

contact plan built for each campaign. In chapter

campaign contacts.

At issue

will

5,

1

a detailed retrospective direct

will

summarize the distribution of

be the number, type, and distribution of the
various

forms of direct contacts within the four voting populations
under study.
In

Chapter

6,

1

begin to test the effects of direct contact on voter
turnout. The

standard socioeconomic model (SES) conceptualizes voter turnout
as a form of

behavior that proceeds from particular social resources and attitudes
such as income,
education

level, social class,

and feelings of political

unavailable to political consultants

who

efficacy.’^ This data is often

instead rely on age and voter history

maintained on county tapes to predict voting behavior.

Actual voting records for the

race in question allows for the development of probabilities for voting at various levels

The

Norman

literature

Voter.

\

oter turnout

H. Nie. Participation in

Philip Converse,
I960).

on

Warren

For a more recent

Miller,

is

\'oluniinous.

For early statements see Sidney Verba and

America (New York: Harper and Row 1972) and Angus Campbell,

and Donald Stokes. The American

suiv'ey see

Warren Miller and

J.

Voter.

(New York: Wiley

Merrill Shanks. 1996 The

Press

New American

(Cambridge, Harvard Press 1996).

Age

is

sometimes

available.

Level of education

is

usually available only at the census level and

therefore describes the propensity of a neighboorhood as defined by the census bureau rather than an

individual characteristic.
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ol iige, pas, v„ling hislory,
par(y n.cmhe.sh.p, and

Ihe ellecls ol lolal direcl conlacis
on each vole.

contact on voter turnout

In chaptei 7,

clilVerenl

1

in

will

each of the

I

comaci mlormalion
will

examine the

lly isolat.ng

elVecls ol'diiecl

under study.

districts

take the next logical step and
examine the ellicacy of

types of vole, coiilaci on

lui noiil.

The kind

ol conipai i.sons that will be

made

include those between mail and phone
eonlacis, Kepiihllcan and Demoeralie
conlacis;

and negalive

vs, posilive eonlacis.

This chaplei

will also

examine Ihe ellecls

direcl

contact has on diireient voter gioups.

In

chapter

8,

the conclusion,

I

will

pievious hypotheses and place Ihe findings

examine the implications Ihe lindings have

examine the empirical findings
in a

larger

for current

16

campaign context

in light

I

of

will also

campaign trends and reform

CHAPTER

2

TURNOUT: CAMPAIGN EFFECTS OR VOTER
CHARACTERISTICS?
There has been

do what

little

research into the question as to
whether campaign activities

their practitioners expect

them

to do.

This

is

not to say that social science

is

silent

on the turnout and persuasion

more

overtly political variables such as campaign
spending, candidate quality, and the

prevailing political and issue mix,

effects

it is

activities to individual level responses

turnout

IS

one of the

richest legacies

two strands of research which
direct contact,

only to say that research linking specific
campaign

have been few.

Indeed, the literature on voter

of the social sciences. The following chapter traces

indirectly illuminate the relationship

of voter turnout and

research on voting behavior, and research relating to
political

The

campaigns.

of voter characteristics, electoral
systems, or

literature

on voting behavior, while

rich in explanatory

unanswered a number of questions surrounding voter turnout. The
campaigns, both that which studies

campaign

activities themselves, while addressing

voting behavior literature,

will

review the

been

literature

provided such a large

slight the

some of the paradoxes

study of actual campaign

on voting behavior and campaigns

literature

produced on the campaign

I

still

will

to

on

raised in the

activities.

First,

1

examine why there has

For a world

on voting behavior, there has been

activities

literature

and that which examines

any, study of direct contact and voter turnout.

little, if

Secondly,

political mobilization

power, leaves

little

that has

information

most closely associated with voter turnout.

review studies which have either examined general campaign effects on

voter behavior or have specifically analyzed direct contact.

17

Because there has been

imle work done

academic

in

the field of d.rec,

literature

campaigning. -

I

will also

The

eomaet and

,,s

effects

on voter turnout

review the "how-to" technical
literature on

dissemination of campaign technique
information

period of remarkable growth.
Internationally,

US

all

is

the

in

phases of

entering a

consultants give seminars

in

both the

emerging democracies of Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Republics
as well as the

more

established western

European

states.

At home, the

development of a new type of degree; the Master's

in

last

ten years have seen the

Campaign Management. Both

National Committees, most state parties,
private companies, PACs, and other
political
organizations,

all

hold campaign training seminars and
produce technical manuals on

everything from candidacy announcements to
late

Many

office closings.

of the hypotheses regarding the effectiveness of
direct contact can only

derived by a look

2.1

November campaign

at

current working assumptions in the field of campaign

now

be

management

Voting Behavior
Research looking

at direct

voter contact needs to draw upon different analytical

traditions as well as professional literature

on the

tactics

and strategy of voter contact as

actually practiced by campaigns and consultants. Because of the
importance of turnout

as a

measure of

civic health

and the ready

have produced an enormous

literature

availability

of survey data,

political scientists

on voting behavior and turnout making a

voter's

motivation, knowledge, and decision making process one of our most widely studied
political

two

phenomenon. There

are at least

strands of research.

The older of the

strands consists of a studies which assume that attitudes and resources precede

There has probably always been
authors

two main

first

campaign handbook was

a

a large store of stock "how-to" literature

1955 document on

Massachusetts Republican State Committee.

18

from campaigns. This

GET-OUT-THE-VOTE

produced by the

3

behavior

and

These studies have

political indicators

identified a

number of consistent

of voter turnout. Wealthy Americans
are more

than their poorer counterparts. The
elderly vote

educated

at

social, psychological,

higher rates than the uneducated.

at

likely to

vote

higher rates than the young, and the

Citizens with a strong sense of
political

efficacy participate at higher rates than
those with a reduced sense of political
effectiveness.

Studies have also found that those wtth
strong community links

participate at higher rates than the socially
mobile

persuasively that,

m addition to

social

also institutional constraints on voting.

least before recent reforms,

The

Finally,

many

studies have argued

and psychological predictors of turnout, there
are

The American system of voter

has been found to depress turnout by as

early studies on voting behavior often obscured

registration,

much

campaign

as

1

at

%""

effects.

Eventually, with the advent of more comprehensive data sets,
researchers started

looking

at

candidate effort and campaign

effects.

The campaign

literature itself started

with anecdotal presentations by consultants and journalists and slowly grew
to include
detailed study of the impact of campaign spending.

That empirical research began with

questions of campaign spending points to the importance of available data.

There are many excellent summaries of the
the issue sec Verba. Sidney and

Social Equality.

Norman

(New York: Harper and Row.

William N. McPhcc.
The American Voter.

Voting.

960.

literature

on voting behavior. For early statements of

H. Nie. Participation in American: Political

Democracy and

1972); Berclson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfcld,

and

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1961); Campbell, Miller and Stokes

For more recent treatments of the topic

sec, William Flanigan and Nancy
of the American Electorate, 8th ED (Washington, D.C. Congressional
Quarterly Press 1994); Ruy Teixeira. Why Americans Don't Vote.; Raymond Wolfmger and Steven J.

Zingalc.

1

Political Behavior

Roscnstonc.

IVho Votes? For a current summaiy' of the literature sec Jan Lcighley

Opportunities and Incentives:

A

Volume

199.5.

48,

Number

Powell,

1,

March

Bingham

Voting Behavior, 3rd

ED"

G.

"Attitudes,

Field Essay on Political Participation." Political Research Quarterly,

"American Voter Turnout

in

Comparative Perspective

Ed, Richard Nicmi and Herbert Weisberg

19

(CQ

Press,

in

"Controversies in

Washington D.C, 1993)

in

of data sources

in

_Ihe

guiding research by saying of
the

teofar as

this

because

nee

s,

Ne w American Voter Warren

book

is

%2

all

I

a reflection of the

of the

NES

Miller summarizes the
importance

NES

work of other

data have been

scholars

it

is

so

the public domain and
accessible
(The utilization of those resources)
by others has created a
sub-field of the discipline of
political science. Furthermore,
it has enriched
the work of colleagues in other
disciplines far beyond the limits
suggested
by the works cited in the notes
in

.

Miller's

quote

illustrates

two important

points.

the

First,

NES

data have provided a

touchstone for an enormous amount of study
on the decisions made by voters. Secondly,
the object and perspective of study

is at

The National Election Survey

is

will

come.

What

behavior research

below

all

they came

is

data

in

least partially

on

search of was voters.

with low turnout

American

in

other advanced democracies

certain facts.

available.

a field of dreams for researchers; collect

in

Participation in

it

and they

The overriding concern of voting

The US

elections.

consistently ranks

voter turnout. Without attempting to summarize

the broad and deep literature on voting behavior
exists

dependent on the data

American

it is

enough

that substantial

presidential and

ebbed and flowed since the turn of the century reaching a peak

agreement

mid-term elections have

after the civil war,

declining in the 1920s, rising again throughout the 1930's, 1940's and
1950's and finally

beginning the long, current decline after the 1960 election. Naturally, most scholars have

focused almost exclusively on the most recent period of turnout decline. Presidential year
turnout

tell

13% between

48.6% of the

1960-1988.

eligible electorate

Miller and Shanks.

The

In 1996, turnout reached an

voted— and the 1996

New American

Voter.

Page 6
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election

came

all

time low as only

after the

Motor Voter

Act. the most comprehensive
simphfication
the elimination of Jim

Crow

in

our complex system voter registration
since

laws.'**

Voting studies take the normative stance
civic health.

They subscribe

that turnout

an important measure of

is

to Schattschneider’s description
of participation and

conflict:

The outcome of every contest
audience becomes involved in

is
it.

determined by the extent to which the
That is, the outcome of all conflict is

determined by the scope of the contagion. The
number of people involved
m any conflict determines what happens, every change in the number
of
participants, every increase or reduction in the
number of
participants

affects the result.

The scope of our own
Campaigns and other

Every change

contests, as

in

the scope of conflict has a bias.’®

measured by voter turnout,is increasingly

political variables

were ignored

in early

influence of voter characteristics seemed so overwhelming.

campaigns, Edie Goldenberg and Michael Traugott could
exists

between the minimal

many
era

when most people had made up

8%

In 1984, while writing about

say,

"A

substantial difference

political consultants,

Goldenberg and Traugott consider the minimal campaign

early studies an accident of history.

"Only

research designs because the

significance that academic studies have attributed to campaigns

and the influence attributed to them by candidates,
the press.

of those interviewed

in

their

The SRC
minds

at least three

1940 actually switched

(New York:

Holt. Rinehart.

The Semi-Sovereign People:

and members of

effects

found by so

studies for example, took place in an

months before the

their votes

Rosenstone and Hansen. Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy

Schattsehneider, E.E.

restrained.

A

election

from one party

in

to the

America. Page 25

Realists View of Democracy in

America

Winston I960) pp 2 and 4-5

Goldenberg, Edie and Miehael Traugott. Campaigning for Congress (CQ Press, Washington DC.
1984)

p. 3
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other during the campaign."-'

may have had more

SRC

studies

to

showed

This strong relationship between
party and vote choice

do with communication than

partisanship.

A close

the potential for campaign and media
effects

when

reading of the

it

noted that

voters exposed to newspapers espousing political
views different from their own, were
three times

more

newspapers.^^

likely to switch their

vote as readers exposed to only

Although there are substantial areas of agreement on predictors
of turnout,

the consistency of the findings has

difficult to address.

made

Demographic and

the question of turnout decline more, not less,

political

change over the

suggest increasing, not decreasing voter participation. In the

have slowly been removed.

Still,

twenty years would

voter turnout has declined.

political variables.

A

effects

informal mobilization activities and

how

may seem

to focus

aggregate economic and

"...

elite

and

they determine the nature, timing, and

consequences of individual participation"
glance,

of a host of

recent survey of the field claims that "mobilization

factors simply cannot be ignored", and that research needs to study,

first

years our

Barriers to registration

second strand of research includes the mobilization

economic and

last

last thirty

population has become wealthier, older, and better educated.

A

like-minded

.^'*

on campaign

Although the

activities

it

literature

was

on mobilization,

at

actually concerned with

political conditions.

Goldcnbcrg and Traugolt. Campaigning for Congress Page

5

Goldcnbcrg and Traugolt. Campaigning for Congress. Page 7

For the classic discussion of this problem see Brody, Richard A.
Participation in America.” In

Anthony King,

cd.,

The

New American

“The Puzzle of Political

Political System.

(Washington,

D.C.: American Enterprise Institute 1978) pp. 287-324.

Lcighlcy.

"Attitudes, Opportunities

and Incentives:
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A

Field Essay on Political Participation."

1

A

clue to the voting paradox

is

be found not

in

turnout studies but

examination of what makes voters pick
one candidate over another.

in the

Much

of the early

research on voting behavior, including
studies conducted by the Survey
Research Center

(SRC),

identified party as the

most important factor influencing a

stood out even stronger against a background
of voter ignorance.
laid the

groundwork

for the

commonplace

that

Americans knew

voter's choice.

Early research also

little

about presidential

candidates and even less about congressional and
senatorial candidates.^^

knowledge of the

issues suggested that voters

psychological, and political cues.

made

its

predictive strength even in the

face of the decline of party identification in the
electorate.

predisposition, party identification

it is

is

Weak

decisions based on social,

Party has retained

classic study, Miller reprises the importance

Party

In a

new

addition of their

of party "As a long-term stable

not only a point of departure for electoral analysis;

the most important of several predisposition's that provide continuity
across

electoral epochs.

Once

party

was enthroned

as the variable of choice, subsequent studies slighted

the effects of campaigns on voter choice and electoral success or failure.

Michigan studies conducted throughout the
identification

and an increase

sixties

in split-ticket voting.

showed

a

University of

slight decline in partisan

Yet, despite an evident decline in

party importance, researchers did not focus on campaign effects, choosing instead to

investigate

economic and

political variables not subject to

campaign

activities.

The most

important of the variables affecting voter choice was incumbency while partisanship,

Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes. The American Voter

Miller and Shanks The

New American

Voter.

Page
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1

presidential popularity,

economic conditions,

political conditions,

between incumbents and challengers were
examined

and the differences

for their effects

on turnout. The

data sources for these studies were
generally aggregate national data or
survey
information.

Generally, aggregate studies which link
either national economic

conditions or presidential popularity

show

individual level panel or survey data.

a stronger effect

The

cue eventually led researchers to the more

original focus

specific question

voter mobilization. There has been a long and
decline

m

partisan voting portends a

until

1

on incumbency as a voting
of campaign effects on

unresolved debate as to whether a

still

weakening of

political parties or a

electoral role as voter attention shifts to a cue based

denying that

on turnout than revealed by

on incumbency.

994 incumbents were remarkably

safe.

change

There

90%

Well over

in their

is

no

could expect

to be elected in a typical cycle and, at least through the
sixties and seventies, they

seemed

to get reelected by

and that safety grows with

See Abraniovvitz, Alan

Michigan

Press. 1992);

Alan

1

more votes each

The longer one

service.

1.,

and

Jeffrey A.

Abrainowitz.

serves, the safer

U

"Elections to the

"Elections to the U.S. Senate."

Amercian Legislative System. (New York:
Divided Government:Competiton
1990);

Scribner's. 1994);

in U.S. IIou.se Elections,

safety

one becomes.

Senate Elections. (Ann Arbor. University' of

Segal.

Silbey ed.. Encyclopedia of the Aniercian Legi.dative System.

Hinckley and Edward Muir.

Incumbency enhances

election.

S.

House of Representatives."

(New York:

Scribner's.

In Joel H. Silbey, Ed.

Gary

C

Jacobson,

1946-1988.

For an excellent summary of both aggregate and individual

1994);

In Joel H.

Barbara

Encyclopedia of the

The Electoral Origins of

(Boulder,

CO: Westview

level responses see

Gaw

Press.

Jacobson.

The Politics of Congre.s.sional Elections, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper-Collins 1992).

Burnham, Walter Dean.

Critical Elections

and the

Main.spring.s

ofAmerican

Politics.

(New

York. Norton Press. 1970).

See Fiorina, Morris. "The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did

American Politcal Science Review 71

1971. pp 177-181;

Mayhew, David.

It."

Congre.ss: The Electoral

Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press 1974); Cover, Albert D. "One Good Term Deserv'es
Another: The Advantage of Incumbency

in

Congressional Elections." Amercan .Journal of Political

24

Explanations for incumbent safety
link the rise in

fall

incumbent safety to changes

in

into three categories.

First,

some

studies

incumbent resources and behavior.

Redistricting, congressional mail, free travel,
case work, local appearances, and

bureaucratic growth have

all

been cited as

internally generated

strength.

An

electorate.

This argument claims that voters

alternative explanation of incumbent success
looks at

prime voter cue

now

Albert Cover suggests that incumbency has gained at the
expense of

opposition party.

It is still

is at all

victory itself

number of defectors from the

In a study supporting Cover's thesis,

party has declined as a voting cue

incumbency

change within the

use incumbency rather than party as a

partisanship because incumbents attract an increasing

incumbent

sources of incumbent

in

Warren Kostroski shows

that

Senate Elections and has been replaced by

an open question as to whether a big victory margin for an

related to either future victory margins or even the certainty of

Winners of safe open

seats are often able to

keep

their seats safe but

winners of marginal open seats are not able to make the seat safer

in future elections.

Science 21 1974: 523-542

Alford, John and John Hibbing. "Increased Incumbency Advantage in the House." Journal of
Politics A3 1981.

pp 1042-61.

See for example Tufte, Edward. "The Relationship between Seats and Votes in Two-Party'
Systems." American Political Science Review 67 1973; pp 540-54; Mayhew. Congress: The Electoral

Connection, and Fiorina. "The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did

Cover. "One

Good Term

Deserv'es Another:

The Advantage of Incumbency

It."

in Congressional

Elections.

Kostroski, Warren. "Paiy' and Incumbency in Post

War

Senate Elections: Trends, Patterns, and

Models." American Political Science Review (December, 1973): 1213-1234
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At issue

in all

of this discussion of the

of incumbency to victory

relation

is

the logic that

asserts larger victory margins indicate
safer seats.
If

incumbents are winning by larger margins,
but are

still

not any safer,

it

indicates an increased volatility in the
electorate or changes introduced from
election to

election by the quality of the challenger or
incumbent and the type of campaign run by

the participants.

Such evidence points to

a

dynamic within the campaign

such dynamics include campaign spending and challenger

quality.

itself

Two

Explanations of

incumbent safety might also focus on an uneven contest
between a well known
incumbent and an unknown challenger. Incumbents

unknown opponents and people
studying incumbency

in light

fare well because they run against

vote for names they recognize.^^

Much

of challenger qualities emerged from

from American National Election Survey (ANES). This

series

new

of the research
data generated

of surveys was the

first

to include congressional district level questions and a district sample size
distribution
suitable for analysis.

analysis

from items

More

like

than just a change

incumbency and

the campaign, to items like the

effected by campaign activities.

name

in

party,

explanation, these studies change the

which are not under the

direct control

recognition of the challenger, which are

When

of

more

asked to rate Elouse candidates, most voters

See the original statement of the problem

in

David Mayhevv "Congressional Elections: The Case

of the Vanishing Marginals." Polity (Spring 1974b): 295-317. For other discussions see John Ferejohn.

"On

the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections" American Political Science Review

March

1977: pp 166-176.

See Gar>' Jacobson. "The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections." and A/onev
in

Congressional Elections’, Hinckley, Barbara. 1980. "House Re-Elections and Senate Defeats: The Role

of The Challenger". British Journal of Political Science 10 441-460;

Alan Abramovvitz. "A Comparison of Voting

for

U

S.

Mann and Wolfmger. "Who

Votes?"

Senator and Representative in the 1978 Election.
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emphasize personal

traits,

personal evaluations

favor incumbents

with incumbents especially
eftective

In cases

at the

with

little

at

engendering positive

or no information, personal
evaluations

expense of challengers and such
personal qualifications

influence voters independent of
party and incumbency.
plausible that a well financed challenger,
by increasing

This information makes

name

recognition, can influence

the election apart from the social and
political demographics of the
electorate.
quality of challengers then,

is

it

The

a factor in voter choice and the
closeness of a given

congressional race. Challenger quality

itself

has been measured

including past political experience, the
type of otTices held, and

in

a variety of ways

money

spent and

raised.^**

We

have come

full circle.

Explanations of voter turnout based solely on social,

psychological, and political information are incomplete
and do not explain

why

voter

turnout has declined over the past thirty years. Research
on voting choice has also
slighted the role ot campaigns but, in studying the
effects of incumbency,

evident that campaigns do play a role
See Richard Fcnno.

in

moving the

Home Style: House Members in

electorate.

Still,

it

becomes

when

Their Districts. (Boston:

Little,

Brown,

1978).

Ragsdale, Lynn.

Incumbent Popularity, Challenger

Legislative Studies Quarterly 6:

For studies looking

1

at past politieal e.xperience see

C.S. Senator and Representative.
in

American

Politics

Politics.

Invisibility,

and Congressional Voters."

980 201-18

Jeff Fishel,.

(New York: McKay

1

973.

);

Alan Abramowitz. "A Comparison of Voting

Party and Organization: Congressional (Challengers
Robert J Huckshorn and Robert C. Spencer. The

of Defeat. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press 1971); Jacobson "The Effects of
in Congressional Elections." Mann and Wolfmger. 1980. "Candidates and Parties

Campaign Sepnding

in Congressional Elections."

Rosenberg. Lisa Bohan,

For more sophisticated measures of challenger qualip' see Shawn

Patrick McCafferty, and Kevin Harris.

"The Image and the Vote: The Effect
of Candidate Persentation on Voter Preference." American Journal of Political Science 30: 1986.
pp.
108-27; Robert Biersak, Paul S. Herrnson, and Clyde Wilcox.
"Seeds for Success: Early Money in
.

.

Congressional ElecUons." Legislative Studies Quarterly 18 1993: 535-51; Jon R. Bond, Quy' Covington,
Richard Flcisher.
"Explaining Challenger Qualitv in Congressional Elections." Journal of Politics 47
1985:510-29.
.
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concentrating on the mere status of the
competitor or on the aggregate spending
involved, the actual effects of campaigns
are only implied.

2.2

Campaign

Effects

and Elections
some forms of participation have enjoyed

Paradoxically,

a sharp increase.

example, Kenneth Goldstein analyzed the growth
of grassroots lobbying

in

For

the office

of former Senator Hart, of Michigan. Senator Hart
received approximately 1795
constituent contacts per

grown

to 9870.

month

in

1959.

By

his retirement in

His successor. Senator Carl Levin, received
20,000

telegrams, 10,000

and 1000 faxes per month

calls,

givers of political contributions.

takes note of the increasing participation

of political

and credits the growth to

life

in 1992.^^

Frank Sorauf estimates that

13,000,000 and 15,000,000 Americans donated to

Goodwin

1975 that figure had

political

Americans are also great
in

1988 between

campaigns.'^ Kenneth

shown by Americans

elite direct

marketing.^’

how much

With fundraising,

it

is

observed that American scholars ask

three of the studies mentioned above; that of Goldstein on lobbying,

and Sorauf on money, the

Goldstein, Kcnnclh.

presented

common

element

is elite

facets

many

European

and why?" while a European observer might ask "Why give

interest groups,

many

in

In fact, in

categories, including political donations, Americans far outstrip their

counterparts.

5000

letters,

"Who

at alH".

uives

In

Goodwin on

recruitment.

"Seeding Ihe Grassroots: Mobilization and Contacting Congress."

all

elite

Sorauf

A paper

at the Midwest Political Science Assoication meeting, Palmer House, Chicago, April 6-9 1995.

Sorauf, Frank. Inside

Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities (New Haven. Yale

University

Press 1992) Page 36

Goodwin, Kenneth

R.

One

Politics.(C\vM\v<m\, N.J., Chatham

Billion Dollars

House 1988) Page

of Influence: The Direct Marketing of
1
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summarizes the
and

attitude by saying, "Although
contributors respond to inner motivations

political convictions, they

political Hind-raiser

respond more immediately to a specific
stimulus.""'

might summarize

A

of thinking by claiming that no one
gives

this line

unless asked.

Other studies have looked

at the links

between campaign action or spending

patterns and the vote. Broadcast advertising, for
example, as measured by a proportion

of total expenditures

is

a positive predictor of the candidate's final
vote."' In fact, the

news media, by focusing on campaign ads and

the horse race, convert ad messages into

horse race stories and the medium truly becomes the message.

media

effects presented researchers with

mixed

results,

with

""

Older studies on

some claiming

commercials lead to a more informed electorate and others showing
effect

on the

voter's views of candidate quality.

More

the

that ads

had no

recent studies, using techniques

derived from cognitive psychology have taken a broader and deeper view of influence

and have argued for a powerful mass media

Sorauf, Inside

effect."*^

Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities Page 36

Jacobson, Gary. "Strategic Politicians and The Dynamics of U.S. House Elections 1946-1986."
American Political Science RevieM’ 83 1989: 773-93; Goldenbcrg, Edie and Michael Traugott.
Campaigning for Congress. (Washington. D.C.: CQ Press 1984).

""

West. Darrell. Air IVars

(CQ

Press,

Washington

DC

1993.)

For the "Ad-Effects" view see Gina Garramore "Effects of Negative

Political Advertising",

Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media 29 1985 as well as West, Air Wars. For an early
statement of the "no effects" view see McClure, Robert and Thomas Patterson. 7he Unseeing Eye (New
York, Putnams, 1976.)

Iyengar, Shanto.

Is

Anyone Responsible? How

University of Chicago Press 1991); Graber, Doris.

D

C.

CQ

Television

Frames

Political Issues. (Chicago:

Mass Media and American

Press, 1993) 4th ed.
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Politics.

(Washington

Campaign spending bears

a

complex

controlling for party and incumbency.
electoral success

election result.

relation to electoral

Challenger spending

whereas incumbent spending had

strongly related to

Jacobson suggests that incumbent spending

more

is

largely reactive to

money.^**

possible that studies showing small campaign effects
are compatible with

campaign industry assumptions regarding the power of campaigns.
At
"small".

Even

in a

world of givens, any

might easily be enough for victory.
realm of givens

To

after

a slightly inverse relationship to the

challenger spending as incumbents in trouble spend

It is

is

outcome even

is

captured

in a

effort that

might

move 2%

This notion of political

quote from The

New

elites

to

issue

8%

is

the term

of the voters

operating within a

American Voter

qualify as a long-term influence a given characteristic

must both be
and have a continuing impact on other partisan attitudes or the

stable

vote.

In contrast, short-term forces in a given

campaign can be based on

temporary activation of stable predisposition's or some unique
forces (and therefore transient) aspect of the current campaign. Short-term
forces need not have an impact on other forces that help shape the vote.
either the

Most

political professionals, despite

some

self-serving posturing every four years,

understand that they can only change votes that

lie at

the margin of a complex series of

givens, including party, incumbency, economics, issues, and other ongoing political

contacts.

This same notion, of the campaign as an entity moving

Jacobson,

'***

There

is

Money

also an

in

of givens,

Congressional Elections.

argument over whether incumbents

raise

money because of the

strong challenger or to prevent the emergence of a strong challenger in the

Box-Steffensmeir,

in a field

"A Dynamic Analysis of the Role of War Chests

in

first

place.

Campaign

e.xistence of a

See Janet M.

Strategy,"

American

Journal of Political Science 40 (1996): 352-371 and Jonathan S. Krasno and Donald Philip Green,
"Preempting quality Challengers in House Elections" ./owma/ of Politics 50 (1988): 920-937

Miller and Shanks. The

New American

Voter,

pp. 8-9

30

is

emphasized by Gaiy Jacobson, when he claims,
"The
national issues depends in

them

m

local campaigns.”

good

part

on

how

electoral impact

effectively individual candidates
exploit

* Jacobson goes on

to say, “what matters to campaigns

not whether a majority of constituents care
about issues

whether an attentive public can be made to
whether an attentive public

upon the

care"."'

will notice issues

of even major

at

is

any particular time, but

In particular, the question

is

and become active, or inactive, based

candidate's issue positions.

Studies that look

emphasize campaign

in detail at

the workings of congressional campaigns also

effects within a realm of political

take shape in response to political

realities.

Some

and social givens.

studies have

relationship

between recognition and evaluation and found

recognition

is

Campaigns

examined the

that, for

incumbents,

name

a necessary but not sufficient explanation of incumbent strength
and that

the reputation of the incumbent matters as well.” In the

Abramowitz model, voter

evaluation of personal qualities, issue positions, constituent service and a diffuse image
variable

combine

Jacobson

to

Gar\'.

form an overall incumbent evaluation leading to voter choice.

The Politics of Congressional Elections. (New York: Harper Collins, 1992) p 7

Jacobson. The Politics of Congressional Elections

It

might be better said that "good" campaigns

do.

p.73

Good campaigns

target their resources.

Goldcnberg and Traugott {Campaigning for Congress, p 47) found that 28% of the campaigns under study
32% independents (swing), and fully 40% said they w'ere targeting all voters

targeted only supporters,

whether

for conversion or for

” Goldenberg and
Parties

GET-OUT-THE-VOTE.

Traugott.

Campaigning for Congress.

and Campaigns.
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Salmore and Salmore. Candidates,

Certainly the presentation of personal
qualities, issue positions, and
the "diffuse image
variable

are critical parts of any campaign.

Lynn Ragsdale adds the challenger

to the

popularity and challenger invisibility related^"
different evaluations

different effects of

model and

Ragsdale not only

"how

media advertising

vs.

The most ambitious attempts

at

is

tries to

between the challenger and the incumbent, she

incumbent

account for

also looks at the

personal campaign contact and finds

evidence that personal contact campaigning might be
more

turnout has been

asks,

some

effective.

measuring campaign effects on voter choice and

made by Goldenberg and

Traugott. Using a representative sample of

congressional races, they examined the effects of stated campaign
strategies and actual

campaign

activity

on a

statistically

derived measure of a normal vote. They use data

from campaign manager interviews, the
literature,

success.

ANES

survey,

FEC

reports,

campaign

and media content analysis to develop a model of campaign

The model

effect

on

electoral

evaluates relative electoral success as a function of relative

candidate recognition and relative candidate evaluation. They suggest that evaluation
in

is

turn a function of candidate status combined with the quantity and quality of media

coverage. Their research also suggests that elections are affected by the working of
the local press and campaign spending strategies.

multivariate test, the

first

The authors use

to determine the effect of media

and the second to measure the

effect

a

two stage

on recognition and evaluation

of recognition and evaluation on electoral success.

Abraniowitz, "A Comparison of Voting for U.S. Senator and Representative in 1978

They conclude:

Media content

demonstrably important to electoral
outcome
the quantity of attention by the
news media as well as
endorsements and greater resources to
purchase campaign controlled
advertising are of obvious benefit to
the favored contestant. Media

Advantages

is

in

coverage directly translates into recognition
and evaluation that
to favorable margins at the polls.^^

in

turn lead

Goldenberg and Traugott see campaigns as more than
simply competition

between two candidates.

Instead, they take the broader

of an ongoing process undertaken by

As

such, campaigns are about

showing may improve future

more

political professionals

more than winning and

contests where a large victory margin

view

may discourage

electoral prospects.

that

campaigns can be part

with long term career goals.

losing.

They

also are strategic

future competition or a surprise

Elections are less discrete events and

a part of a career process.

Research focusing on voter characteristics has provided a powerful model for
predicting an individual's likelihood of turning out to vote. However, that
same

research

left

unanswered

a

number of question regarding the

election to election and the overall decline in voter turnout.

variability

of turnout from

Studies which focused on

the effects of campaign variables such as incumbency, campaign finance, and challenger
quality have suggested that campaigns have effects as well.

literature, that

In addition, a third strand of

focused on the mobilization effects of political situations and actions

returns to the question of whether voters are mobilized to vote because of aggregate

political conditions or because, like the

person contributing to a campaign, they have

been asked. These mobilization

have received increasing attention.

” Goldenberg and

Traugott.

effects

Part of the

Campaigning for Congress, p 159

Leighley, Jan Attitudes, Opportunities, and Incentives:
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interest in mobilization effects stems

attitudes precede behavior and

generate future behavior.

from concern

that the

do not consider whether the

SES model assumes
activities

themselves

ignores the possibility that voting might be

It

that

may

more

productively viewed as a habit and policy concerns
directed toward the early

development of such

habits.

Participation enhances

including efficacy and sophistication.

powerful,

it

clearly

It is

is.

This

political attitudes

not to suggest that the

SES model

is

not

only to suggest that political variables need to be included

any model of turnout. The notion of a
variable such as the state of the

local,

is

numerous

political variable

economy

in

might be an aggregate national

or the presence of a presidential election; a

or state level variable such as the competitiveness of a race or the strength
of the

top of the ticket; or a specific campaign event such as direct voter contact

Although there

is

ample work on the aggregate

level effects,

efforts.^*'

less attention has

been

paid to the role campaign activities themselves have on voter turnout.

The few

studies that

campaigns can operate
information

is

do focus on the extent of campaign

at the

effects

that

margin of political and social givens. While campaign

not the sole source of voter evaluation,

it

is

a necessary and important

Conventional wisdom supports the notion of marginal effects as well and

component.

suggests that voter mobilization can increase voting rates by a modest

” Bennet.

show

Stephen.

2%-5%;

but

"Know-Nothings' Revisited: The Meaning of Political Ignorance Today."

Social Science Quarterly 69 1988: 476-490

For a brief summaiy’ of the

literature

and below see Richard G. Nienii and Herbert

on
F.

political variables

Weisberg.

and voting

at

the congressional level

"What Determines Congressional and

State-Level Voting?" In, Controversies in Voting Behavior, 3rd Edition (Washington D.C.:

1993) pp. 207-221
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Press

again,

percentages and effects that

may seem

small in the abstract

may make

the

difference between victory and defeat
on election day.
If there

have been few empirical studies on
campaigns

been even fewer
electoral results.

that isolate the effects of different

What work

concentrated on television.

but

when looking

Television

According to the

May

at

there have

campaign techniques on turnout and

has been done on individual campaign
activities has

form of modern campaigning, and
politics,

in general,

is

generally considered to be the most
important

certainly dominates presidential and
senatorial

American

politics as a

whole, mail usurps TV’s throne.

1997 issue of Campaigns and Elections:

Mail emerges as the top expenditure category. Over $3 Billion
dollars was
spent by political candidates and committees on direct mail
over
the last

four years. This covered everything from

management,

list

rental to database

labeling to postage, printing and processing to layout and

design, computerized targeting to creative copywriting

Despite

contact

in

its

widespread use there has been very

the literature on campaigns and elections.

campaign techniques had an impact on
direct mail, in

some circumstances, had

campaign spending often obscure the
spending

is

House

Fauchacu.x,

examination of direct

In 1992, Paul

Herrnson found

that

challenger’s vote share, and that

the greatest impact.^® Aggregate measures of

distribution of such resources.

divided into categories that include direct

campaign spending not encompassing

Ron

a

little

direct

When campaign

communication with voters,

communication, and non-campaign

Campaigns and Elections Magazine

Herrnson. Congressonial Elections.
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“

Answer

d) Direct

Mail” May, 1997 p 23

“

spending,

it

is

money

the

spent on communication which

is

most closely related to the

final vote,®'

Campaign
first

by

interest in the

the campaign.

among

activity

is

an important source of turnout
variation. Turnout varies

campaign, but secondly by voter
recruitment through the party or

Of those

recruitment mechanisms campaign
literature

most

effective

those predisposed to vote already.

Bingham Powell puzzles over
would

is

the political attitudes of most
Americans, which

predict high voter turnout, and the relatively

other countries.

The present
the

US

13% by

He blames low

low turnout

in

US

elections vis-a-vis

turnout at least partially on institutional
restraints;

analysis suggests that in comparative perspective,
turnout in

5% by political attitudes, but disadvantaged
the party system and institutional factors, and up
to 14% by the

is

advantaged about

registration laws.^^

Powell also includes under

his "institutional restraints" the object

paper: party voter turnout and recruitment efforts.
especially

among

citizens with

low

levels

He

a

in this

finds the lack of such programs,

of education and income, to be one of the

main reasons for turnout variance. Other authors have
of political mobilization does not do

of study

also concluded that our system

good job of covering those

at the

bottom of the

social order.

Ansolabehcre, Stephen, and Alan Gerber.

"The Mismeasure of Campaign Spending: Evidence
from the 1990 U.S. House Elections." Journal of Politics 56 1994: 1 106-18

Claussen. Aage. "Do Parties

Make

a Difference?" Journal

Powell, Bingani. "Turnout in Comparative Perspective."

of Politics. V. 48 1986 page 47

4 wer/coi?

Politcal Science Review. V.

80 1986. pp 17-44

Walker, Jack L.

Jr.

Three Modes of Political Mobilization. Paper presented

Science Association, 1984 p 33
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Political

John Blydenburg conducted a
controlled experiment on
door-to-door canvassing
and telephone
found

solicitation at the precinct
level

For analyttcal purposes.
Blydenburg

convenient to distinguish between
two possible types of voting
behavior

,t

effects, referred to in his study
as preference

By

and turnout

effects.

a

preference effect, we shall mean any
alteration in the individual's
candidate preference or more precisely,
in the conditional probability
that
he votes, he will vote for a given
candidate. By turnout effect, we
shall

mean any

alteration

m

the probability that he votes at

all ’

if

for anv

candidate.^^

Blydenburg found

significant persuasion effects but
not turnout effects, the exact

opposite of previous studies.
studies

He

suggests that this reversal

were about races heavily covered

in

the media

may be because

the other

where people had made up

their

minds and additional personal contact simply
encouraged turnout.

Another controlled experiment on personal campaigning
and the vote was
conducted

in Britain

by Bochtel and Denver.

underlying this study:

"Do

election

They

explicitly

asked the question

campaigns then merely serve to provide personal

psychic satisfaction or to increase ‘expressive solidarity’
amongst party activists?".

authors chose two
other

flat

became

flats in

one ward of Dundee, One

the location for the experiment.

flat

provided a control while the

The experimental

three campaign phases. First they received a personal canvass.

followed by a literature distribution and

“ Blydenburg, John "A

finally,

"An Analysis of the Effecth cness of Certain
Bochtel, John and

flat

went through

The canvass was

favorable voters were called, reminded

Controlled Experiment to Measure the effects of Personal Contact

Campaiging. Mid^’est Journal of Political Science.

Government

The

May

1971 365-381 Quote from Gerald H. Kramer,

Precinct Level

Campaiging

Activities"

Warren Denver. "The Impact of the Campaign on

Elections, British Journal

of Political Science 2 239-260 1971.
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the Results of Local

to vote, and offered a ride to
the polls.
calls

and a canvass were 10% more

The authors found

likely to

that those voters receiving

vote than those living

m the control

flat.

Boctel and Denver conclude
Scholars concerned with the problem
of non voting, for example, have
tended to discuss the phenomenon in
terms of social and demographic
variables, offering sociological types
of explanation. We would not quarrel
with this, but would suggest that the
effectiveness or otherwise of local
party activity is an additional factor
which should be
considered.

Daniel Katz and Samuel Eldersveld found
that strong party leadership at the
precinct level increased a presidential
candidate's vote by 5%.''

the differences were stronger for the minority
party. Their

Raymond Wolfmger who
The bald proposition
established.

They

also found that

work was supported by

stated as early as 1963,

that precinct

work can have an impact has been

A

comparison of the data in this paper with those presented
by
Katz and Eldersveld suggests that this impact will vary in
inverse ratio to
the salience of the communication to the voters. The
present research task
in this area to explore the effectiveness of
vigorous party activity in

conditions of varying public knowledge and interest

in different

types of

elections, with different types of voters.

Gerald Kramer likewise found that personal contact was effective
turnout but not effective

in influencing

or local office candidates. Surprisingly,

in increasing

voter preferences for presidential, congressional.

Kramer found repeated contacts

to be relatively

ineffective.^®

I

Bochtel and Denver, p 269

I

Katz, Daniel and Samel

J.

Eldersveld, "The Impact of Local Party Activity

Upon

the Electorate.

Public Opinion Quarterly 25 1961 pp 1-25
1

I

,

j

Wolfmger, Raymond, "The Influence of Precinct Work on Voting Behavior," Public Opinion
Quarterly, Fall 1963. p 398.

Kramer, Gerald H, "The Effects of Precinct Level Canvassing on Voter Behavior", Public
Opinion Quarterly, 34, 1971. pp 560-572
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In a

more

recent study,

Robert Hughes, using voter

concluded that the phone canvass
under study had

files

httle effect

for the analysis,

on the turnout

rate

of the

independents targeted by the
campaign. Simply getting
someone on the telephone

appeared to be positively correlated
with turnout. This

is

not so unusual as

sound. The chance of reaching
someone on the telephone

is

it

might

closely related to stability.

Variables that predict stability such
as age, income and community
involvement are also

W

related to voter turnout.^’

Adams and DJ Smith came

merely having a phone and answering
the canvass

The most

fluctuates

Taking another look

from campaign

attitudinal data

social

at

effects, is the

why

might predict increased turnout.^^

in elite

work of Stephen Rosenstone and Mark

voter participation

is

declining, and

why

it

% percent of the overall decline in voter turnout,

mobilization efforts account for the

rest.

This marriage of

and demographic predisposition's with targeted and
purposefijl

efforts helps to explain the decline in participation
as parties,

expend increasing energy on governmental lobbying

more

that

to campaign, they suggest that social,
demographic, and

can only account for 60

while fluctuations

same conclusion,

recent and most comprehensive
explication of mobilization literature,

and one that focuses on campaign

Hansen

call

to the

traditional voter turnout efforts.

efforts

elite

mobilization

PACs, and campaigns

and decreasing efforts on

Rosenstone and Hansen des cribe the constellation

Hughes, Robert, "Assessing the Effectiveness of a Phone Bank Voter ID and

GET-OUT-THE-VOTE Program
Stiid>’.

for Unaffiliatcd Voters for the

Voter Contact Journal 1991

Adams

W and DJ Smith,

1988 General Election:

An

E;vplorator>-

.

"Effects of Telephone Canvassing

on Turnout and Preference:

A

Field Experiment, Public Opinion Quarterly, Fall 1980
pp 389-395

Rosenstone and Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Denweraev
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in

America. Page 25

of factors affecting the who
and when of participation
with the phrase "the
poiittcal elites”

social

which

is

centrality

a very different descr.pt,
on of the pohtical process
than the

and psychological determinism
of earlier

studies.^'*

Direct mobilization by political
elites for the purpose
of increasing turnout
declining according to

Hansen and Rosenstone.

They argue

that

-Political

and social changes have dramatically
altered the mix of incentives
for
mobilization and

...

like these are part

active

m

and individual campaigns.

direct contact efforts.

becoming appellations

Soft

for scandal,

Get-Out-The-Vote and volunteer
parties have declined

state parties are

The

still

m

economic,

way

to polls and

to professional staff.”

and parcel of the move from party to
candidate centered

campaigns and much of the new technology
interest groups,

way

is

political

face to face canvassing in
neighborhoods has given

focus groups... Grass roots organization
has given

Changes

of

is

hired by professional lobbying firms,

Parties,

on the other hand, have remained

money and coordinated campaigns,

were

originally legal

efforts.

Although

it

despite

avenues for increasing party

has been persuasively argued that

importance for candidate recruitment and nomination,
local and

active in mobilizing the electorate.

Party communication efforts

recent rewrite of the

American Voter, called "The New American Voter" looks
to formative
generational political experiences as determinants of voter
behavior which adds an element of history, and
thus, through the back door, governmental statesmanship
and politics, as long term factors effecting
turnout levels.

Rosenstone and Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Deinocracv

For arguments looking
Difference.'’",

America pp 233-234

and mobilization see Paul Herrnson. "Do Parties Make

at parties

Journal of Politics 589-613

in

v.

and Robert Huckshorn. "Whither the Local

a

48 1986; and James Gibson, Cornelius Cotter, John Bibby
Parties?:

A

Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Analysis of the

oiVnriy OrgmiznWon", American Journal of Political Science,
29, 1985 pp 139-160. Perhaps
this distinction underlies the change in parties from organizations
which control jobs and, as a result, the
career patterns of dependent politicians to organizations which control, develop,
and distribute political

40

no, only increase the stock
of voter inforntation but also
act as a direct ntotivator
of

turnout.”

be active

Although
in

parties

may have

declined as shapers of policy,
they do appear to

voter mobilization.^*

Studies of political organizations
outside of the party structure
also document
the efficacy of elite mobilization.
Goldstein, for example argues
that, with
factors in his

model held constant,

elite

all

other

mobilization increased the probability
of

participation in a variety of political
programs by 33%.'^^

The

literature suggests that voters
participate

social, psychological,

and

political factors outside

campaign finance data made possible a closer

and choose based largely on

of the realm of campaign control.

analysis of specific campaigns,

As

more

studies began to raise questions about
the individual campaign effort within
the arena of
social

and

effect.

what

TV

political

Still,

givens and, as seen, these studies indicate
that campaigns do have an

these studies are limited in using data like
campaign spending to stand for

m reality is more specific

and radio, direct

technology.

campaign actions

like the

mail, rallies, literature drops, etc.

The move from

politics to technolog>'

production and presentation of

Barbara Hinckley comments

can certainly be seen as parellel

to the

change from

recruitment and nomination to mobilization.

Claussen Aage and Mary
Participation Level".

A

Ann

Kasofsk>',

paper presented

at the

"Dynamic Modelling of Campaign

Effects

1989 annual meeting of the American

on Voting

Political Science

Association. Atlanta.

The

classic statement

produced by the Committee on

on responsible

parties

Political Parties

is

"Toward

and published

September 1950.

Goldstein, Seeding the Grassroots.
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in

a

More Responsible Two

American

Party System"

Political Science

Review

that “(r)esearch designs

have not yet linked the campaign
stimulus with the voter

response”.

Goldenberg and Traugott summarize the
problem:
has been

It

difficult, however to collect
contextual data systematically.
one thing for the press to speculate or
campaigns to assert

It is

that this or that

issue or strategy or contribution

made

a difference.

Maybe

they are riaht

and maybe they are wrong it is quite
another problem- and a much more
difficult one - to measure campaign
emphasis or media coverage or a
pattern of endorsements.

The

studies of direct contact covered in this
chapter have

left

a

number of

questions unanswered, or have given conflicting
answers to the same questions.

Although the studies have consistently found some
small
they for elections or lobbying efforts, there

of the

effect.

effective and

There

is

from contact

on what types of voters.

Mobilization literature

be

no agreement as to the strength or scope

in

No

at

one has studied many contacts are needed

what types of contacts go

to different voting

general has placed campaign activities back into the

forefront of analysis but the accumulation of campaign specific data

One reason

efforts,

no agreement or analysis on what types of communication
are

nor has anyone systematically looked
cohorts.

is

effect

for the lack of data

on these questions

such detailed information using surveys, the most

is

is difficult.

the difficulty of collecting

common method

of studying

campaigns. The following study explores campaign effects by studying the direct
contact efforts of four campaigns but instead of using survey information the data set
will

be created using

Hinckley, Barbara,

DC

files

of registered voters as a base and adding campaign contact

"Congressional Elections" (Congressional Quarterly Press, Washington,

1981) p 138

Goldenberg and Traugott, Campaigning for Congress p

42

4.

information, gathered from interviews,
contact reviews, and campaign
finance reporting,
to that base.

Voter

files

measurement of their
campaigns

is

allow the detailed tracking of
individual voters and an accurate

actual participation.

The most

developing a research design which

demographic background

to

importantly, using a voter

aspect of studying

efficiently links a voter's

behavior and

campaign contacts. By allowing an exact
one-to-one

matching between a voter record and
information already on the

difficult

file

file

a

campaign contact voter

files

allow the use of the

such as age, gender, party, and past voter
histoiy.
allows coding each phone

call

More

and mail piece to the

correct voter group and avoids survey and panel
methods which rely on the voter's

memory of campaign communications.
comparison of voter groups within

campaign contact and those

This in-depth campaign view allows for the

a single

campaign between those receiving a

in similar political

and demographic groups who, for a

variety of reasons, did not receive a campaign contact.

testing

Using voter

files

allows the

of a number of theories on turnout as well as an opportunity to cover a

campaign’s direct contact

effort in great detail.
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CHAPTER

3

CONTACTING VOTERS
Any

nnan

who

attains a high place

among you

downfall from the moment; for any
printed
villain pens
appeals at once to your

.

may

distrust,

date h,s

any notorious

that

lie

and

is

believed

Charles Dickens, American
Notes, 1842

To judge from
Dickens to

heart.

casual conversation or

Negative campaigning

and citizens often deciy the
negative as

there?

The

we seem

"state

to think they are^

election literature

perspectives on campaigns.

with

its

voters.

of our

the top of many campaign finance
reforms

dirty campaigns".

What

summarized

in

second perspective takes

as

the previous chapter offers a variety
of

social,

elite

Are campaigns

types of campaign communications are

One branch of the

emphasis on the psychological,

A

is at

news coverage Americans have taken

literature focuses

on voting behavior

and demographic characteristics of

action as the unit of analysis and studies

candidate recruitment, media placement, campaign finance,
campaign behavior, and
mobilization efforts.

Literature

on voting behavior, by concentrating on voter

characteristics, often slights the effects

electoral context often verify that

evidence suggests.

from

Still,

fleeting enterprises

of campaigns, while studies looking

at

the

campaigns may be as important as the anecdotal

campaign studies labor under the

difficulty

of assembling data

and assigning causal relations to the data that can be salvaged.

This chapter concentrates on the idea of direct contact as currently used by
political professionals.

What

is

direct voter contacf^

campaigns use voter contact and when‘s

How

Why

is it

worthy of study? What

are direct contact efforts implemented in

44

.he political environment^

The answers

to these questions are
tnterest.ng in and of

themselves, but they also open
up a rich world of data sources
voters

-

which can be used

-

tiles

of registered

to track voter part.cipation
at the individual level

and

electoral results at the precinct
level.

The

analysis of direct contact will
proceed in five parts.

extended discussion of the
political professionals

activity

of direct contact as

it

be an

understood and defined by

is

This discussion will be used to
develop a

direct contact efforts for study
and analysis.

First, there will

way of categorizing

This extended effort

at definition will

comprise the second part of this chapter.
Third, using a database of campaign
expenditures, combined with census
information,
direct contact and under

this

chapter looks

campaigns.

The

at the

we

will

take a brief look at

what circumstances such use takes
construction and content of

final section will pull

files

place.

The

who

uses

fourth part of

of registered voters as used by

together the previous four sections in a

discussion of case study selection.

3.1

Direct Contact

As understood by campaign

professionals, "direct voter contact" refers to that

portion of the campaign using techniques that reach out
to individual voters.

seem

at first that all

campaign

activities

on the way to work, but the commercial
Because

it

is

may

reach out to individual voters but they do not.

Television and radio are experienced by an individual voter

individual.

It

is

at

home, or maybe

in the car

targeted at a demographic group, not an

targeted at a group and then broadcast over the airways

certain that people not in the target audience will receive the message.

often contrasted with "broadcasting" and

is

Direct contact

even sometimes referred to as
45

it is

is

"narrowcasting" by consultants.
Direct contact

exactly that.

is

contact directly to an individual,
not a group. That individual

It is

,s

part

the del, very of a

of a target group,

but the message goes to
particular individuals with
specific demographic or
political
characteristics.

It is

the individual nature of the
message delivery that

distinguishing feature of direct
contact and
distinctive strengths

It

it

is

is

the

from that distinguishing feature
that the

and weaknesses of direct contact
flow.

might also be useful here to

revisit the division alluded to
in the

previous

chapter between efforts designed to
persuade voters and efforts made to
turnout voters.

This

IS

the

same

distinction as the "preference effect"
for candidate preference and
the

turnout effect" regarding the alteration
of the probability that an individual will
vote
all,

for any candidate.**^ Although direct
contact encompasses both persuasion and

turnout, the

analysis.

two

are not only different in practice, they
require a different

In the following study the

two

voters after the election

in

it

is

only necessary to look at a tape of

question to ascertain participation

the voter's actual candidate choice

is

not so easily discerned.

in

the previous election but

Most campaign

use surveys to measure voter behavior and surveys have
a clear advantage
flexibility

method of

are analyzed separately because of the
different

nature of the dependent variable. In turnout

and

at

of the data collected, but voter

files

studies

in the

amount

record actual participation and avoid

the over-reporting of participation by sun^ey respondents.

Turnout and persuasion have even spawned
efforts rely heavily

on the mail and are managed by

different industries.

Persuasion

direct mail consultants or the

occasional general consultant. Turnout efforts, also referred to as Get-Out-The-Vote
Blydenburg, "A Controlled Experiment to Measure the Effeets of Personal Contact

Campaigning"
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(GOTV),

are usually phone or
door-to-door efforts.

The world of turnout

is

more

diverse than the persuasion universe
as campaign volunteers, party
workers,
professional phone banks, and field
consultants

Turnout

efforts tend to include

all

more volunteers than persuasion

always possible for a campaign to use
volunteers
just as

It

common

IS

tor professional

persuasion telephone

enough

to

in practice

make

is little, if

is, it

campaign

GOTV calls.

There are

designed to effect turnout but the

also important to distinguish direct voter
contact

is

important

from fundraising.

any, discussion of direct contact efforts in
academic literature, and,

concentrates on direct mail flmdraising. Direct mail
fundraising
activity

and one

that has everything to

fundraising and persuasion mail persists even

in

do with money and very

to direct mail but only talks about the

fundraising, not persuasion.

The

list

Still,

works

respected as Larry Sabato's Political Consultants.

as

a

where
a distinct

little

to

do

comprehensive and well

Sabato has an entire chapter devoted

segmentation and production involved

in

political industry reflects the distinction as firms

San Francisco/D. C. based Campaign Performance Group

Of late

is

There

the confusion of direct mail

specialize in either fundraising or political direct mail, but seldom both.**^

the

is

and deliver, of mail

and for purposes of analysis

with the immediate turnout or persuasion of voters.

like the

it

for emphasis.

It IS

there

phone centers

tasks.

direct contact but

for the production

calls just as there are mailings

between the two, both

distinction

perform the necessai, technical

will

A

company

do only voter

few firms ha\ e combined. The fundraising firm Malchow and Associates merged with

November Group,

a persusion mail firm and the ftmdraisihg firm

Norman Communication merged

with David Welch and Associates, a Republican persuasion company. In both cases the former firm is
devoted to fundraising and the latter to persuasion direct mail and political communication. They are
treated as very different worlds because they arc.
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persuasion mail while a firm like
the Boston based,

SCM

Associates produces

fundraising mail.

Fundraisers contact those deemed
likely to donate money.
There

unspoken assumption

that the

people receiving tlindraising mail

vote for the candidate sending out
the

expended to acquire

are

smaller, the targeting

lists

more

file

is

In fundraising,

and the costs per piece greater

generally targeted at undecided voters.

undecided and

will, at a

an almost

minimum,

Even when prospecting, enormous

mail.

of “likely” supporters.

intense,

is

The message emphasizes

designed for immediate, emotional appeal.

the

lists

efforts

are

Persuasion mail

issues

is

of import to the

Persuasion mail uses voter

targeting to reach larger universes at a lower
per piece cost than fundraising mail,
All

campaign communication involves

message dissemination.

A campaign’s polling

aged 45-55 are a swing voting universe.

message construction, and

targeting,

for example,

A campaign

”

may suggest

that

women

using television will produce an ad

appealing to the target universe and then purchase
commercial time

in television slots

which, according to a number of possible measures, attract
large numbers of viewers

who

are

women, aged

The

45-55.

direct mail equivalent

is

the creation of a mail piece with a

design appropriate for the targeted voters.

audience of women making use of a

and

final

dissemination.

It is in

list

The piece

is

message and a

mailed directly to the target

of registered voters for the selection of the

list

the dissemination phase that direct voter contact differs

most

significantly

when

using electronic media, the message

from television and

radio.

No

will

matter

go out

See Sabato, The Rise of Political Consultants.
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how

sophisticated the targeting

to a broad spectrum

of voters.

Even commercials
still

m

mn

on specialized cable channels,
while aimed

reach voters beyond the target
aud.ence. They

the original target or they

ads must convey

its

may

reach voters not

may

in

at particular

groups,

reach demographic groups
not

the district.

Such broad spectrum

message without offense or
inconsistency.

Unlike electronic media, a piece
of direct mail goes to an
individual household.
If

a message

is

to be directed at

women, age 45-55. then

be for that audience, and barring
error, no other

segmentation of the audience and a more
persuasive impact of television

finely

the labels produced will only

Direct mail allows for a finer

tuned message but lacks the
immediate

also easier to ignore.

It is

Television commercials are

hard to escape because they intrude
into a passive, quotidian experience.
Direct contact
mail requires

Phone

calls

consumer

effort

and acquiescence. Mail has to be opened
and then read

must be answered and then

keep a trash can next to the mailbox
immediately hang up on callers
handling by consumers

is

in

tolerated.

my

Much

my

neighbor's dismay,

front yard for rapid “sorting” and

who mispronounce my

far different

to

last

I

1

name. Such message

from the passive viewing of a

television

commercial.

When
with the

decreased persuasive power and more uncertain delivery

ability to

more

message presentation

is

finely target an audience, a

combined

push for more and more dramatic

The voter must be captured immediately by the

inevitable.

message and the most important information conveyed
Furthermore, because the message

is

is

in

the most dramatic fashion.

not as widely seen as a television ad a campaign

might use a more divisive theme because of reduced public
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scrutiny.

Campaign communications

are part of an overall
electoral system.

In this

system

voter habits and expectations
combine with current media and
computer technology to

determine the mix of campaign
communication methods and messages.
this

One

part

of

system, targeting, has always been
a part of political campaigns, but
has become

increasingly sophisticated.

coalitions that,

m

Targeting programs work to divide the
electorate into

a standard two-party contest, will
equal

on any given election day.

It is

50%

plus one of those voting

the heavily targeted nature of
modern campaigns which

bridges the gap between the importance
attached to campaign technology by
practitioners and the academic focus on social,
political, and psychological givens

practitioner

knows

that a technique

swaying

one but an aggregate study of campaign

2% to 4%

effects will

of the electorate

is

A

an invaluable

miss small changes that are

concentrated within specific voter groups.

The importance

ot dividing the electorate into micro-groups

distinguishing features of modern campaigns.

It is

is

one of the

both a cause and effect of a volatile

electorate, candidate centered campaigns, and a voter base

accustomed to sophisticated

communication technology. As noted above, some form of targeting has always
been
important.

In the early 20th century party organizations targeted their

Partisan targeting involved building

preexisting canvass

lists

Campaigns then moved

lists

own

partisans.

of supporters through the compilation of

or the creation ot new, candidate and campaign specific

the identified supporters to the polls with an endlessly

lists.

full

bag

of method including simple door knocking and extending to tavern clearing and the
paying ot "social dregs", as one turn of the century progressive pamphlet described a

New York

Democratic

GOTV effort.
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Campaign
provides

all

targeting of e.ther individual
voters or of specific
demographic groups

campaign communications with

campaign communication

direct contact efforts arise

campaign. Research discovers
well as what messages

move

how

framework.

Like other forms of

from the research phase of a

specific voters feel about issues

specific blocks

question: Vv^hat voters are undecided
and
include:

a Similar

and personalities as

of voters. Research looks to
answer the

how

"What types of messages might move

might

we sway themV

voters'^"

and

"How

Related questions

should these

messages be presented^" Campaign messages
are often organized around

theme but

increasingly, as the public

becomes accustomed

of advertisement, the single strand of a theme
might be
of diverse messages. Regardless of how

it is

begin with a target group and a message.
the

make up of the

many
is

target group

make up

in

pick out from a host

The content of the campaign message and

form the strategy of the campaign. Although there
are
is

said,

the bulk of critical campaign decisions.

development used

difficult to

sophisticated forms

presented, campaign communications

other elements that go into a strategy, what

said

more

to

a central

how

it

is said,

and to

whom

it

Targeting and message

campaigns has become so sophisticated

that

one consultant

reported the use of studies to ascertain the impact of various
colors on the voter

perception of direct mail.

having

first

No good

defined a message.

number of candidates but

it is

campaign delivers a voter communication without

The exact content of the message can be

common

to divide such efforts into negative attacks,

positive communications, and issue pieces.**^

definitions for these terms and

as varied as the

There are no generally agreed upon

one campaign's positive advertisement

See Herrnson, Campaigning for Congress or

Shea, D,

Campaign

and Art of Political Campaign Management. (Westport CT, Praeger
51

is

another

Craft: The Strategies, Tactics,

Press, 1996)

campaign's scurnlous attack.
Negative attacks look to shine
an unflattering hght on
one's opponent or

oflfer

vantage of one

an enhghtening compar.son
between the two candidates to the

s rival.

Negative campaigns attack an
opponent on the basis of a

personal or professional issue not

Despite

reputation, not

Its

Bo ok of Camp aign

Ftiqiiette,

in

synch with the

all

district.

negative communication

Professor William

is

"dirty".

In

Mayer of Northeastern

The

Little

University

is

quoted as saying

We

need to find out about the candidate's
strengths, it ,s true, but we also
their weaknesses: the abilities
and virtues they don't
ave, the mistakes they have made,
the problems

need to learn about
the issues they
policies they

they haven't dealt with
prefer not to talk about, the bad or
unrealistic

would

have proposed.

The opposite of the negative communication

is

the positive one.

Like negative

communications, positive communications have a
personal emphasis that
directly related to public policy.

A positive image

experience, history, and accomplishments.**^
identification

which

will

and

it

will invariably

also

positive piece might be for

Many

consultants

m

a particular district.

communicate with voters about

make

They then categorize

their

it

issues.

Issue communications

Negative, positive.

a point of honor to distinguish between an attack ad

work

name

describe the candidate in positive, memorable terms,

present a candidate's stand on substantive public policy questions.

piece.

not always

message emphasizes personal

A typical

have a strong resonance with the voters

Campaigns

is

and a comparison

as "comparative".

Herrnson, Campaigning for Congress

****

DC

Hess, Stephen, The Little

Book of Campaign

Etiquette, Brookings Institute Press

1998) page 5

Herrnson, Campaigning for Congress

52

(Washington

and ,ssue pieces have a great
deal of overlap and the
conceptual
useflil,

ought not be carried too

far.

.The Little

following example of an ambiguous
ad

1NI2CUI1

.

uoesn

i

neiieve

It is

we

distinction, while

Bonk of ramnaivn

uses the

taken from the 1972 Nixon Cam
Campaign

should play games with our national

security.

In thts television

also a useful

advertisement what might be defined as
an attack on

summary of his

Nixon was acute on

military plans

status.

contrast between

is

McGovern and

issues of national defense.®'

The mix of campaign messages
research and the

The

McGovern

is

two most important

determined by

political variables are the candidate's party

Status implies whether or not a candidate

contestant tor an open seat.

political variables as well as

is

and

an incumbent, a challenger, or a

These two items, party and incumbency, are the most

important strategic dimensions of campaign planning and
the two most important voter
information shortcuts.®^

communication

It is

reasonable to assume then that the source of a campaign

raises interesting questions about that communication's
content

effectiveness. Current assumptions are that candidates focus

on

their records

and

and that

voters evaluate candidates based on that record. Candidates are more successful

if

emphasize issues which are viewed favorably by voters and for which they have an
90

91

Hess, The Little

Book of Campaign

Etiquette,

For the study's working definition of negative,

For a suniinarv' on

\

pp 4-5

positive,

oter inforniation sliort cuts see

(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996).
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and issue see Appendix

1.

Samuel Popkin, The Reasoning

Coten.

they

-

es.abl,shed record.

This would ind.cate ,ha,
,„cunrbe„,s. often the only
one

race with a record of any
sort, would emphasize
their background.

candidates

may

Candidates
party.’'

In

in

may

the

Likewise,

often exaggerate their
accomplishments and voters,

discount such claims

,n

knowing

this,

may

the absence of experience or
use other voting cues altogether.
also emphasize issues

which are already

1994 the "Contract with America”
provided a ready

Republican candidates. Republicans are
associated with issues

«

identified with their

identification for

like

crime and taxes

while Democrats are often seen as
more capable of handling education and
social
security.

the race.

The content and

As

the race

quantity of issues

becomes

is

also affected by the competitiveness
of

closer the messages

become more

negative.”'

Noncompetitive races are characterized by a comparable
lack of campaign information

Sellers, Patrick,

“Strategy and Background in Congressional
Campaigns. American Political

Science Review Vol. 92, No.

1,

March

1998..

For a discussion of how candidates and voters act
Ferejohn. Ed. Information

ami the Electoral Process

IL, University of Illinois Press, 1994);

in a principle-agent relationship see

John

Information and Democratic Processes^ (Urbana
For voter discounting see Melvin J Hinich and Michael
C.
in

A Spatial Theory' of Ideology." Journal of Theoretical Politics,
4-31; Shanto Iyengar, Nicholas A. Valentino, Stephen Ansolabehere,
and
Munger,

Woman: Gender Stcreoty-ping in the Politcal Campaigns."
Norris. (New York: O.xford University Press. 1992)
a

” Ansolabehere,

In

Number

Adam

F.

December 1992. pp
Simon. "Running as

4,

Women, Media, and Politics, Ed. Pippa

Stephen, and Shanto Iyengar. "Riding the

Wave and Claiming Ownership over
and News Coverage in Campaigns." Public Opinion Quarterly
58(2), 1994. 335-57; John Petroeik, "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980
Case
Study." American Journal of Political Science AO, August, 1996: 825-50
Issues:

The

Joint Effects of Advertising

Sec Herrnson, Campaigning for Congress.

The

”

notion of messages varying by competitiveness can be found in Stergios Skaperdas and

Bernard Grofman, "Modeling Negative Campaigning." American Political Science Review 89 March
1995: 49-61
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Incumbents are more

I.kely ,o

send positive messages
h.ghltghttng their background

while challengers are more likely
to attack the incumbent.’*

Thus, diflferences

in

Republican and Democratic
campaigns, along with even

greater distinctions between
incumbent and challenger races,

important to the study of any campaign
communication.

make both

Does

the candidate affect the type or
effect of direct contact effort?

incumbent advantage extend to the

The campaign message, and
strategic

framework

for

campaign

Some

the party or status of

Does

the notion of

direct contact arena?

the source of that message, form
part of the

direct contact.

In addition to strategic

considerations there are also tactical choices
involved
efforts.

differences

tactical choices involve allocation

in all

among

campaign communication

different

mediums such

as the

choice of doing television or direct contact.
Other tactical choices include choosing

between

different

no research

into the allocation choices

and door-to-door

Why

one

is

methods of communication within the same medium.
There

efforts are the only

among

methods

of direct contact.

varieties

is little

or

Mail, phone,

for delivering a direct contact effort.

used instead of another often depends on candidate and
consultant

preference along with the purpose of the direct contact.
Direct contact has three possible goals. First,
voters.

Secondly,

identify

how

of voter

identification, reflects the division

it

it

might be used to persuade

might be used to urge voters to the

polls.

Finally,

it is

often used to

voters feel about a candidate or an issue. This division, with the addition

used by Blydenburg between preference and

Herrnson. Campaigning for Congress and Sellers, "Strategy and Background in Congressional

Campaigns.”
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turnout effects of direct contact^
generally defined as voters

who

«
are

Campaigns

target

members of the

some mix of base

voters,

candidate's party, and persuadable

voters.

Campaign

strategy

is still

more an

than a science.

art

Still,

research that has

focused on the different choices made
by incumbents, challengers, open
seat candidates;
Republicans and Democrats; and those

in

competitive or noncompetitive seats
have

suggested that the status of the race dictates
the mix of direct contact

The

efforts,

preceding discussion has divided direct
contact into a number of mutually
exclusive
categories.

These categories, and the question they
address, are summarized

in table

3,1,

Table
Coding

Question

Source

Where

Type

Categories of Direct Contact

3.1:

did the contact

How was

come from?

What was the purpose

Message

What type

Who

of

Mail

Phone

Persuasion

GOTV

Positive

Negative

of the contact?

message was disseminated?

uses voter contact and

The only way
created

Challenger

the contact disseminated?

Purpose

3.2

Incumbent

in section 3,

1

to

is

effects

examine a race

closely, or set

possible to examine the questions of how

Blydenburg,

“A

Door

Issue

of direct contact using the categories

of each individual contact. However, before going
it is

Dem.

why?

examine the
to

Rep.

much

of races, and follow the

effects

into detail about the coding process

voter contact

is

used vis a vis other

Controlled Experiment to Measure the Effects of Personal Contact

Campaigning,”

See Goldenbcrg and Traugott. Campaigning for Congress', Herrnson, Congressional Elections;
Shea,

Campaign

Craft: The Strategies, Tactics,

and Art of Political Campaign Management.
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commun, cation
manner,

why

techniques;

direct contact

who
is

uses direct contact; and,

used.

The answers

at least in a

preliminai^

to such questions will assist
in p.cktng

case studies where the entire
range of categories can be
examined.

Congressional candidates consider
television the most important
advertising

medium and

district

population density

is

the key variable in resource
allocation.

Urban

candidates tend to rate direct mail and
canvass activities more highly than
rural
candidates, which

of television

makes up a

in

may

reflect the density

urban areas.

significant

Despite the dominance of television, direct
contact

budgetary item

In an article written for

direct mail consultant

direct mail

and

its

is its

and concentration of voters and the
high cost

,

C_am paigns and Elections Magazine

working for Lukens Associates, emphasizes

ability to

Katherine Cook, a
that the strength

reach individual voters with a specific message.'®^

associated benefits are at the heart of direct contact’s
appeal.

finer targeting, consultants also consider the
cost

communication.

When you

still

think of politics

of direct mail

you think of the

possibly an exciting congressional or senatorial race.

vs.

of

Targeting

In addition to the

other forms of

presidential election or

Seldom do

city council,

county

commissioner, state representative, or state senator contests occur to even
the most
politically involved citizen.

range.

Even though

E lections

Even congressional races

television dominates

fall

out of the populace's attention

well-known races

a recent

Campaign and

issue even suggested that direct mail might be the largest recipient of political

See Herrnson. Congressional Elections, pp. 181-199

Cook. Katy,

"Mr. Smith Stays in Washington" Campaigns
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and Elections Magazine, May, 1997

money

in the

nation

if

one takes

into account

Mail and other d.rect contact
efforts are

still

federal, state, county,

integral parts

and

local races,'"’

of the overall effon but most

resources are focused on television.
Direct contact

,s

not as public as television
nor

is it

as easy to track from outside

of the campaign. Television money
flows to consultants and
contact expenditures can be spread
out
mail shops,

list

analyzed

all

among phone companies,

vendors, and the post office.

figures for direct contact

is

The Morris data

persuasion mail from

One

author

Dwight Morris. Morris and

of the campaign expenditures

1992, and 1994.'“

who

consultants, printers,

has collected

his various partners

for every congressional race

number of advantages.

offers a

GOTV efforts.

TV stations while direct

some
have

from 1990,

First,

it

separates

This allows for comparison between the
two

conceptually distinct categories. Second,
Morris keeps persuasion mail separate from
flindraising expenses.

Finally,

Morris collects the data for each candidate, not
simply

each race, and provides a comparative basis for
statements about the expenditures of
Republicans, Democrats, incumbents and challengers '”
year, in this case 1994,

is

relevant

1

the Morris data for one

combined with census data for median family income.

Faiicheaux. Ron. "Direct Mail"

The book

When

for 1994 has not

994 data by congressional

Campaigns and Elections Magazine, May 1997,
p

been published. However, Morris did provide

15

this author

with

district.

Unfortnately, the data reporting period for the Morris data includes a large amount
of

organizational maintenance expenditures leading to an a distinction between incumbents

spending

is

spread out over two years, and challengers

who

confine their spending to the election cycle.

For the purposes of this analysis the comparison of direct mail and
the percentage figures for spending on mail and

- whose

direct

GOTV still

remains valid even

GOTV may be low for incumbent campaigns.
58

if

percentage

rural,

percentage over 65, and percentage

begins to emerge on the use
of direct contacts

One

diffieulty that

GOTV, Campaign
expenditures and

IS

in

money

in

campaigns.

Morris faced was with the
reporting of expenditures for

the

GOTV category -

He

often using volunteers and
in-house

conducted with Morris he said the assumption

measuring

lists

-

i,

eventually placed such expenditures
in an "other” category.

the “other” category

difficulty in

college degree, a picture

finance reports often fad to
provide enough detail to allocate

especially difficult.

In an interview

in

wuh

was

spent on

GOTV is that

it

is

is

that the majority

some type of GOTV

the one area

where

effort.'®^

parties

of

A fijrther

and independent

groups, especially labor, spend an enormous
amount of time and money. Often, the

campaign

will rely solely

Education (COPE), the
political

the

on the party’s

political

GOTV effort.

The Committee on

arm of the AFL-CIO, spends

budget on turning out registered union members.

On

a

good

Political

part of

its

the Republican side both

NRA and the Christian Coalition often work diligently to turnout members.

GOTV efforts are

Smaller

run by issue groups, local unions, and professional
associations. In

1996, for example, one voter

file

GOTV efforts with the Hawaii

firm.

Voter Contact Services (VCS) worked on

Service Employees local, the Sierra Club, People for the

American Way, and the American Medical Association. Because of the data
problem
and the amount of resources dedicated to

GOTV and

other phone efforts by entities

other than the campaign, campaign spending alone probably understates the
amount of

money going

into turnout efforts.

Direct contact expenditures can

still

be placed

in

context even with the limitations of the data. In 1994 campaigns spent a grand total of

The

interv

iew was conducted by the author in July of 1997
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at

Morris' Virginia office.

7

$ 302 , 250,996 dollars.

Of that,

$ 51 728,222
,

$ 32 326,643

(

,

28 %.

«/„)

1

Direct mail

contact mail being

saw

a range of $ 573,300 and

12%

GOTV of $ 662

GOTV and

994 Morris data

is

direct mail

preliminary

it

,

700

mean percentage

but the range being from 0 to

summarizes spending variations for
1

spent on

the variation of spending
for direct contact

also reflected in percentage
expenditures with the

Because the

was

12 %) went to direct mail
for a combined direct
contact percentage of

As might be expected

wide.

(

and

was

The

.

variations are

spent on direct

97%. The following

GOTV

quite

table

by type of race for 1994

was not coded by type of race.

I

used

the final general election percentage,
and a candidate code supplied by Morris,
to create

categories for unopposed campaigns, hot
races, and contested races.

were defined

as races

where only one candidate reported expenditures.

included any campaign where the winner
received
a race

was considered merely

received

61%

or

Unopposed

more of the

"contested"

final vote.

if

60%

or less of the

A

"hot race"

final vote.

two candidates were present but

Because there was no data on the

Finally,

the winner

file

for

seat races they are not included in this analysis.

Table 3.2 Direct Contact Expenditures by Type of Race for
1994
Level

Total

Average Mail

Expenditure

Expenditure

Unopposed

$11,975,857.00

$9,595.00

3.00%

$27,046.00

14.00%

Hot

$74,001,074.00

$65,973.00

12.00%

$100,589.00

32.00%

Contested

$116,274,065.00

$30,194.00

%2.00%

$51,001.00

35.00%

Total

$302,250,996.00

$43,862.00

12.00%

$70,188.00

33.00%

Mail Percentage

Average

GOTV

GOTV

Expenditure

Data taken from file provided to author by Dwight Morris.
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races

Per.

open

Hot races

in

1994 expended $74,001,074

spent $65,973.00 on mail, or

$100,589.00 on

GOTV

l2«/„

efforts

in total dollars.

of the average amount spent

which represented

32%

The average
Hot races

of the money spent

hot race

also spent

in

the

average hot race.

The absolute amount of money
spent on persuasion direct mail. This

campaign

activity” category.

when comparing
each activity

is

Still,

mail and turnout,

may be due

even

it

GOTV activities is higher than

spent on

is

if

we

between turnout and

is

of the "other

can be sure about the absolute
numbers

striking

how

despite the level of campaigning.

the competitiveness of the race

to the catch-all nature

that

It

consistent the percentage spent

does not appear

at first

on

glance that

one of the variables affecting resource allocation

mail.

Table 3.3 summarizes the same expenditure data for
1994 from a party
perspective.

How

does the party of the candidate

affect resource allocation divisions?

3.3 Direct Contact Expenditures by Party of
1994
Party

Total

Avg. Mail

Avg. Mail Per.

Avg.

$137,616,166.00

$43,064.00

13.00%

$69,878.00

35.00%

Democratic

$164,634,830.00

$44,689.00

11.00%

$70,508.00

31.00%

Total

$302,250,996.00

$43,862.00

12.00%

$70,188.00

33.00%

Republican

Note:

GOTV

Avg.

GOTV

per.

Data taken from file provided to author by Dwight Morris.

Allocation between persuasion mail and
parties.

Republicans spend

Democrats spend

1

1%

and

13% on
3

1%

mail and

respectively.

GOTV

35%

is

almost equal between the two

GOTV in the average race while

on

If party

and competitiveness do not

influence the allocation of direct contact resources what does?‘°’
It

would be

useful to e.xaniine the data by incumbents

iiifonuatiou docs not allow the distinction to be made. There

designation for open

scat.
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Candidates

in

urban

and challengers but the 1994 Morris

was

a

code for "incuinbcnt" but there was no

areas rank direct contact higher
than television relative to
their

counterparts

In

many

of thousands of voters

districts the electronic

who

live

outside of the

more

rural

media markets broadcast to
hundreds

Time purchased on Los Angeles

district.

television for example, costs
approximately $814.00 per rating point
while in the third

congressional district of Ohio a campaign
might pay only $75.00 per point.

important for both but affordable for only
one. Expensive channels are

Urban areas

well.

of TV

like

New York

people

who

live

fall

New York

candidate puts on a television ad

in

victim to expensive markets as well.

and Philadelphia

South Jersey,

television.

New

Whenever a

of Philadelphia sees

all

More

it.

outside of the district will get the chance to
enjoy the candidate's ad

than will voters within the scope of the campaign's
concern.

There are parts of

southwestern Connecticut that are wholly within the expensive
market.

inefficient as

City and Los Angeles are perhaps
the best example

inefficiencies but adjoining states

Jersey relies almost entirely on

TV is

Direct mail, in this circumstance,

is

more

because the message can be targeted to voters
send the message to voters

in

other districts.

in

efficient

New York

media

than electronic media

the correct district without paying to

If this

hypotheses

is

true spending

on

direct contact should increase be positively related to a

measure of TV costs while

controlling for total expenditures.

the

direct contact will be used.

This

The more expensive
is,

in fact, the case.

TV,

the

more

likely that

While controlling for

total

expenditures the Pearson correlation between television Cost Per Point and direct
contact expenditure

is

.394 and

is

significant at the .01 level with

Herrnson. Congressional Elections, p

1

99
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an

N

of 699 races.

Can

tins

simple bivariate equation
be improved by adding
any other

demographic information^ Claussen
suggested

when

targeted to highly educated
voters.

campaigns make an

effort to target as

a campaign’s strategic choice and

it

that direct mail

If this is correct

such but

it

it

was more

still

Although

voters.

examining

in its

own

this

also echoes the distinction

light.

may be a

activities.

we

little

reviewed

Urban areas are

earlier

also target higher

breakdown of a

it

is

worth

may be

district

traditional bastions

However, including percent urban, education

income adds

does not indicate that

stand in for education level,

Finally, the rural/urban

related to resource allocation because

effacious

does present a possible explanation
of

between the casual voter and the policy
wonk. Many consultants

income

district

of GOTV

and median family

level,

explanatory value to a simple bivariate model
containing only

television cost per point.

The degree of urbanization, the education

median family income are

all

closely related to the

TV cost

level,

and the

per point.

Data can not capture the complex mix of campaign
decision making.
all,

at the intersection

of art and science.

best empirical tradition.

and influence.
mail

is

more

If the

What

is

effective than television or that the

done

is

often pursued

will

message

be an increase

in

is

more

efficiently

in direct mail.

same message

Like most industries

even with personal relations and past predilections taken into account,

some

empirical basis for resource allocation.
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the

staff believes that direct

decisions are based on past results, personal relationships, reputation, and

the television cost provides

after

often based on consultant salesmanship

a variety of channels, each disseminating the

through different means, there

Still,

things are done

are

campaign professional or the candidate's

communicated by using

many

How things

It is,

it

is

trust.

clear

3.3 Voter Files

Once

a

campaign decides on

most important technical resource.
under used, source of research

data.

a course of direct contact
the voter

The voter

file

a

file

The examination ofrelat.onsh.ps
between

of registered voters and a

contact efforts.

Voter

files.

The following

files offer

a

becomes

specific accounting

reliable.

of campaign direct

section will review the use and
construction of voter

number of advantages over survey information

as a research

official statistics.

In

1988

50.

1

5%

files

to

20%

1% of Americans

claimed they participated when asked

voter

is

more

Survey estimates based on respondent voting
reports of their own behavior

suggest voting turnout rates that range

64%

political

two comprehensive

While survey data probes deeper than simple
voting records, actual data

tool.

its

also provides a rich, and
largely

variables such as message, method,
source, and purpose requires

data sets,

file

higher than rates derived from

voted

in

the presidential election but

post election surveys.

in a

Not only do

give a better picture of actual participation than do
surveys they also contain

past voting history which allows a comparison of electoral
behavior from year to year.
Finally, voter files contain

demographic and

political

information including party,

gender, ethnicity, age, registration date, precinct, and jurisdictions
such as assembly
district, state

political

senate

district,

district.

and demographic information on computer

targeting that has

become

Miller and Shanks, The

no

and congressional

Soraiif,

Money

in

It is

the presence of this

that allows for the sophisticated

a defining feature of modern, candidate centered campaigns.

New American

Pater, p 16

Congressional Elections, p 29
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Because

this

study

,s

based on an analysts of these
computerized hsts

examine the construction and
content of voter

How detailed

targeting can be

is

is

worthwhile to

detail

My experience

much of a

not

is

some

limited by four factors,

consultant, money, actual
turnout, and data.

imagination of the consultant

files in

it

the imagination of the

has been that the

limiting factor

because

their imaginations

run toward the expansive.
Money, or lack thereof, limits every
aspect of campaigning.

Complex
IS

targeting often requires that
external

always an expensive undertaking.

complex but simply put there

is

The

good

who

have voted

a tradeoflfbetween the total

in five

also

good

will

not get a piece of mail because

it

University of Colorado

at

who

will

call

are actual voters.

this

more

If a consultant

the chances are very

on election day, but the chances are

has been so narrowly targeted, William Daly,

(VCS) and Professor Robert Hughes of the
series

of articles that cover the

"Hit" or the likelihood that a piece of mail will
get to a

vote and "Cover" or the percentage of people

receive a piece of mail.

,s

and

to the polls for the election in question

Boulder have written a

tradeoff between what they

file

number of actual voters

last five elections,

number of people who go

president of Voter Contact Services

voter

of the

who

that a person receiving that mailing
will vote

that a large

be matched to the voter

relationship of turnout to targeting

reached and the percentage of people
reached
targets people

files

who

participate that

Consultants and campaigns always have to keep

tradeoff between fine targeting and a narrow electoral reach

in

mind the

when developing

their

direct contact universe.

Finally, targeting

voter

file.

Data

is

constrained by the amount and type of data available in the

quality, content,

and cost varies a good
65

bit

from

state to state

and from

county

county within

a state

In

sonte state, there

is

a single statewide
ntagneitc

tape available. The tncreased
reporting and data processing
required to comply with

Motor Voter
However,

in

legislation has led to an
increase in the

many of those

contains so the

final file is a

some of the

that a

country where the

tiles

file

tiles at

the county level.

firm

keypunch the

are maintained by the

profusion of responsible entities and
makes

Once

file

comhinalion of county purchases
and the statewide tape.

smaller counties will not have
automated

campaign or voter

files.

states certain counties
maintain better data than the
state

Other states maintain voter
that

numher of statewide

That almost always means

tiles

available

This requires

There are even a few parts of the

data.

town and not the county which
produces

a

building a difficult proposition.

tile

collected from the proper authorities
the

files

need to be converted to

a

standard format before they can he
processed. The special computer program
and

procedures needed tor each tape take

a

programmer

a

might cost as much as $1000 per format.
Sometimes
counties will

processing.

come

in

the

same format because

day or two to complete and

it

is

possible that a

a single service center

With automated counties updating

for

new

number of

does

all

registrants, deletions

of their
and

changes of address are handled by getting a completely new
tape and discarding the old
file.

ot

Voter

files

are usually inexpensive enough to

merge-purge system. For those few counties

necessary to

start the

costs

upwards

might

finish

of

make

still

this

more

practical than

without electronic data

expensive and time consuming keypunch process.

$70 per thousand

an entire statewide

entries.

file in

Keypunching

the time

it

county.
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is

Keypunching

also takes time.

takes to keypunch one

it

any kind

A company

medium

sized

The data used by
vendor.

The data

that

consultants either

comes on

the original

and maintatned by the
governmental
elections.

The

and

affiliation.

how

tile

or

is

often called the "base"

added by the
file, is

state.

For the purposes of this study,
only

may be

useftil to

look

districts

information will be used. That

histoiyi. registration date,

It

entered

un.t responsible for the
general administration

minimum amount of demographic

includes age, voter

party

tile,

the voter

quality and content of voter
files vary from state
to state and

county to county within a
contain a

comes on

phone number, gender,

at

from
which

minimum

ethnicity,

and

what each of these variables
represents

they are collected and maintained.

Many

counties collect birthdate at the
time of registration. The presence
of

birthdate allows candidates to send
a specific message to particular
age groups.

what has become
that

of

a regular dance for example.

Democrats send mailings to the

In

elderly

accuse to Republicans of tiding to gut
Social Security, Republicans respond
by

either defending their record on Social
Security or accusing the

Democrats of trying

to

frighten older people.

Voter history

refers to a voter's actual election
participation

most important targeting variable
targeting to save

identifying voters

voters"

who may

it

is

useful to see

vote

to increased

Voter history

is

file.

in

who

is

potential mailings or

voted

in

the single

Candidates use voter history

turn out for only certain types of elections.

eligible to

may respond

messages.

on a voter

money by removing non-voters from

election year, for example,

though they were

available

and

by

In a presidential

1992 but not 1990 even

both elections. This group of "presidential surge

GOTV or may be the target

of additional campaign

so important to direct contact targeting that
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many

campaigns go to great lengths to
add
base

it

to the

file

by hand

if

it

is

not available on the

file.

Registration Date

is

often recorded by the county
as well as age.

present, and regtstration date
voter.

files

and

it

is

age

not

is

can be used as an approximation
for the age of the

is. ,t

Like age. voter histo^, and
regtstration date, party
aff.hation

most voter

If

available on

all

of the

files

used for

,s

this study.

also included on

While the

presence of age. voter history, and
registrat.on date varies from
place to place, they are
often available, and

when

not available, universally missed.

In addition to data available

from the county

files

the voter

file

vendor often

adds information including, but not
limited to phone number,
gender, and ethnicity.

These items are

all

appended to the voter using computer
matching. Phones are

matched by name and address from
matched based on proprietary
voter

file

vendors.

most voter

file

a national

phone

file.

dictionaries developed

For gender, a

first

name

Gender and

ethnicity are

by consultants, campaigns, and

dictionary

is

used.

vendors have developed large surname coding

To code

tables.

ethnicity,

Both of these

Items have a variety of political uses and are
very popular selections although neither

fool-proof

which
States.

Names

like Lee, a

veiy

illustrates the inaccuracies

who

register

by

American

Indian,

African-American

specific first

initials only.

Hispanic, Japanese, Chinese,

Chinese as well as Caucasian surname

generated by the “melting pot” process

There are also non-gender

as voters

common

names such

in the

United

as "Terry" or "Pat" as well

Ethnic dictionaries usually contain names for

Irish, Italian,

Jewish, Russian, Polish, Greek, Armenian,

German, and French surnames.
is

is

It is

important to note that

not an ethnic group that can be targeted by
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last

name

coding.

In

many Southern
which requires

states race

is

coded onto the voter

statistical infornta.ion

file

by race on voter

to

the voting right's act

lulfill

registration,

,n

other areas,

precinct election returns are
used to identify predominately
African-American precincts.

Despite the problems involved
the accuracy rate of
gender dictionaries
that

of ethnic dictionaries over

Because phoning and
file,

80%

GOTV

most

in

If you are. for

moved, and

numbers from the

file

failed

in

the phone

mundane, the

results allow the

campaigns are so addicted.
available

3.4

on voter

files

There are several companies

of phone numbers and they are usually
generated from
directly

from the phone companies.

These then are the variables found on or added
is

book and “Hannahan” on

campaigns can almost always obtain enough

Still,

keypunching phone books or buying tapes

process

There are

matches caused by spelling

to meet their campaign objectives.

that maintain magnetic tapes

and

Like matching with

file.

an imperfect process.

is

example. “Hannahen”

the voter role the match will
miss.

94%

efforts are so important for
direct contact voter

ethnic and gender dictionaries,
phone matching

differences.

over

areas.

vendors must append telephone
numbers to the base

unlisted numbers, disconnects,

is

to voter

files.

Although the

complex targeting to which modern

In addition to fueling the

political

machine of targeting, the

makes an in-depth study of campaign

rich data

efforts possible.

Case Selection

The two data
turnout, voter

The

difficulty

relative lack

files

files

needed to assess any relationship between

and contact information, are both

of acquiring and

utilizing

difficult to collect

campaign information

of election research. Voter

files

are
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direct contact

is

enormous data

and manipulate.

one reason for the
sets.

and

The average

congressional dis.ric. has about
325.000 voters and each voter
record includes name,
address, party, voting histo^i.
age. registration date,
and a variety of other bits
of
information.

Manipulating and coding

files

of this

size

is difficult

and time consuming.

Likewise, collecting campaign
direct contact information
requires finding people
are years

Manning

who

removed from the
the

two

files,

election and

whose memoiy and

by coding each individual contact
to

filing

all

system are

who

faulty.

of the voters on the

file

received the contact, involves
substantial computer resources.
Clearly, data

considerations

call

for case studies.

information for anything approaching

competitive congressional elections

be impossible to collect and
manipulate the

It is

-

all

of the congressional races

of voter

file

information.

districts,

making up

analysis.

Four important

likely

criteria

all

of the

eight campaigns,

and

The four cases were chosen with an eye
toward

putting together what Eckstein calls
a crucial case study.

might present either the most

or even

during any given cycle.

The following study examines four
their use

-

Crucial cases are those that

proof of a theory or be a

least likely case for

emerge from the previous discussion which frame
the

choice of campaigns which, through comparison
and contrast, will offer evidence on the
effects

1 )

of direct contact and voter turnout.

Campaigns must reach

a threshold of competitiveness but

variety of competitive situations.

In other words, the

still

present a

two candidates must

have spent enough money to make the analysis worthwhile
but

still

represent a range of competitive situations.

2)

The campaigns must have generated

a variety of direct contact

messages and used a number of mediums for the transmission of those
messages to allow for an analysis of the

effects
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of different types of direct

contacts on turnout.
3)
direct contacts to

The caiupatgn must

also itave generated

enough

make study worthwhile.

)

Some of the campaigns must come
from
must come from an otTyear,
Tl.is allows

a presidential year

for

some

and some

control over this critic al

turnout variable.

4

The campaigns must come

5)
costs.

fron, districts w,th a
range of television

Previous analysis indicates that
direct contact

television,

liy

is

a substitute for

capturing districts with a range
of TV costs

inter that voter contact
elfects turnout at various levels

possible to

is

it

of television

expense.

6)
1 he

campaigns must come from

ot the data needed for analysis.

districts

where the voter

This includes a voter

file

files

have

all

with age, party,

gender, phone number, ethnicity, and,
most importantly, voter history.

There must also be personnel available
that remember the race and can

pioduce an account ot the

direct contact efTorts

backed up with

documentation

Someone must

Initially,

were from

1

twenty

give permission for the campaign to be
studied.

districts

from

994 and ten were from

1

1

994 and

996.

1

The

996 were chosen.

districts

Ten of the

districts

were then divided between

competitive and non-competitive races, a distinction
based not on a prior evaluation of
the race nor the

amount of money spent

but on the final outcome.

difference between the winner and the loser

competitive and laces where the difference

was

tell

1

5%

points or less

Races where the

were considered

above 15% were considered

non-competitive.
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Out of the

some

critical

voter

data component.

file

that either could not or

campaigns was

twenty races, fourteen were
eliminated because of a lack
of

initial

would not

Two

participate

other districts had one or
in

the study.

more campaigns

Since the permission of both

the refusal of one side of
the contest rendered the
district unfit

critical,

for inclusion in the study.

The

field

was narrowed

Congressional District

I,

Congressional District

I

to

to

Maryland Congressional

District 5

and Ohio

Pennsylvania Congressional District
21, and California
Unfortunately,

all

of the open seats under consideration

meet either the data requirements of the
study or had

at least

failed

one candidate who

refused to cooperate.

A

summaiyi of the important characteristics
for these four

districts is included in table 3 .4

below.

Table
District

3.4:

Case Study Congressional Races

Competitive level

MD05
PA21

OH01
CD01

Year

Data?

TV Cost Per

Not Competitive

94

Yes

Moderate/High

Moderate

Competitive

96

Yes

Low

Light

Moderately Competitive

94

Yes

Moderate

Moderate

Competitive

96

Yes

High

Heavy

Maryland
are from

1

996.

5

and Ohio

All four

I

of the

are from 1994 while California

districts

requirement. Ohio has age coding on

all

of the other

variables.

age, gender, and party.

point

The other

have voter

60%

files

of its voter

districts

all

have

The column "TV Cost Per
72

1

I

Contacts

and Pennsylvania 21

which meet the data

file

but has

00%

Point"

100% coverage

for

coverage of voter history,

shows

that there

is

a

wide

range of ,elev,sion costs
included

low

in the

in

the study w,.h a Ingh
,n the California
d, strict and a

Pennsylvania race. The "contact
effort", which wtll be
summarized

detail in later chapters,

is

great
g

,n

the combined total of
both campaign's contact
efforts within a

district.

The
utilization

definition

of direct contact and

in this

chapter, and a brief discussion

of direct contact, as well as a
description of the

contact plans provided criteria
for the choice of cases.
contain

all

of the

political

files

used to implement direct

Although the base voter

I

files

and demographic information
needed for study the direct

contact strategy and campaign effort
of each campaign has not be
explored,.
next chapter

on the

In the

turn toward the reconstruction
of eight campaign efforts; one
Democratic

and one Republican for each of the
four

districts.
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CHAPTER

4

THE ARENA OF DIRECT CONTACT
Was

t^he

rad!!r s"

phone and the mail usefuE You

bet.

will reconstruct the direct
contact efforts

that took place in the four
districts under study.

initial

First,

Secondly, there

of the eight campaigns

Each reconstruction

will

have three

there will be a description of the
general campaign situation

description will

Finally, at the

wasn't our biggest ticket

rlem'"”

This chapter

components.

It

will

accompany

a discussion of the campaign's
direct contact strategy.

be a detailed description of each
campaign's direct contact

end of each description, there

will

will

effort.

be a table which summarizes the
coding

for each individual direct contact
undertaken by the campaign.

chapter each campaign's strategy

This

At the end of the

have been examined with an eye toward

determining the distribution of contacts

among base and

persuadable voters and each

individual direct contact will have been
described, categorized and coded onto
the base

voter

file

for analysis.

The campaign world
planning" an oxymoron.

into

exists in a time

frame so compressed as to make "advance

Campaign organizations

and passing out of existence

in six

month

reflect

time compression by coming

Records from two election

intervals.

cycles ago are difficult to find and, once found, difficult
to interpret.
staffers

Campaign

have moved and even those remaining have only dim memories
of past

Because of the uncertainty of this kind of information

Interv

it

is

imperative to confirm the

iew with Bob Holste, Administrative Assistant and campaign manager

Phil English.
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efforts.

to

Congressman

data using multiple sources.
Usin g interviews, original
vendor invoices, campaign
finance reports, and a detailed
review of old voter

file

orders, the chances of
a

reconstruction are good.’’^

4.1

Maryland Congressional

District Five: 1994

Congressman Steny Hoyer

is

a powerful nine term
Democratic incumbent

represents Maryland Congressional
District 05.

campaign strategy over the years
the

map on

the following page.

Moyer's

are Atrican-American.

Added

population.

more

to understanding Moyer's

the diversity of the district
that

The map

district includes

district in the country.

lies in

The key

also contains a partisan

federal

who

is

represented

in

breakdown by county.

employees than any other congressional

In addition, nineteen percent

(19%) of the voters

The neighboring 4th Congressional

the district

has a majority black

District

to the federal workers and
African-Americans

in

is

a substantial

academic community centered around College
Park, home of the University of
Matyland.

With such a strong core constituency

house floor
and

my

let

in

1994. “I

am

it

is

no wonder

a tax, tax, spend, spend Democrat,

opponents make of it what they

that

Moyer

me make

Let

said

on the

that clear,

will.”

His opponents have tried to make much of such
statements. Because of a strong

suburban Republican section
areas

m

in

Anne Arundel

outlying counties, Hoyer always attracts quality opposition.

congressional districts nationwide, the 5th

A

county, combined with conservative rural

"voter

file

order"

places an order for labels,
these documents

is

is

lists,

the

CD

document or computer

or a magnetic media

that they indicate

file

in

Like

many

Maryland, although heavily

file

generated

with the voter

when

file

the

campaign or consultant

vendor.

what was actually produced as opposed

to

The advantage of

what the candidate

thought (or wished) was produced. Copies of the interview forms and documents arc
in Appcndi.x
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1

Democratic, has experienced strains
between

liberal

and consen-ative Democrats,

Mao-land 5 include suburban Anne
Arundel county,
urban Prince George's County,
as well as

Although the

Democrats

rural St,

district registration is heavily

that has given Republicans

partially

suburban and

partially

Mao's, Charles, and Calvert eounttes.

Democratic

hope over the

tt

is

years.

the diversity

The

among

the

three rural counties

have traditionally been conservative
on many issues even though the
increase of long
distance

DC

commuters has

Almanac of American

Maoland

Politics “Historically, this

has been conservative on

Clinton, and

well,”"’

many

many

Prince George's and

Hoyer faced

Lawrence Hogan,

Jr,

Anne Arundel whites

Hoyer

George Bush over

well,

won 60%-38%

In

1992

his

opponent,

raised and spent a remarkable $1,6

local

Reagan

outside of Prince George's county but lost

Hoyer 53%

discontinuities and contradictions of the 5th

Political consultant

Bill

are Republicans as

Hogan, the son of a former congressman and a

inside Prince George's to be defeated by

challenger in 1994.

According to the

a Democratic area but southern

issues and voted for

spent $265,065 while

campaign chairman as

The

is

well funded opposition in 1992 and
1994,

Million to keep his seat,

enough

diluted the socially conservative
vote.

CD

to

44%.

attracted another well placed

and college professor Donald Devine presented

Hoyer with an experienced opponent with an impressive resume and reasonable fund
raising capacity.

Devine had been the director of the Office of Personnel Management

during President Ronald Reagan's

Barone Michael and Grant
National Journal 1995.)

A

table in

from 1992

to 1998.

p.

first

Ujifusa.

term.

After winning a hotly contested Republican

The Almanac ofAmerican

Politics.

(Washington. D.C.

617

Appendix

2 gives the electoral

and spending histoiy of the
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district

general elections

pr.mao', Devine

Hoyer’s $

I

waged an aggressive

3 Million

battle against Hoyer.

This time, Hoyer

won

county and was one of the only
Democrats

both

in

Devine spent $58 1,000 to

and outside of Prince George’s

1994 to increase

in

his

winning percentage

over the 1992 cycle. Thus, the 1992
and 1994 cycles saw a powerful
Democrat residing

m

a district marginal enough on
paper to attract well financed
challengers. Using the

Morns

data collected for the 1994 election

we

can review the spending distribution
of the

two campaigns.
Table

4.1:

Distribution of Hoyer and Devine
Spending

Campaign
1

Hoyer

Devine

otal

$1,295,285.00

otT-OUT-THE-VOTE

$93,544.00

GET-OUT -THE-VOTE%

$89,857.00

7.22%

Mail
Mdll

$346,569.00

25.93%

$39,684.00
/o

$58,265.00

3.06%

Total Direct Contact

16.81%

$133,228.00

ContactVo

$148,122.00

10.29%

Mote: Data taken
tak(>n from
fmm campaign
rumrvainn finance reports and

The
campaign

difterences in

strategy.

file

42.74%

provided to author by Dwight Morris.

amount obscure an even greater

In the last chapter

we

difference in approach and

discussed campaign strategy

in

the context of

imperatives and incentives arising from the status of the candidate
and the

competitiveness of the race.

and

effort mailing to his

Devine, engaged

in

a difficult primary, spent a lot of time

Republican base. Mail

is

especially effective in a primary

because the message can be targeted to people of one's own
primary reach thousands of people
case of a Republican primary

in

commercial to 303,444 voters;

who

cannot participate

Maryland,

1

in

party.

the primary at

this translates into

03,362 of them
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eligible to

Television ads in a

all.

In the

sending a television

vote for you on primary

elecon

day.

The campaign

strategy of each candidate

incumbent or challenger as well
as the
district.

As

a challenger

political

was

dictated by their status as

and demographic construction
of the

from the minority party

in

the district Devine needed
to put

together a coalition that included
a very high percentage of
his base, independents,
and

conservative Democrats. This led him
to a highly targeted strategy
designed to

communicate with the most malleable voters

Hoyer followed
throughout the

was reserved

in

the

efficient

manner.

a classic incumbent strategy
that included using television

district to

trumpet

his

experience and accomplishments.

Direct contact

for very specific voter identification
and turnout efforts as well as an

attempt to raid Devine's base

Although

I

will discuss the contacts in

the chapter the overall strategic
implications of the

emerge from

most

their status as an entrenched

more

detail later in

Hoyer and Devine spending

patterns

incumbent and a well financed, but clear

underdog, challenger. Hoyer was working
a plan conceived three cycles ago. The
incumbent's campaign centered on communicating
with an already identified base and
built

on programs begun as

reaching out

first

far

back as 1990. Devine, as the challenger, focused
on

to Republicans for the primary and then to
building a winning

coalitions of voters.

4.1.1

The Hoyer

Effort

Corey Alexander, Hoyer's current administrative
direct contact effort.

in

was

in

charge of the

Alexander served as Hoyer's deputy campaign manager during the

1994 general election and had held
election.

assistant,

that position for seven

Although John Bohannon was the

charge ot day to day

official

months preceding the

campaign manager, Alexander was

details, including the direct contact effort.
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A

local

campaign

staffer, Patty Fiorello,

handled the Idndraising.

canrpa.gn pollster and Matt

buying duties.

much of the
summer

Mark Mellman served

McWdliams performed

The campaign used Voter Contact

actual mail

was designed

with favorability figures

in-house,

in the sixties

The campaign

a current voter

42%
in

in

the early

the nineties.

inclination to run a positive

described

These records

file.

listed a

as being for, against, or undecided in
a

were stored on a voter

file

to

and name identification

Some of this 1992 program was

file in

season the data collected during the

1994 voter

58%

campaign

in detail

during

Previously identified voters, from the
1990 and 1992 elections, were

Democrats and independents
results

led

direct contact effort started
with utilizing voter identification

computer matched against

The

media prodnction and

district service.

records dating back to 1992,
the introduction.

Hoyer

Service for voter fde work,
although

Hoyer

These strong numbers reinforced the
campaign's
based on experience and

electronic

as the

1

the

VCS

990 and

1

This process eliminated people

office.

number of

Hoyer campaign.

Just before the

1994 election

992 cycles was moved forward

who had moved

to the

or died since the

previous cycle.

The campaign extended
Democrats and independents
this late fall effort

undecideds

who

The campaign

previously identified universe by calling

district

all

of the

wide who had not been contacted before. After

was completed, Hoyer

sent a mailing to both the favorables and the

had been identified through phone banks from 1990, 1992, and

1994.'^^

also did targeted mailings to increase support in rural Charles and

Calvert counties.

The 1994

its

effort

In its only effort to reach out

was

beyond

a micro-coordinated campaign.

its

base, the

Hoyer campaign

Hoyer asked questions about a host of

candidates as well and shared that information with those closely associated with Hoyer.
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local

ma,led a piece called "Choice”
,o Republican and
Independent

had participated

in

the 1990 and 1992 general
elections^ Finally, the

sent out a sample ballot to

whtch

will

be repeated

all

Democrats and Independents

The campaign

Little

who

Hoyer campaign

the district

did tew,

if

any

cantpaign effort went to mobilizing

GOTV

coordinated campaign called Democrats
candidate Parris Glendenning,

phoning

,n

with phones

In a pattern

other races under study the
Hoyer contact effort concentrated

,n

on those already hkely to vote

In a final

wcnen

effort the

The

in

party

calls,

new

voters.

but the Mainland Democratic

targeted precincts on behalf of
gubernatorial

work has

Hoyer campaign

called

also been

all

coded back onto the

tile

of their favorable voters on or

around election day.
Table 4.2 below summarizes the Hoyer direct
contact
IS

efforts.

The

first

column

simply a code that designates that particular
contact. Democratic contacts begin with

a "D" and Republican contacts begin with an "R".

The second column describes

the

contact.

Table

4.2:

Summary

of

Hoyer Direct Contact

Target Group Description
All

Rl

Count

Dem. Hnsids with a phone not previously contacted

Women

(sj875)

w/ phones vtd 90 and 92 General (sj876)

Hhsids

in

Charles County Portion of the

All Ul

Hhsids

in

Calvert County portion of the District (mhS99)

All

Hoyer Favorables

All

Hoyer Favorables with a phone

All

Hoyer undecided

sample

ballot

for Mailing

District

(mh597)

(mh668)

for a mailing

for calling

in

19,510
7,692

27,944

(mh669)

20,336

(mh664)

27,809

(mh222)

Democratic Party Phoning

48,465
3,249

All Ul

All Dl,

Effort: 1994

154,000

targeted precincts

17,000

Note. Contact descriptions taken from interview with Corey Alexander; counts derived
from invoices, job
analysis of computer coded data.
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files,

and

The campaign
leaders,

also sent mailings to
in-house

and environmentalists but these

recorded onto the voter

4.1.2

The Devine

lists

lists

of fire

have since been

fighters, business

lost

and cannot be

file,

Effort

George Nesterchuck managed Donald
Devine's campaign
not use a pollster.

They used

The campaign

a staff member, not a consultant,
for fundraising.

mail, both fundraising and
persuasion,

did

Direct

was done by Nesterchuck and Devine
with advice

from some of Devine’s consulting friends
and colleagues.

The

party also supplied help.

Finance reports indicate that the campaign
used national and state party resources
for

TV

production, radio production, and voter

made use of a
acquired the

voter

file directly

phoning or voter

make

tile

calls to

development

Persuasion mail efforts

provided by the Maryland Republican Party,
The party had

from the Secretary of State.

identification

Republicans

clearly run with

file

in

on

own

its

the district.

local resources

and

Devine's organization did no

but relied on the state and national parties
to

Although well lunded,

that to

win they needed to add conservative

Democrats, Christian Coalition members, and the National

They

two-thirds of the independent vote

campaign was

talent.

Nesterchuck and Devine believed

base of Republican voters.

this

also calculated that they

in

the district.

Rifle Association to their

would need approximately

Based on

this,

and the national

Republican trend of 1994, Nesterchuck gave the Devine campaign an even chance
for
victory.

First,

Devine needed to win a primary and to secure

Republican base against a well known incumbent. To
mailings to the

district's small

this end, the

Republican population. The
81

his small, but critical.

rest

campaign sent

of the campaign

six

eftbrts

used an ami-tax message to
build a coalition of
conservative Democrats and
independents.

The campaign dropped

George towns of Bowie,
information on Devine

s

a positive newsletter to
the northern Prince

Laurel, Beltsville, and College
Park.

public seiwice and anti-tax
message.

The drop

featured

Although the campaign

did not have polling information
on this area their analysis of local
races and their

experience

in

the district led

potential swing voters.

Ronald Reagan

in

them to believe

that these

neighborhoods contained

Next, the campaign targeted
Democrats

1988 and George Bush

in

1992.'"

commitment

Jack Cade, sent a

county

of the

district's

A
all

district.

drop"

is

letter

to family values.

The Maryland Republican

a volunteer effort

election.

The two

in

of

the district

popular retired State Senator,

in his

former Anne Arundel

party claims to have

all

made

GOTV calls to all

the door of

at

households) in a given area.

targeting.

One

type uses demographic measures to contact

This might include age, gender, or voting histoiy.

is

independents

where campaign workers place a piece of literature

There are two types of direct contact

targeting

all

heel's

Republican households.

voters (or sometimes, on

individuals.

Finally, a

on behalf of Devine to voters

won by

precincts

Following close on the

the Democratic mailing Devine's
wife sent out a letter to

discussing his

in

A second type is geographic.

often based on precinct election returns which include

how

Geographic

a given precinct voted in a specific

types of targeting are sometimes used in tandem. Precinct election returns are collected

from individual counties, usually on paper, and keypunched
information comes off of the voter

file.
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into a spreadsheet for analysis.

Demographic

The following

table gives a snapshot of
the Devine direct contact
etfort.

Table

Summary

4.3:

of the Devine

Campaign Conlaet

Efforts

Description

Count
Kepuuiicdri Mailings (six times)
Lit.

drop

Bowie, Laurel,

in

103,000

Coleqe Park

Beltsville,

71,712

Keagan Democrats
124,844

Wife

letter

on taxes to

Letter from

all

independents

Former Senator Cade

Republican GET-OUT-THE-VOTE

to

in district

41,597

Anne Arundel

45,645

effort

63,098

uc:>i.iipiions laKen trorr

and analysis of computer coded

data.

The campaign recognized

the coalition they needed to build
but, for whatever

reason, they concentrated on then
Republican base.

due to the

Some of this

September primaiy but the campaign

late

4.2

clear strategy

Ohio Congressional

is

this

may have been a mistake

not the same thing as implementing

District

was

also sent out three mailings to

Republicans after the primary. Nesterchuck
admitted

Having a

concentration

it.

One: 1994

Republican congressman Steve Chabot wrested the right
to represent Ohio's
congressional district

when he

of many Republicans swept

defeated incumbent David

own

Democrat and

Mann

cast

party as well.

Mann down. He had

ironically, a

1994

.

He was one
It

was not

to contend with trouble

While trying to establish himself as an independent

to distance himself from a then unpopular President William
Clinton,

one too many conservative votes for the

constituency.

in

into office behind the Contract for America.

only the Republican sweep that brought
within his

Mann

first

Labor was

activists within his

especially incensed by his vote for

own

traditional

NAFTA which was,

Pro-Clinton vote. His apostasy earned him a primary challenge from

83

Afncan-Amencan
race.

The

was

result

The

first

State Senator BHl

Bowen, Mann's

a hard fought primary ending

congressional district of Ohio

is

in

original

a

opponent from

his

1992

667 vote victory for Mann.

nestled entirely within Hamilton

County, Ohio and includes much
of Cincinnati as well as a number
of surrounding
suburbs.

Portman.

The

rest

A map

of Hamilton county

in

Congress by Republican Robert

and chart on the following page show
the

partisan composition of each

city

represented

is

community within

and Republican by urban standards.

Its

the district.

district's

location and the

Cincinnati

is

a conservative

immigrants were primarily German,
but

over the years, an African American and
Appalachian population has emerged.
Cincinnati

may be

the only city in the country to prohibit
discrimination against people

of Appalachian Origin”.
the city

is

A major

Ohio River port and a regional center of
commerce,

headquarters for the giant Procter and Gamble,

Proctor and God. Milacron, a world leader

Federated Department Stores,
Cincinnati and bespeak of the

politically.

Inc.,

city's

in the

or, as

they say in Cincinnati,

production of machine tools, and

which owns Macy’s also make

their headquarters in

diverse economy.

equally diverse

Cincinnati has given the world

Marge

Cincinnati

Schott, Klan

is

rallies,

and the

anti-pornography movement. Historically, Cincinnati was an
anti-slavery Republican
bastion in an otherwise Copperheaded southern Democratic
Ohio but, over time, the
city has

developed a unique

with a strong third party offering additional

political culture

competition to Republicans and Democrats
Charterites, as the third party

is

called,

alike.

Republicans, Democrats, and

vie for local office while Republicans and

Democrats, both seeking Charter party support, compete

84

in the

two congressional

races.

One

or both of the local
congressional districts has been
seriously contested

in

almost

every election since 1964.

Mann's challenger was former City
Council member, and current
Hamtiton

County Commisstoner, Steve Chabot,
and Chabot,

Mann would

step

In the general election

away from

president Clinton while Chabot

advance the image of the then unpopular
President one step
S87I,77I to unseat

Mann

while

Mann

In a race pitting a well financed

closer,

Mann

would

Chabot spent

spent $1,001,393 trying to keep
his office.

Despite Mann's slight spending advantage
he
history of the district's general
elections

dance between

is

lost to

contained

Chabot
in

56%

Appendix

to

44%, The

political

3.

incumbent against an experienced challenger

both sides were aware that the election
might come

down

to the effective targeting of

swing voters. The number of swing, also known
as "persuadable", voters may be small
but their importance outweighs their number.
Both the Chabot and the

campaigns aimed the bulk of their
partisans.

Cincinnati

is in

direct contact efforts at small

groups of potential

a relatively low cost television market and

campaign resources were accordingly directed

to television.

Mann

much of a

Each campaign used

television to paint a favorable picture of their candidate
while direct contact

reach specific swing voter

Although the author

is

in particular precincts

Jeriy Springer,

much

politically

engaged enough

to

have

of the description of the cities economic base

taken from Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa's The Almanac ofAmerican Politics Op.
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to

judged amenable to persuasion.

from the Cincinnati area, and was

worked with then City Councillor

was used

Cit.

1994

was

Table

4.4:

Dis.ribu.ion of

The competitive nature of the
base of support make
contest.

to

district.

this contest

Mann and Chabo.

Ca.npaig„ Spending

Mann's problems with

more

like

his base,

and Chabot's

an open seat race than a
challenger/incumbent

Although Mann outspent Chabot the difference

is

not great and

much of it

Mann's expenditures on organizational
maintenance before Chabot had

4.4 above).

Unlike Hoyer,

Mann

strong-

is

due

filed (see table

could not run a safe incumbent campaign.

Mann was

forced to engage his base from the beginning
and compete for persuadable voters with
the
well

known Chabot.

It is

not always possible to attribute differences

in direct

contact

expenditures to neat strategic calculations because
consultants and campaigns respond
differently to similar situations, but

communicate with

way

his

it

is

clear that in this circumstance

base required that he spend

money on

Mann's need to

direct contact.

It is

the only

to reach only African-American voters effectively
with a specific message and to

speak to the other Democrats

in his

base without alienating swing voters. Chabot, on the

other hand, could target his direct contact efforts and spend the
bulk of his
relatively inexpensive television market.
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money

in

the

4.2.1

The Chabot

Effort

The Chabot campaign was

Many campaigns

amateur.

most never

rise

above a

a unique combination
of the professional and the

attempt to do

level

all

sorts

of technical work themselves,
but

of technical med.ocrity,

A

campaign bogged down

in

xeroxing, disk crashes, and
production decisions instead of
fundraising and voter

communication has serious problems.
Consultants often wort, about
candidates who
spend more time on campaign

Chabot campaign, while
and professionally

a

effort,

raising

money or meeting

avoided

in

put the campaign together

Januai^ of 1994 and

administrative assistant.

political decision

home grown

on

this

voters but the

problem and was

efficiently

run.

The person who
campaign manager

details than

maker

was Shannon

now works

for the

Jones,

She staned

congressman as

Characteristic of the Chabot organization.
Jones,
after the candidate himself, lives

and works

in

as

his

still

the key

the district, not

in

Washington D.C..

The Chabot

staff

produced

its

own

media, fundraising, direct mail, and voter

file

work, consulting occasionally with the Pennsylvania-based
media firm of Brabender Cox
for advice.

The

involved

the race."

in

firm

was

characterized

Although nominally
the

more Republican

a

in

Democratic

leaning suburbs

the interview as “helpful, but not that

district,

Jones pointed out that the turnout

more than compensated

disadvantage. Ohio Republicans turn out

at

in

for the registration

higher rates than do Democrats or

independents."^ The turnout disparity suggested a three pronged strategy for
Chabot.
There

is

no party registration

in Ohio.

Democrats and Republicans are defined by

87

Iheir priinaiy

Firs,,

work

generated

,he strong conservative
infrastructure

lists built

from sources

that

tn

Cincinnat, by using internally

might naturally gravttate
toward Chabo,

including, but no, limited
to. Catholic Churches,
Realtors. Christtan groups,
and

Pro-Life activists

These groups

affintty for their issues

of Chabot.

either received a

Chabo, mailing reminding them
of

or were contacted by the
group organization

itself

on behalf

These contacts are an important
source.

Second, the campaign identified
swing precincts by taking the
Bush percentage

from 1992 and subtracting the
Chabo, percentage

for 1992

when Chabo,

Hamilton County Commissioner. They
then ranked precincts by

assumed they housed people who
200 precincts were designated
nearly

all

campaign

inclined

ran for

that difference

and

toward well known Republicans,
The top

as "Chabo, persuasion precincts”
and

direct contact efforts.

were the focus of

Chabofs targeting program

is

an interesting

combination of party targeting and candidate
targeting. Although he was the
challenger
his

long record of seiwice had allowed him
to build campaign experience and

organization.

Within the targeted Chabot precincts the
campaign only targeted households
without a Democrat.
with a

The Chabot campaign

GOTV program.

participation.

The

The

GOTV effort

also targeted Republicans districtwide

c onsisted of one call

definitional formula for the 1994 file

was "Anyone who

Republican. Anyone not voting in the 1994

""

in the 1992 priinar>' as a Republican

is

also a Republican".

the remainder being carried as "independent".

VCS

remarkably low number of people "pick" primaries. In
voted in different part}' primaries over two election cycles.

The

prolife

movement

as

we know

In voter file language this universe

independent households, and

all

it

^•oted in the

primal

1994 primary- as

as a Republican, but voting

A similar definition codes the Democrats with

has conducted studies in

that

on the Friday and

Illinois, out

Illinois

and Ohio and found

of 6,900,000 voters, 7200 people

today was founded in Cincinnati.

would be

“all

pure Republican households,

pure Republican and independent households”
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all

pure

Saturday before the election and

on

elect, on

day

ttself

aggressive ground

a

follow-up

call

on the Monday before the
election and

Within these disparate universes,
the Chabot campaign
ran an

game

using as a unifying theme.
Another Family for Steve Chahot.

Chabot's persuasion pieces were
modeled on standard Republican
themes

developed for the 1994
featured a

election.

young Chabot with

the brochure detailed

His standard brochure emphasized
local roots, and

his parents standing in
front

Chabofs local-poor-boy-made-good

of their mobile home.
rise to

Inside,

community

prominence. Over the course of the
campaign, volunteers dropped

this

brochure to

all

targeted households.

The
1994,

same

family emphasis of Chabot’s campaign,
typical of Republican efforts in

was coupled with other standard Republican
appeals
target universe on taxes and crime.

associated with the campaign

were described

At the time of the interviews no one

had a copy of the crime or taxes mailing but
both

still

as positive pieces

including mailings to the

which

listed

Chabot's issue positions.

Republicans

had not cornered the market on standard mailings,
and Chabot had to defend

on seniors

-

senior policy.

a mailing necessitated by the standard Democratic
attack

The

senior mailing

his

record

on Republican

showed candidate Chabot standing with

his

mother

while promising never to cut Medicare.
In keeping with

its

amateur ethos the campaign placed a volunteer

a comprehensive precinct leader program.

in

each of the 200 key precincts

Chabot and printed on

charge of

This volunteer attempted to find one family

who would

be willing to have

The

text

precinct specific and said something like

“We

a post card.

in

89

their picture taken with

on the reverse side of the card was
live

on Elm Street and

we

are another

hamify for Sieve Chahoi. ” The
vicinity

of the volunteer

family.

letter

was mailed by

the campaign to voters
living in the

Eighty volunteers covering
eighty precincts were

eventually recaiited. Through
a kind of geographic
extension these eighty
volunteers

saw

their

coverage increased to include
120 precincts representing over
30,000 pieces

of mail. These cards were

sent to

Republican and Independent
voters living within

all

precincts which had a volunteer
family.'^^
substantial telephoning.

Ohio.

The Republican

1

994 was a

ticket,

The campaign

terrible

also did, or benefited from,

year for Democrats both nationally
and

headed by the popular Governor,
George Voinovich, put

together a formidable coordinated
campaign called Victory 94.

contacted

campaign

all

Republicans with

itself

a

GOTV call

augmented the Victory 94

targeted precincts.

in the

by

effort

arget

The

ticket.

The Chabot
in

call

was more

specific,

a close race for congress.

The

effort:

Chabot Contacts during the 1994 Campaign

Group Description

Count

300 Top precincts/Drop on local

Top 300

area.

that

calling 10,000 Republicans in

following table summarizes the Chabot direct
contact

1

was Victory 94

Hamilton county

urging voters to go to the polls because
Chabot was

4.5:

It

Victory 94's script was a simple 5
second talk which urged

Republicans to turn out and support the

Table

in

roots/all Rl

households

108,003

Precincts/Mailing on Taxes/All Rl households

108,003

Top 300

Precincts/Mailing on Crime/All Rl households

108,003

Top 200

Precincts/Mailing to Seniors/All Rl over 65

11,911

Top 120 Precincts/Postcard from

GET-OUT-THE-VOTE

call to all

GET-OUT-THE-VOTE

call to

The volunteer was

local families

45,572

Republican HHsIds with a phone

10,000 Republicans

in

Top 200

also an amateur photographer

the reemitment duties.

90

51,906
23,300

and took

all

the pictures as well as performing

4.2.2

The

IMaiin Effort

The Mann ca,npaign
to

faced ,wo n,a,or prohlcns;
neither ofwhicl,

improvement without exacerbating
the

other.

The

first

was

was antenable

the unpopularity of

President Clinton, summarized
by the Chabot slogan;
‘‘A vote for this

Mann

is

another

vote for this man,” While
addressing the Clinton problem
by casting “independent

democratic" votes, he alienated
difficult

his labor

primary which cost money and

and African-American voters
and drew a

political capital, leaving

him weakened for the

general election.

The
poll

situation did not look so bleak
for

showed him ahead of Chabot 48%

tavorable/unfavorable

ratio.

In this

In

32% Mann

the

summer of

also had a fair

almost every case the campaign manager
was a local

until

put together a team which included the

and Schoen for

polling;

,%%

reelecting

case the team was headed by native
Ohioan JeffBerding

Mann

1994,

to

An

early

32%

Mann

was,

like

study, a combination of local activists
and national

campaign manager for Mann from January 1994
helped

in

The campaign team charged with

many of the campaign teams under
consultants.

to

Mann

Berding was the

November of

New York

political operative.

1995,

Berding

consulting firm of Penn

Washington D.C, consultant Roy Fletcher

for the production

and placement of electronic media; and Cleveland
based Burges and Burges as general
and direct mail consultants. The campaign used
in-state fundraising,

fundraising.

The

and a

DC

based firm,

a local staffer,

FMG enterprises,

division of fundraising duties

91

between

Andy Goldner,

PAC

and

DC

in-district efforts

and

for

for

Washington

D

C. efforts

is

,u,te

common

and points ou, the nat.ona,
and local

character of many congressional
123
efforts.

Mann's primary challenger was
Afncan-American
candidate

Mann had

onginally defeated for thejoh

African-American community and
divisive

May

primary.

labor, lost to

The campaign pursued

state senator Bill

Bowen,

the

Bowen, with the support of the

Mann by

fewer than 1000 votes

in

the

the triple strategic goal of
increasing the

perception of Mann as an independent
Democrat, solidifying the Democratic
base after
the bruising primai^. and increasing

To

Chabofs negative image through

early attack ads.

accomplish these goals, the campaign
ran an aggressive, heavily
targeted,

direct contact effort.

group of voters

Like the Chabot campaign, the

living in

swing voter precincts.

The

Mann

contact effort focused on a

actual swing vote

a combination of precinct and demographic
targeting.

First, precincts

was

were

identified

identified as

swing through the application of formulas
developed by the National Committee
an Effective Congress (NCEC), a Washington
for Democratic candidates

all

DC

over the countiy.

group

NCEC

that

by

for

performs these analyses

defined swing precincts as

those voting for then candidate Clinton and
Republican Senate candidate Michael

Dewine
Fisher

in

in

1992 as well as Voinovich and Democratic
gubernatorial candidate Gene

1990.

The campaign

to both presidential candidate

also

gave consideration

also vote for a belter

gave a

George Bush and Senator Howard Metzenbaum

These combinations allowed the campaign to

may

to precincts that

target areas

See Herrnsoii Congressional Eledions.

92

in

1988

which lean Republican but

known and more popular Democratic

ballot.

plurality

alternative

on the same

After completing their
computations the campaign
was

Mann

precincts,

himself,

talked to voters where possible

A mailing

Both the

of Mann by emphasizing
literature

The next
policies,

mailing,

A

it

his

of Mann

in

targeted to the

These same voters received

Mann and

Because of Mann
in

mailing

was then mailed

was designed

same key

of Mann on one side headed a

On

s

list

is

to build a

of issue positions on

the opposite side

file,

often the case, no

was an

unflattering

number of programs touted by Mann,

a tlnal mailing constructed from a collage
of newspaper

his record.

tough primary with Bowen,

They

his

campaign needed to improve

sent out

two mailings which were

designed both to improve Mann’s image and to increase
turnout.

As

the mailings

campaign

staffer

were targeted

Because race

to selected precincts.

had saved any copy of the

descriptions arc taken from an interview with Jeff Bcrding,

Mann campaign

Mann

is

The

not

first

mailings. These

manager.

People often confuse "race" and "ethnicity". This

is not limilcd to the political world but is
cvciyday conversation as well as within the social sciences. Definitions of the terms
arc
controversial. However, in the political world "ethnicity" is a category which
can be approximated by
using surnames while race cannot. Approximately 55% of African-American voters
code as "Irish" on

endemic

to

ethnic dictionaries.

all

compared Mann and Chabot’s

precincts,

the African-American community.

a variable on the voter

to

the district, and both highlighted
Mann's

picture of Chabot which listed his
opposition to a

image

The

Mann

independence from the Democratic
party

education, race relations, and social
security

his

every door and

diverged from Clinton or other key
democratic constituencies,

flattering picture

articles praising

literature at

the

in

drop and the mailing featured
the same material. Both
were

positive, both contained pictures

voting record where

left

called "Independence"

households within the one hundred
top precincts.

line.

with 100 targeted

along with volunteers and
workers, went door-to-door

twenty top persuasion precincts.
The volunteers

positive picture

left

Such targeting require

care.

There arc two ways

93

to target

African-American

\

oters.

African-American mailing was signed
by Senator
general election.

The

letter

The

letter pratsed

Both pieces went

to the

straight "David

Mann

efforts

Mann

at the

that

The Penn and Schoen

base

script

was

a

(say polling place). Blue Chip Marketing,
a Cincinnati-based telemarketing

voter to participate

in

someone who knows

African-Americans

any precincts

more

detailed persuasion message.

\

otcrs.

the area will simply
If

list

precincts they

such local knowledge

that cast over

in July of 1997.

in

The phoner

congress, and urged the

the election on Tuesday.

75%

know

isn't available,

to contain a certain

percentage of

or not applicable, campaigns will

of their ballots for the Democratic presidential candidate.

Recollections of the Penn and Schoen call

and Burges

know

Their pollster, Penn and Schoen,

asked to speak with a particular voter,
praised Mann's record

target

voters

needs your vote. Please turn out on
Tuesday.” Your polling

firm, called selected precincts
with a

First,

let

rights legislation.

same group of 38,567 households.

designed a turnout program aimed

is

on behalf of evil

for the

supporting Mann. The second
piece attacked Chabofs record
on race

The campaign made two phonmg

place

efforts

contained nothing controversial
and was designed to

Bowen was
issues.

Mann's

Bowen and endorsed Mann

The Blue Chip

came from an inten iew with

Jeff

Rusnak of Burges

review came in a phone conversation with Terry Ward,
President of Blue Chip Marketing of Cincinnati, also in July of 1 997.
script

94

The following
effort

table provides a quick,
visual

undertaken by the

F

summary

of each individual direct
contact

Mann Campaign.

able 4.6 IMaiui

Campaign

Direct Contact Snniniary

Target Group Description

Door to Door drop

^

Count

to

all

hhsids

in

top 20 swing precincts

56,418

^
1

precincts

Newspaper Collage

—
9 296

Independence mailing to top 100
persuasion precincts
ConiDSriSOn
mailinn tn
IDA
...
^
lu tr*r»
lup Fvu persuasion
to top 100 nersiiT-inn

56,418
56,418

Bowen

Letter to African-American
precincts

38,5b/

Race/issue comparison to Atrican-American
precincts

38,567
3«5,^8b

ciivfii lu

beieciea larQeted precincts

15,233

4.3 F^ennsylvania Congressional
District

All descriptions or accountings

Erie

feels

IS

Third

of Erie, Pennsylvania, begin with a
sentence

in size

Ignored by the rest of Pennsylvania,

political

IS

the forgotten city".

wag

Twenty-One: 1996

behind Pittsburgh and Philadelphia,
falling into the great

often

bulk of the state one

characterized as "Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and
Mississippi in-between."

even relegated the

state's highest

were an afterthought. The

city

congressional district number; 21, as

state.

is

never

given place because their day-to-day

much of an
life is real

is

if

tied

to Pittsburgh or Philadelphia.

issue with the actual residents of any

enough

to them.

Part of that

life in

Erie

a highly competitive political environment, reflected in the congressional
district that

encompasses Erie and the surrounding counties of Butler, Crawford and Mercer.

95

It

the district

Northwest Pennsylvania

by water and industry more to Cleveland and Buffalo than

Of course being "forgotten"

if

has the best natural harbor on Lake Erie but few,

anyone, thinks of Pennsylvania as a Great Lakes

is

it

like

In

1996 the
district

district

produced one of the closest
House races

and a partisan breakdown,
by county,
In

1996 the incumbent congressman

was Republican

Phil English,

background" which,

in

He brought

is

A map

the nation,

in

of the

provided on the followin
g page.

for Pennsylvania
congressional district 21

to

Washington what one book

20.h century American

politics,

means

calls a "varied

a varied political career

as a legislative aid, campaign
strategist, state committee
member, candidate for
treasurer,

994

local elected official.

English

of political experiences. He was

variety

1

and

at the

is

a professional politician
but

one with a

originally elected in the
Republican landslide

age of 34, the culmination of a

of

political career that started in
his early 20's

Local politics tends to be Democratic
and union, with contests taking
place

along ethnic
decade,

lines.

Poles and Italians have long
competed for local oftice. In the past

some of the

community has moved away from

Italian

the Democratic party and toward
the Republicans.

more

tied to Erie

proper and

is

in

Reagan won Erie county

by

Crawford and Butler county tend

industrial problems,

district

is

American

and

in

1980 and 1984 but

GOP

facts talcen

Mercer make up

to be Republican but

the very popular

Republican, helped establish the

District descriptions

Butler, and

a Democratic stronghold.

was represented by

community has remained

1988 and 1992.’^^

The outlying counties of Crawford,
district.

Polish

very close to labor. Outside of the city
of Erie, in Erie

County, the battles are hard fought

Dukakis and Clinton won

The

their traditional roots in

Tom

now

of the

Mercer county, hard

Before English

Ridge,

49%

won

in

hit

1994 the

Governor. Ridge, also a

as a force in local politics.

from Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa.

Politics (Congressional Qnaterly Press,

Washington

96

DC

1996).

.

pp 1178-1180

The Almanac of

English bea, Eric Leavans

Leavans contrasted

hts

a 1994 race that
highlighted class differences,

in

background as the

local

with English's histoo- as a
mainline Erie family
sector,

Enghsh stuck with

son ofa Polish-American

who had

never worked

in

worker

mtll

the private

the winning national
formula for Republicans and
called for a

middle class tax cut and attacked
Leavens by linking the Democrat
with President
Clinton,

Evidently taxes and current political
animosities outweighed
perceived class

differences and English

won by 4713

votes, 89,439

summarizing the general election history
of the

Appendix

in

(49%)

district

to

A

84,796 (47%),

from 1990

until

1998

is

provided

3.

The 1996

contest

Always considered

was very

different,

even

a classic marginal seat, except

found himself on top of every target

list.

As

if

the

when

outcome proved the same.
held by

early as April

Tom

Ridge,

Enghsh

of 1995 he was one of two

Republicans targeted by the Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee
in local

table

(DCCC)

ads that sought to marry English and Gingrich.
The ads had serious effects and

contributed to making the 1996 English/Dinicola
race one of the 20 closest House races

m

the country.

English finally prevailed by fewer than 1000
votes and a percentage

margin of 51% to

49%

despite outspending DiNicola $1,262,645 to
$478,871.

English's spending advantage obscures the large
role played by labor in the

DiNicola campaign and also hides some very diverse spending
patterns
individual race.

television

TV

The two men faced very

was king

m

the 21

different strategic situations.

congressional

district,

areas around Eire and intensive, targeted

GOTV

st

97

in

each

Although

markets outside the lower cost
efforts

by both campaigns

led the

1

to the use of the 2

1

CD

st

voter

The

file,

table

below summarizes the spending

etTort

of the two campaigns.

Table

4.7:

Distribution of English and
DiNicola

Campaign Spending

Campaign
English
Dinicola

$1,262,645.00

$478,871.00

$118,930.00
1

nt-VU c%

-

$66,100.00

9%

1

13.7%

$151,287.00
Mail”/,

1

11.9%

oiai uirect

wUllldCl

Contact

ource:

Much of English’s
maintenance

GOTV and

in

The spending

is

spending advantage consists of money
spent on organizational

reflects their strategy.

his

money on

manager

On

more phone and
in

of the

the eight months preceding the

the other hand,

money

labor.

This type

DiNicola had to spend a

because he needed to spend time and

mail intensive activity.

more

detail

The

direct contact

below.

Effort

Phil English's

campaign was managed by Bob Holste, now

Administrative Assistant in Washington,
for

85%

English needed to spend

direct contact

campaigns are discussed

Congressman
s

in

Over

image against early attacks by DiNicola and

solidifying his base, a

The English

English

reports^

best conducted on television.

strategies for both

4.3.1

EEC

Mail expenditures for English took place

greater percentage of his

money

35.3%

the months and years leading up to
the election.

defending himself and

of defense

$169,388.00

21.4%

figures taken from

elections.

Ti.5%

$270,217.00

/o

—

$103,288.00

Congressman English during the

98

final

D

C. Mr. Holste

three

worked

as

campaign

weeks of the campaign.

Public Op,„|„„ strategy
a.td the

campaign did

direct mail

and voter

,POS) was

local fundraising mternaliy

tile

television

They

all

had local campaign managers

also had fundraisers

working

in

the district and

C.

In the early

RiNicola and a

fundta.s.ng

Steve Meyers of SCM
Assoc.ates did

Hoyer and Mann. They

but national campaign consultants.

D

LAC

Again, the English campaign
shows an organizational make-up

similar to fellow incumbents

Washington,

Ottosea/Sandets did

work while Murpy/Pmtak/Gautier
provided

production and buying.

in

the., pollstet

summer

47%-29%

percentage of voters

a

POS

showed English with

Eavorable/Unfavorable

who view

considered worrisome

poll

ratio.

a

50%-37%

lead over

This ratio retlects the

the candidate favorably and any
figure under ,S0%

fhe below average favorable figure

may have

retlectcd the early

spring labor attacks on English's record
and required that the campaign spend
early to both defend English and attack
DiNicoia,

of the English effort, and

inefficient Pittsburgh

it

was concentrated

media market

based on the cost of felevision.

This

is

in

Direct contact

is

was only a

money

small part

areas within the expensive and

an excellent example of campaign tactics

The campaign

senf out four mailings

and ran an

extensive calling effort.

The

first

piece of mail

and contained a signed
governor,

Tom

letter

was

sent to

all

voters

in

the district

who were

55 or over

from the very popular former congressman and current

Ridge.

99

In the letter

Rrdge defended English's
effons on behalf of Social
Security^ Ridge

wrote
Phil English realizes
that Pennsylvania has the

population

America

in

'When

Phil s position IS co-stal
clear;

promised

A

it,

it

You

you are counting on

second highest senior
to Medicare and Social
Security
earned it, you deserve it, you

comes

it,

wer^

and he wil make sure you
get

second mailing went to Senior's
throughout the

district.

it.'“

This piece was a simple

oversized post card with a picture
of a senior citizen and the headline
quote

worked harder

for us than Phil English,"

"No one

Butler and Crawford county
voters,

all

has

of whom

are within the Pittsburgh media
market received a mailing contrasting
English's local roots

with DiNicola,

who

had resided

"Hollywood" Ron image
countered with their

built

in

California prior to

moving back

by the English campaign lasted

own message

ten

weeks out from

to Erie,

until the

the election.

In fact, the

DiNicola people

This mailing, with

small local variations, had pictures of
English in the district opposite of DiNicola

surrounded by symbols of California
saying

California U.S, 66", All of it

here; DiNicola

is

from

English also

let

Hollywood

was meant

sign, sunglasses,

and a road sign

to express the theme, "English

is

from

there".

made heavy use of advocacy

your message get

in

Republican Party called
with a

like the

below the radar
all

screen."

calls

And phone

of the Republican voters

GOTV script which read

"Tom Ridge and

because, as Holste put

they did.

it,

“Phones

The Pennsylvania

in the district prior to election

day

the rest of the Pennsylvania

Republican ticket need your vote, please go to the polls on Tuesday."
The campaign
calls

mail.

focused on Crawford and Butler Counties and used a
"Phil English

is

script

one of us and the Democrats have brought

which reinforced the
in a

candidate from

Steve Meyers, English's direct mail consultant, kindly provided copies of the mailings.

100

—

California'"^^

agatnst his

The

n,ail

also called DINicola
a California Uberal and

dangerous

liberal

ideas!"

encompassed the whole range of
phone

The phone

effort

warned the voters

undertaken by English

goals; persuasion, ID, and

GOTV. The

following table provides a
visual suntma,^ of the
English direct contact

Table

English Direct Contact

4.8:

efforts.

Summary

Target Group Description

'

Count

^

Kidge Letter to Senior^
56,994

Brochure to Seniors
56,994
52,091

Butler/Mercer county comparison
piece

85,256

130,274
«.>dmpaign oalls to Butler and Crawford

4.3.2

The DiNicola
It IS

and go

like

Effort

often difficult to speak of "the
campaign manager", as they tend to

modern

manager of record

Itself

professional sports franchises.

for

prior to the election.

found

67,943

Ron DiNicola

It is

a

Bill

Peduto was the campaign

but he only held that position for the
ten

wonder anyone would have wanted

2
3

Schedule candidate

No

weeks

The campaign
first

task

was

After a series of meetings they decided on
three goals:

Secure a strong commitment from local labor leaders.
Solidify the Democratic base

1

the job.

twenty-two points down with ten weeks to go. Mr.
Peduto's

to focus the campaign.

come

copies of the scripts

s

time and lundraising efforts.

e.xist.

This reconstruction was done over

president of Grassroots Direct, the phoning
January of 1999.

company making

the calls.

tlie

The

phone with Jack Zadow,

inteiv

iew took nlace in

Labor leaders supported DiNicola. The support described was a local
effort to keep national
COPE, from dropping the race from its target group. The task of the campaign was to
convince local and national leaders that they could reverse the downward
drop and climb back into the
labor, primarily

race against English.
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To acccopHsh

these three goals Peduto
put together a campaign
tean, that

included pollster David
Bennett of Bennett. Petts

RMM Consulting;

direct ma, expert
I

&

Associates the fundratsing firm

Ed Peevy of Dtrec, Response;
and

consultant Michael Donilon of
Shrum/Donilon/Devine.

Peduto was a

televtsion

local political

operative but the other members
of the campaign team were from
out-of-state.
All three goals

which,

in

were directed

and of itself, would be

at arresting drift

sufficient to

distnct demographics and time
constraints.

win the

and refocusing
election.

Tactically,

It

effort

was

on a base

a strategy born of

the DiNicola campaign
needed

to sohdtiy their base through
personal contact and then use their
abundant

ground

resources to turn out their vote. They
also needed to respond to the
English attacks

key jurtsdtctions.

First,

the campaign identified a core
group of voters

voted since 1992, These voters, mostly
Democratic

women

in Eire,

came

who had

two turnout

not

to 15,000

households with a phone. Each targeted
household received one identification
then

in

and

call

calls.

Like the English campaign, the direct mail
focused on Butler and Mercer
counties.

inside the

sent

These counties were home

more expensive and

two mailings

households. The

slick

to a

number of key swing voters

less efficient Pittsburgh

into Butler county, both to

first

all

as well as being

media market. The campaign

Democratic and Independent

mailing, called "Bricklayer" sought to redefine DiNicola
from the

Hollywood lawyer portrayed by

made good, "Tough enough

to

box

The campaign manager developed

in

the English campaign to the ex-marine, local

the Marines, smart

enough

to

go to Harvard", and

a mail plan calling for four mailings to Butler

county. These were considered, at least in part, "swing" areas. They only had the
the last minute funding groups in the state switched their money over to different

boy

money

and Mercer
for

two and

Pennsylvania races.
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at

born to an immigrant
bricklayer
in

at that.

That the piece was mailed
to Democratic voters

Butler and Mercer counties
showed the importance placed
on recovering a dwindling

The second
Independent voters

campaign

mailing discussed senior
issues and was sent to

who were 65

called this the -Older

or over and

who

all

Democratic and

lived in Butler county.

Voter/FDR- piece and

The

emphasized DiNicola’s

it

ties

to traditional Democratic
issues as well as the threat
Republicans presented to the
elderly

by contrasting Democratic support

on our most important

for Social Security with
"Republican Attacks

social program".

Because of the large number of labor
volunteers and the importance of
turning
out the Democratic base, the
DiNicola campaign concentrated on
phoning and literature
drops, both of which can be performed
by volunteers.
drops.

The

first

drop was done

in

They

the City of Erie and the

second drop, done by labor union volunteers,
was

in

its

volunteers for one

Christian Coalition prints

ballot

its political

final

and over" as

definition of senior"
its

is

Shenango

large literature

Valley.

his

The
Both

Democratic base.

The

foray on the Sunday before the election

The

endorsements on that day and puts the resulting

package on the windshields of cars parked

The

two

Western Eire county.

drops were designed to improve DiNicola's
image with

campaign used

did

somewhat

arbitrarv'.

at

One

churches.

voter

file

senior definition until the owner of the firm turned
54.

The campaign got an

company
The

insisted

definition

was

on using "55
altered to read

"65 and over".

The

valley

is

defined as the towns of Farrell, Sharpsville, Sharon, Hermitage,
and Wheatland.

Western Eire county

campaign defined area and encompassed all of Erie City, Albion
Boro, Edinboro, Fairview Boro, Girard Boro, North East Boro,
Waterford Boro, Wattsburg Boro,
Wesleyv'ille Boro, Fairview Township, Girard Township,
Harborcreek Township, Millcreek Township,
is

largely a

Summit Township, Union Township, and Waterford Township
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advance copy of the piece and
prepared a response^ Their
volunteers then placed the
response next to the Christian
Coalitton piece on each

church

lots in Erie. Butler City.
Greenville.

This activity took place

car.

at all

Sharpsburg, Parrel. Meadvtile.
and the

previously defined West County
area. The drop

in

response to the Christian
Coalition

featured DiNicola with his family
history and linked English
to "outside extremists”
didn't

have the

drop are

it

left

districts best interests at
heart

last

the calling

polls

called

short, direct,

on Tuesday

to elect a

Labor also made

own
all

all

Democrats

four general elections.

was

in

In the city

the district

had voted

of Eire they called

and partisan. The

Democrat

who

all

in

two or more

Democrats.

script read, in part, "Please

go

All

of

to the

to congress and stop the right wing."’^^

significant efforts.

In addition to calling

and turning out

their

union membership organized labor helped the
campaign to knock on the doors of

Democrats who

lived in precincts with an National

Committee

Congress (NCEC) defined Democratic performance
of 70% or
door

that

DiNicola's personal background.

The campaign
of the

Unfortunately, no copies of the
second

and none of those interviewed
remember much about the piece
except

was taken up with

who

effort

was aimed

at

effort

GOTV calls to

and the labor

Provided in an interview with

NCEC
information.

greater.’^®

The door-to-

persuading Democrats and encouraging their
participation.

Labor volunteers then made a

Both the door-to-door

for an Effective

Bill Peduto,

all

calls

Democrats
emphasized

campaign manager,

living in the

that

in

it

was

same

precincts.

a union calling

June of 1996.

provides Democratic campaigns and parties around the country with precinct
targeting

The organization

is

based

in

Washington

for this dissertation.

104

DC

and was very helpful

in providing information

—
and that DiNicola represented
the union and working
class vote.

summarizes the DiNicola campaign

Table

4.9;

DiNicola

The following

table

effort.

Campaign

Direct Contact

Summary

Descriotion

Count

u

iinsias in Duller

and Mercer

(Bricklayer)

56521
Ul

Hnsids 65 plus Butler, Mercer
(Senior/FDR)

All

Hhslds, brie City, Shenango Valley
(Drop

—
9996

1)

81077
All

Hhslds, Western Eire County (Drop

2)

115793
All

D

m E„e Cty; All D phone »,d 2 o, more Gen. In the

All

D 70%

All

D

reel

ofii^Tcounty UDonej

42653

IviCEC persuasion

22903
70/o

NcbC

with

phone
17070

4.4 California Congressional
District

The

California

self-description;

it

first

One: 1996

congressional aspires to

fulfill

Walt Whitman's

too encompasses multitudes. Stretching
from the

Sonoma county

wine country to the rough, remote, country
along the California-Oregon border,

more

present

country.

are the

it

the

is

50%

to

that outsiders take with

cliffs in

district

In the 1980’s the population of Vacaville and
Fairfield

counties.

The

diverse

economy

ranching, tourism, eco-tourism, and the military.

marijuana as a cash crop of note. The

district
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first

the northern counties of Del Norte and

more than 150,000, About 40% of the

Napa and Solano

them of the

more populated and suburban southwestern corner of the

that provides the votes.

roughly

common image

redwoods standing over the

Mendocino,

may

contrasts and contradictions than any other
congressional district in the

Although the most

tall

it

district's

total

grew by

vote comes from

includes agriculture, logging,

The

agricultural output counts

contains Fort Ross, the only place

in

the

lower 48 states ortginally

Had

1841.

settled

distinctly Slavtc flavor.

bad Russian land deal

in

the

new

distant cousin the grape
vine.

now

built

the for,

in

18,2 and sold

it

in

they waited another
eight years they would
have found gold and the
49'ers

would have had a

are

by Russians, They

over two-hundred.

world.

As

district

the sale will

The Redwoods

Where twenty

A

it ts,

go down

as yet another

and thrive near then

live

years ago there were twenty
winenes there

map and

partisan

breakdown by county

,s

provided on the following page.*^^
This unstable amalgamation of
economic, botanical and historical
diversity has

given

rise to

a competitive and unstable politics
defined less by traditional ethnic
or

class cleavages like those that
divide the
cultural conflict

The

large

in

number of working

class citizens in the district has
tilted

issues, but

took

victory

it

m

his

background

in the military

a tough 1990 election.

Two

is

in

alternative school in the district.

District description

Almanac ofAmerican

and

toward the

district's coast.

and law enforcement and parlayed

years later Riggs,

Dan Hamburg, one of People

year, a charismatic environmentalist

it

represented by Congressman Frank Riggs

checking account overdrafts, found himself uncovered
as

opponent

and more by

has gravitated toward Republican social

response to the influx of counterculture
voters along the

California congressional district 01

who

traditional Pennsylvania
21,

between environmentalists, loggers,
developers, and suburbanites.

Democratic party on economic
Views

more

who
well.

it

into

helped uncover House

He drew

a tough

magazine's "50 Most Beautiful People" that

who had

graduated from Stanford and founded an

Hamburg summarized

political history taken

from Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa.

Politics (Congressional Quaterly Press,
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the differences between Riggs

Washington

DC

1996) pp 95-97

The

and himself by saying "He
used to be a narc and

1

favored growing your own".

Hamburg won.
They
and the

battled again in 1994

battle turned into

say jobs

one ofjobs

and not Earth

first

Hamburg drew

firs,

vs,

heavtiy

conservation,

on envtronmental suppon

Riggs was quoted as saytng,

‘4

hke Dan Hamburg and the
other environmental

extremtsts do”. Evidently the
message worked better in 94 than
in 92 and Riggs

regained his seat

-

the only congressman that
year to do so.

Spending followed incumbent
to $647,532.

Hamburg won 48%

to

lines.

Riggs outspent Hamburg

45%, The

roles

were reversed

Hamburg, now the incumbent, outspent
Riggs $834,61
to

47%.

It IS

probably the only

winner two cycles

Appendix

in

a row.

district in the

A table

1

in

newcomer Angela

Democratic primary and the

famous San Francisco

1994 and

to $605,185, while losing

53%

country where the loser has outspent
the

summarizing the

district's electoral history is in

Alioto surprised political observers by
winning the

right to challenge

politician,

Riggs

in the general.

made

Related to the

Joesph Alioto, and wheelchair bound from a skiing

accident, the telegenic Alioto proved to be
a colorful candidate.

Her

surprising primary

her a target of opportunity for the Democratic party.
In addition to

providing the Democratic candidate, San Francisco also
supplies the
stations

1992 $716,401

3.

In 1996,

victory

in

dominate the market and make advertising

expensive proposition.
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in the 1st

CD

TV coverage.

an inefficient and

Its

Table 4.10: Dis.ribu.io,. of
Riggs and Aliolo Campaign
iinipaigii S
Spending
Campaign
Riggs
Alioto

Total

$1,390,399.00

UET -OUT-THF-VOTF

$1,228,870.00

$83,4ji'J.OO

CjET-OUT-THF-VOTF®/.

$61,443.00

6%

Mail

5%

$431,023.00

MdiP/o

$270,351.00

31%

22%

$514,446.00

$331,794.00

37%

ource;

FiPiires takpn frr

Riggs outspent Aliot (see table

money on

^27%

P’rr'

4.

1

0) but not by much.

persuasion efforts than on

GOTV

Both campaigns spent much more

and both spent larger percentages
of their

budget on mail than did other campaigns
included

in this study.

No

doubt the high cost

San Francisco media market constrained
both candidates.

The Riggs

4.4.1

Effoii

Phillips

managed

the Riggs campaign team.

unlike the other campaign managers

become

POS

tor polling,

and

studied,

of California provided the voter

relied

out-of-state,

Riggs team included

Steve Powell for media production; National
Media for media

Bay Area consultant Harvey Hukari

To pay

The

In addition to Phillips the

for the targeting

Shellie Garret of Garret Enterprises assisted with
the

VCS

was from

the case studies, but, like them, he went
on the

Riggs’ Administrative Assistant.

buying; and

mail,

in

Phillips

and design of direct

complex precinct targeting

file effort.

tor this collection of talent, Riggs, again like the other
incumbents

on two fundraisers, one

local fundraiser

in

was Pam Simpson,

Washington

D

a Riggs staffer.
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C. and the other in the district.

Tom Hammond

performed the

PAC

duties in the Distr.ct of
Coin, nb, a.

39%,

a

dose margin

Californta

45%

firs,

of the

In July,

an Al.oto poll had Riggs
ahead 4

!•/.

to

for a race with an
incumbent but not unusual in
the turbulent

congressional

d, strict.

An

early

dtstricfs voters held a
favorable

POS

poll

showed

view of Riggs. Over

that

between

89%

40%

and

of the voters had

heard of Riggs as compared to
near zero for newcomer Alioto.

According to

Phillips, the

campaign stressed voter turnout of
its base areas

well as targeting swing areas for
persuasion efforts.

The campaign message compared

the experienced Riggs who,
as a congressman, had brought
a
into the district,

number of local

in

charge of small,

and the consultant team of Hukari and
Garret providing the targeting and

design for larger direct mail and phoning
calling

projects

and Alioto. the young, inexperienced
newcomer. This message was

delivered by a two-pronged direct
contact effort with the campaign
local mailings

as

and door-to-door

targeted included

all

effort

The campaign undertook an extensive

efforts.

based on precinct election return targeting.

those meeting the following four

1 )

Dan Hamburg

lost to

2)

Angela Alioto

lost in the

3) Frank Riggs beat

Don Bosco

in

criteria:

the 94 Democratic Primary

1996 Democratic primary

Dan Hamburg

4 ) Pete Wilson beat Kathleen

in the

Brown

1994 General

in the

These precincts were the focus of a three

Gubernatorial

part walking program.

voters in the precincts were canvassed with an ID question.
distributed a piece

Precincts

which touted Riggs'

district

work.

First, all

Second, the campaign

Finally,

all

of the voters were

given a newsletter and a video that attacked a number of statements Alioto had
made
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dunng

the campaign.

Later, the

campaign

called

back

of the favorable voters

all

in

these precincts for turnout.

The campaign

Napa county
done

voters

also did a

all

number of local

received a mailing touting the

The campaign

in their area.

mailings.

Mendocino, Solano, and

work Congressman Riggs had

did no, have any copies of
the local mailings

left

for

the election but Phillips described
them as "positive pieces which listed
the federal
projects that Frank had either brought
into the district or

The Napa
mailing to

mailing

all

was

further subdivided into a mailing
to

of Napa outside of American Canyon

federal grant for

was

American Canyon

City.

Finally,

City.

currently working on.

American Canyon City and

a

Riggs had worked hard on a

a local mailing wen, out to targeted

zip codes along the district's Pacific
coast which highlighted the positive side
of Riggs'

environmental record.

The campaign's
produced and targeted

internal effort

was supplemented by twelve

direct mail pieces

and extensive paid phone work. The

campaign defined groups of seniors, persuadable

The

actual targeting

was very complex

were recovered and used

for

file

These older voters received two mail

voters, and base voters for targeting.

but, fortunately,

coding.

the original production orders

Seniors were defined as those over

pieces.

The

first

on Social Security benefits by 59%". After noting

would

over

this

one

in his

sixty.

attacked Alioto for "helping to

raise taxes

roll

professionally

that "President Roosevelt

grave" the campaign went on to compose another senior piece,

positive, touting Riggs for his leadership

The persuadable universe was

on the Medicare Preservation Act.

defined using a combination of precinct election return

targeting and political information.

First,

Democrats

living in precincts

which had

voted RepubHcan for president

in

1994 and on the conservative
side of a 1994 ballot

measure were chosen. The campaign
referred
this

were Repubhcan voters who had

failed to turnout out in

The targeted Republicans were

elections.

three attacks on Alioto.

pay her taxes, vote, or

all

had

left

live in the district"

her heart

in

called "Soft R's"

The

her native

first

mailing

who had moved
The second

city.

a quote of hers saying "People

The

final

two of the

who

These voters received

was

in

"Taxes are for the

graphic presentation

reader.

that a

may

It

man

on time and contrasted

The

that with

attack piece sent to the persuadable
universe, entitled

lines:

She

can't

be bothered to pay

here.'"^”

the middle and a spare outside cover sporting
a head turning lead
Little

People

The Riggs mail

mode which conveys

a

message

in the

woman

campaign could

in a

campaign

recall

original quote appeared in the

which

will

is

an excellent example of a

to even the

also signal the passing of the assumption,

attacking a

No one

"Her Heart" and

of the mail pieces were printed on oversized
pieces of glossy paper. They

had a single fold

like

called

to the district to run for

taxes, she can't be bothered to vote, she
can't be bothered to live

all

three

can afford to pay their taxes should
be happy to pay

"Bothered" summarized the other attacks with
three

All

last

attack, called 'Little People"

detailed taxes that the wealthy Alioto
had failed to pay

their taxes.’"”

D's".« Added to

designed to remind the voters
that "She can't be bothered
to

implied that Alioto. a San Francisco
native
office,

to thrs target as "Soft

come

most

common among

Register,

consultants,

off as too harsh and

ballot initiative.

Napa Valley

inattentive

March

Quotes taken from mail piece provided by consultant Harv'ey

16, 1996.

Hiikari.

mean-spiritied.

The

campaigned from

Rigg's campaign not only
attacked a

woman,

but one

who

a wheelchair.

Riggs targeted independents
with three positive pieces.
The

first,

"Clear

Choice" contrasted newspaper
endorsements of Riggs to negative
press for Alioto. The
second, "Fighting" simply
like the

final

listed the

endorsements Riggs had received
from

United Seniors Association and the
National Federation of Small
Business. The

The campaign

targeted Democrats.

To supplement

also mailed a piece

In

all,

on the Riggs environmental record

the eleven Riggs mailings reached
over

same persuadable universe which had received
so much

delivered a message about Alioto being

of the Riggs contacts

emphasized

his

1

that

50,000 voters.

the mail, the campaign paid a
telemarketing firm. Direct Contact

America, to conduct an intensive persuasion
phoning program.

All

groups

piece mailed to independents
highlighted headlines from
newspapers endorsing

Riggs.

the

local

record

in

new

Direct Contact called

mail from Riggs and

to the district and inexperienced at
politics.

illustrate the strategy

of an incumbent with a tough

mailings to independents and he called his base
but,

addition, because the district

was

volatile

and the race close, he attacked

by mailing to groups of swing Republicans and Democrats.

his

race.

He

in

opponent

1

Table 4

number of mail

1

1

ilu,i

follows so.omarizes the
Kiggs contact cITott

Because of the

pieces an extra column giving
the ca.upaign's nante
for each piece

IS

included.

Table
"ri

The Kiggs Canipaigii

4. II;

Her Heart

R2

Little

R3

People

Bothered

R4

Roosevelt

R5

Soft

R and

Soft

D

Soft

R and

Soft

D

Soft

R and

Soft

D

Seniors

Seniors/Medicare

136,069
136,069
97,321
97,321

Independents

78,412

Fighting

Independents

R8

Headliners

Independents

R9

Redwood Empire

Dems

Local

Mendocino

Local

Solano

K1Z

Local

Napa

r\io

Local

Coastal Zip Codes

1

136,069

One

R7

K

Sum, nary

Seniors two

Clear Choice

Din

Direct Contact

Phoning

All

78,412

78,412

voted 11/94

84,969
_

(RIO, 11, 12 = 160,626)

169,000

Walking One

target precincts

Kib

Walking Two

target precincts

68,070

K17

Walking Three

sg525, target precincts

68,070

4.4.2

The

Pier

the final vote

was

managed

the Alioto for Congress from

tallied in

Bill

electronic media advertising placement.

fundraising.

The campaign
and

its field

in this

study,

The

Ambrosino and Muir

efforts.

inception

in

early 1996 until

Carrick did both media production and
firm of Gaddy/Neuwirth handled both local

did direct mailing planning and production.

did no internal phoning but did

phoning

its

November. Paul Maslin of Hickman/Maslin and Brown

provided polling and strategic advice.

PAC

68,070

Alioto Effort

Tom

and

-

43,296

voters with a phone

work

closely with the Democratic party

This campaign team was more local than

Ambrosino and Muir, Gaddy/Neuwirth, and

Bill

many examined

Carrick were

all

from

CaLfornia,

„

is

hard to gather front this
fact whether

challengers hiring

draw on

more

local talent or

name ID was

a

campaign

part

of a larger trend toward

whether Calfornia candidates
can more

felt

it

easily

had an excellent chance to
unseat Rtggs, Riggs’ high

mixed blessing because

The Ahoto's campaign's

to

is

the huge base of local
consulting firms.

In July, the

many swing

districts

it

his favorable/unfavorable
ratio

was

38»/„ ,o

37%.

strategy aimed to link Riggs
and Gingrich in the mind of the

voters.

weaken the incumbent’s

Like many challengers she

base.

The campaign

felt

that attacks

were necessary

direct mail plan suggested
that

resources be spent on targeted voters
with a message that emphasized the
Assault

Weapons

ban, education funding. Medicare
and Social Security.

To quote from

the

plan:

"He (Riggs)

is working closely with
Newt Gingrich to slash flinding for
education, Medicare, and Social Security.
Frank Riggs is strongly

NRA

supported by the
and opposes the ban on assault weapons and
requiring waiting periods before being
allowed to purchase a gun. He
also out of touch with the needs of working
families by voting against
job-training programs.'"^’

To

get this message across the Alioto campaign
developed a complex direct mail

target of approximately 90,000 voters.

The

target

group consisted of three sub-groups;

independents. Republican

women, and

information

is

it is

illustration.

Unlike Riggs, they are simple enough to review, but unlike English
or

tedious but

soft

Democrats. Repetition of detailed targeting

worth quoting the Alioto targets

Devine, complex enough to be interesting.

The

This special target group for the medicare mailing
all

is

R women

in 3/96

over 60

who

voted in

1

in

depth simply for

three groups are defined

is

below

defined as "All Independents over 60 plus

1/94 but not 6/94 or 3/96 or registered since 10/5/94 and did not vote

T
and Greens over 30 who voted
nlnVr'
n792
1/92 plus
all independents
and greens over 2S who
voted in I/Q4 nr

1

1

registered since 10/05/94.

Group

b)

Republican women:

R women
women

1/92 but not 6/94 plus
Republican
not 6/94 or 3/96 plus all R
women
1

2/26/96.

Group

ages 25 to 49 who voted in
25 to 49 who voted 1/94
but
8-49 who have registered
since
1

1

Soft Democrats: Democrats
over age 25

c)

who voted in 1/92
democrats who voted 1/94 but not
6/94 or
3/o7°'i 'T'
w'’o have registered since 10/5/94
and
did
not vote
s/qa’ plus
4/96
democrats who have registered since
2/26/96.
1

'

1

Although the campaign recognized
that

It

had to increase Alioto’s name

that

it

needed to attack Riggs

identification.

it

also realized

Messages coming from a known

source have more impact than those
coming from an unknown source.'* The

of mail was a

made

reprint

five negative attack pieces

of varying severity

one each on Medicare, Assault Weapons and

text.

all

of the Alioto pieces were

The mail was designed

This style of mail

is

piece

of a primaiy brochure called "An
Independent Fighter for Us", and

the case for Alioto as a strong candidate.

mailings,

first

to

Rapidly following the brochure were

Two

of them covered education with

the Riggs record.

large, single fold,

Like the Rigg's

graphic pieces with very

little

convey a message to even the most cursory of readers.

often called "California Mail" because

it

thought to have come to

is

perfection in the expensive Los Angeles media market.

The

first

education piece attacked Riggs on his student loan votes. The second

piece featured a picture of Riggs and Gingrich with the headline "Frank
Riggs voted for

From

the Alioto direct mail plan. Quoted with permission of Paul Ambrosino,
principal,
Ambrosino/Muir/Hermann. All direct mail quotes from the Alioto campaign come from samples
provided by Ambrosino and Muir.

See Sellers, Strategy and Background

in

Congressional Campaigns.

Newt Gtngnch's
that

plan to cut education by
$10 B.liion

Riggs voted to cut Medicare
by 270

The Medicare piece claimed

billion dollars,

wh.le the assault

claimed that Riggs wanted to
repeal the ban. This mailing
often aggressive nature of
graphic mail.

with an assault weapon, held

anonymous crimmai. On
assault

rifle,

When

the back

should be sold to the public.

in

at

is

The

don’t think militatr-style
assault

I

final

or no

coordinated campaign for phone

phoning programs which called

,s

faced

All

all

weapons

of these mailings went to the same
target

field effort

calls.

same

attack piece used cartoons to
highlight

group except for the Medicare piece
which went to senior
little

the front the reader

Alioto. seated in her wheelchair,
holding the

the Riggs voting record.

The campaign had

compelling and

the sinister looking gloved
hands of an otherwise

in

stating "Unlike Frank Riggs,

inconsistencies

looking

illustrates the

weapon ban

The

of its

citizens.

own and

relted

on the state party

State Party ran both volunteer and
paid

of the Democrats

in the district.

additional local Democratic effort which
tried to increase the turnout

There was an

among Green

Party members, selected independents, and
Democrats, but the local party organization

would not share

its

actual target information.

Table

4.

1

2 below summarizes the Alioto

direct contact program.

Many

papers thought she was implying she had been injured with a weapon. She was actually

hurt in a ski accident.

keeping with the table
convention for Riggs, the campaign
names of each direct contact

In

effort

is

included.

Table 4.12: Aliolo Campaign
Direct Contact
Code

Name

Target

Fighter

Target Group

D2

Education

Target Group

D3

Truth

Target Group

D4

Medicare

D7

4.5

I

arget

Target Group

Gun

Target Group

Party

96,706
96,706
96,706

Group Seniors

College
Bdfi

'

Count

D1

D6

Snmmary

^

9,688

96,706
96,706

Democrats

118,987

Summary

In this chapter

1

detailed the direct voter contact effort
of eight campaigns in

four congressional districts through
interviews with consultants, campaign
managers,

and candidates, along with an examination
of phone
mail pieces.

Each contact was coded onto

purpose, and message.

One

final result

the base

of this

scripts,

file

effort

is

door-to-door

scripts,

and

and identified by source, type,
a description of seventy-three

(73) separate campaign contacts reaching over 1.2 million
voters during the 1994 and
1

996 campaign

cycles.

After the target universes for each contact had
been defined,

each contact was coded to voters on the base voter

file.

the categories defined in chapter three. Each contact

Coding proceeded according

was assigned

to individual voters

within five mutually exclusive categories.

1)

Party Source. Did the contact come from a Republican or Democrat?

2) Status Source: Did the contact

3)

Type Was

come from an incumbent

or a challenger?

the contact delivered via phone, mail or door to door?
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to

4)

5)

Puipose

Was

the contact designed for
persuasion, voter identification
or

Message. Was the contact
negative, personal, or issue

Table 4.13.

Summary

MDOS
Rpmihliran

33

6

17

33

7

7

8

“41

10

6

~19

~50

4

4

5

~3

1

1

2

3

1

2

1

5

4

3

16

10

7

21

43

9

8

6

36

3

10

21

2

9

17

13

25

74

4

4

4

4

21

15

Note: Cells represent
reoresen the niimher
nf contacts
rnr
number of

It is

8

11

4

Total

41

7

8

13

Issue

17

6

'

10

15

Negative

Total

8

5

Positive

CA01

10

1

P6rsuasion

PA21

7

15

nr\T\i

of All District Direct
Contact Efforts

OH01

11

specific’

in

~

each cateUy. Sou rce: Interviews and supplemental
sources.

not surprising to see a slight edge for Republican
and incumbent campaigns

over Democratic and challenger efforts (see Table

more money than Democrats and incumbents

4, 12).

Republicans tend to raise

far outstrip challengers in fundraising.

Mail efforts out number phone and door-to-door efforts
by a large margin. Sixty seven
percent of the contacts traveled through the mail as compared
to

and

9%

via door-to-door efforts.

related to

occupied

GOTV,
58%

persuasion

of the

total.

is

Because mail

is

22%

over the phones

related to persuasion, while calling

the dominate purpose of the contact programs and

is

Given the media attention

to negative

campaigning

it

is

a moderate surprise to

see that, overall, positive
contacts outnumber negative
contacts 43 to 36,
.0 look closer at

positive efforts

Still,

we

need

what kinds of contacts serve
various purposes. The
preponderance of

is

probably a result of most phone
efforts being coded as
"positive".

This brief summary

is

useful for understanding the
types of contacts involved in

the sample of cases selected
for study but

it

is

the types of voters receiving
the contacts

as well as the effect direct contact
has on those voters that

end the following chapters bring
together the voter

file

is

of interest.

that

information discussed in chapter

three with the contact information
summarized in this chapter.
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Toward

CHAPTER

5

THE RICH GET RICHER: THE
UNEVEN distribution of direct

CONTACT

shock

around when, toward the end
of that election day our
“wards had already cashed more
anToo
300 of
ofTr^rd
the 486 new registrations
that had just gone into
the books

In

all

T
IoTT

W

that

''°“8

"

“P

'"“'T

at

showed roughly 100

the polls, and

we

figured

A' "tat point

ooked
Iked

like
likTzs'm
25 might make the nut, particularly
m a sharply-divided
three-way mayor s race in a town
with only 1623 voters
t

Butwherei Nobody knew
until a girl
suddenly came up with a key to

wh5dr"“‘'^t‘'’°'^'’'’°"^'
who
d been working on the phone
network
a spacious

two-room

.

office in the old Elks

,

Club building.
We seized the
howls and curses of the mob in the
Elks bar
where the outgoing mayor’s troops
were already gathering to celebrate
the
victory of his hand-picked successor.
By six o’clock we had the new
eadquarters working nicely. The phone
calls were extremely brief and
dire:
Get off your ass, you bastard! We need
you. Get out and vote!'145
..

(office) at once, ignoring the

.

1

Who

receives political contacts^ First,

voters in the four districts included
generated,

1

also

What

campaigns.

the study and then

I

frequency of contacts with
analyze types of contacts

direct contacts

from

sorts of voters are likely to receive multiple
contacts and, conversely,

none'^

It

campaigns are an important source of political information

same campaigns provide some motivation

distribution of campaign information

questions.

detail the

examine the types of voters who receive

what voters receive
and, if those

in

I

Included

for voters to turnout, then the

among blocks of voters

in this section will

raises important

normative

be a comparison of GOTV and persuasion

contact efforts in the context of campaign strategy.

Thompson. Hunter
Ballantine Books

S.

“Freak Power

(New York, I979)p,

in the Rockies'" reprinted in

157
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The Great Shark Hunt,

In the

hnal section.

I

will focu.,

on dillerences between

pe, suasion

and

(iOTV

contacts and the etrotts
candidates ntake to teach
on, to .ndependents
and tnetnhets of
the opposite party,

C’antpaigns ate contests w.th

teceive contacts front both.

I

5.1

members

low

often

ntany votets

tatget ndependents.
often
,

do candidates

a.tentpt to

orCaii.paigii CoiKacIs
1

,36 million tegisteted votets
on the font disltict base

of those voters received

at least

one contact from

percent of the registered voters
turned out.
contact attempts to the electorate
little

I

how

of the opposite party?

Kretiiieiicy

fhete ate

piayets hut

low ohen do candidates

consideted the ntost petsuadablo
univetse't
contact

two

more than two contacts

-

The

at least

eight

one

llles

candidate,'-'

and

05%

Sixty-six

campaigns made 4,838,297

direct

an average of 604,787 contacts per
campaign, or a

per campaign per voter

Some ol llic contacts recorded in this study were made by political parlies. In one
case, the
was made by a labor union. Still, this study did not atlcnipl to capture, and
probably could not
have captured, the number of mail pieces or phone calls generated by
Independent E.xpcndilure and Issue
Advocacy groups,
contact
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)

Al

r.rs.

glance

connnumcare d,recly
(see table

,1ns ,e|ncsen,s a sign.llcan,

will, Ihe

elec„,a,e via

dVo„ on hchalf ofca.npaigns

lo

phone, and dooMo-doo,
eiro„s.

n.a.l,

5.
1

I

able 5.1: Total Niimbci of
Voters and Direct ( oiitacts
by District

District

Voters''*'

Mnr.nnf;

Turnout

265,192

OHCD01

272,186

PAf!n91 MQQCt

302,991

At Least

One

Mean #

167,625 (63%)

265,186 (99%)

4.45

163,845 (60%)

192,804 (70%)

2.53

290,281 (96%)

2.64

204,618 (69%)

292,461 (99%)

6.89

752,762

1,040,732

216,674 (71%)

of Contacts

“

296,316
1,136,685

Note: Cells represer t the number
of voters
represent the percentage of total
voters

in

6ach ratpnnrx/

Porf-

w/ithin a district

In three of the lour districts
nearly

two campaigns. Even

the

the voters received

more

variation

from a low
voter

in

in

in

in

at least

the

the district with the fewest
contacts,

one

direct contact

CDO

I

least

5.2

in

Chapter

3,

it

With only four

districts in the

the

in

appears that even

below compaies the mean number
Although

this

Ohio CDOl,

in

study

it

is

M.iryland

CD

is

not possible to

number of contacts per

TV

but as

district,

our small case study group there

of contacts

is,

costs and direct contact

nol Ihe

is

For example, after removing

all

and the 4th quarter average television

same

as (he

of those

mmiber of voters

who

registered after

lhal
1

1

22

among

district

were

1/94 in

05 there were 265,192 thousand voters Icit on I1lc. However, on election
day
more. About 8% ol the voting population moves or dies each year.

may have been

at

Table

study concentrates on the distribution of contacts

of volers" on ihc voter Hie

registered on election day.

of

That figure ranges

voters and the small district sample size does not allow
generalization from the

The "miinbcr

70%

one campaign. There

received per voter

on the surface, a strong relationship between

costs per point.

at least

one of

at least

to an astounding 6.89 average direct
contacts per

generalize on the reasons lor the variance

discussed

from

mean number of contacts

Ohio CDOl of 2.53

California

every voter was contacted by

1

994 there

level

son. hypotheses do suggest

dtstric,

thentselves.

The average nutnhet of
contacts pet

does not seem related to
election year or turnout.
The low and high turnout

dtstricts are

evenly

split

between Republican and
Democratic incumbents as well
as

presidential and non-presidential
year cycles.

money were
the table

spent ,n each race

below
Table

Furthermore, comparable
amounts of

TV

However.

costs varied w.dely

among

indicates the possibility of
a relationship between the
5.2:

two

districts

and

variables.

Comparison of Contact Mean and
Television Cost
District

Contact Mean

TV Cost

CA

01

6.89

$491.00

MD05

4.45

$371.00

OH

01

2.53

$113.00

PA

21

2.64

$19.00

Note: TV cost is the 4th quarter
cost per point of
the media market covering the
largest part of the
•'^®dia Strategies Research
1998 Media Planning Guide.

The

district

with the highest

direct contacts (see table 5.2).

21, have correspondingly

TV cost

also had the highest

The two lower

cost districts;

low numbers of per capita

television not quite as expensive as California
but

Ohio

contacts.

still

number of per
1

and Pennsylvania

Maryland

substantially

capita

5,

with

more than Ohio and

Pennsylvania, ranks second. Clearly, direct
contact can be seen as a tactical substitute
for electronic media.

Most
receptions.

consultants agree that a message

One

rule

is

registered by a voter only after multiple

of thumb suggests that a television buy needs a minimum
of 300

Gross Rating Points (GRP) before any kind of voter movement
hundred

Many

GRP s

indicate that the commercial

is

is

to be expected.

seen by the target audience three times.

consultants feel that the "rule of three" applies to messages received
through
123

Three

1

d.reo,

comae

as well

All

„ni.e aveiage con.ac, Hgures
sun,n,a„zed

exceed or hover around the
nragic number three
voters.

when continued wtih

address the distribution of contacts

Fable 5.3:

at

Tahle

5.

to targe, particular

the need to send voters
ntuittple messages,
suggests that

the distribution ot campaign
contacts will duster

contacts by frequency

The imperative

,n

among

among

voters.

Table 5.2 begins to

voters by displaying the
dispersion of

every level of contact.

Distribulioii of C^oiitacts

by

Dislricl

Contacts

CA

MD

OH

PA

Total

Q

3,tiU6

6

79,382

127,021

95,944

39,687

74,066

139,924

20,791

73,390

315,300

46,181

63,930

541,482

26,412

38,001

524,500

21,068

18,177

460,545

27,233

19,839

15,715

551,370

32,621

33,897

12,427

4,504

584,150

26,135

23,732

4,980

2,506

458,824

5,656

1,251

0

281,007

738

168

0

310,911

221

0

0

178,849

0

0

0

116,580

10,854

0

0

0

51,090

3,903

0

0

0

19,680

1,312

0

0

0

1,312

1,242

0

0

0

1,242

319

0

0

0

319

i

9

0

15,249

10,922

18,703

44,766

10,069

26,323
35,546

29,108
/

o

9
10
11

12
13

14
15
16

17

tT4,316
31,005
16,038

9,715

Note: Cells represent the
four files are combined.

number

60,314
40,389
17,318

of voters by district, "total" represents the
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number receiving

a contact

when

all

Table 5.3 contains a h.m
of conventional wisdom
as the plurality of voters
received between

two and four

two and more than four
California

CDOl

is

contacts.

contacts.

Sign, f, cant

There

is

numbers also received

enormous

a major donor to the total

among

variation

number of contacts

less than

districts.

contributing

of

all

those receiving twelve or more
contacts and the vast majority
of those receiving eight or

more

contacts.

Some poor

soul in California received
a total of eighteen contacts

contrast, a voter in Pennsylvania

CD 21

might have received a

maximum of stx

In

total

contacts from the two campaigns
combined.

Table 5,4 below uses the same
information but summarizes
low, moderate, and high contact
groups.

of contacts

in

Table 5,3 and the

political

The grouping

is

goal of sending a

each voter. The low category includes
those receiving

in

the high contact category received

the campatgn.

The

districts are

ordered

in

more than

into categories

minimum of three

less

contacts to

than three contacts. The
five total contacts while

five contacts during the

state

CA

MD
OH
PA
Total

5.4:

Percentage Distribution of Contacts by Frequency
Low

Moderate

High

Total

37,807 (12.7)

71,938 (24.3)

187,571 (62.6)

296,316

55,694 (21)

118,021 (44.5)

91,477 (35)

265,192

139,860 (51.3)

93,661 (34.5)

38,665 (18.6)

272,186

160,157 (53)

120,108 (39)

22,726

302,991

393,518 (34.6)

403,728 (35.5)

232,698 (20.4)

Cells represent total

number

course of

the table from the highest to the lowest

average contact per voter.

Table

(8)

1,136,685

of voters within each district with percentages in parentheses.
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of

suggested by the distribution

moderate category includes voters receiving
between three and
those

it

In

Ohio and Pennsylvania
approximately half of the voters
received fewer than

the accepted target

in

number of three

contacts.

Matyland and California majority
80

In the

two higher

television cost districts

% and 89% of the voters received more than

three contacts respectively.

5.2

Types of Contacts

What

Who
Table

sent

5.5:

types of contacts were generated
by the eight campaigns under
study^

them and what types of material
were disseminated^
Percent of Voters Receiving

Variable/state

MD

No Contacts by Contact Type and

OH

District

PA

CA

Total

37.7%

65%

43.2%

Incumbency
Chdllen^er

10%

57%

31.9%

57%

32.6%

2%

30%

57%

37.7%

65%

48%

57%

32.6%

2%

25.4%

Party
31.9%

Republican

10%

Type
Door to Door

76%

97%

53%

80%

76%

iviaii

0%

45%

49%

5.1%

25%

66.6%

65%

31.5%

22%

45%

30.2%

67.8%

81.2%

15%

48.8%

17.4%

44.7%

70.3%

19.4%

38.6%

30%

29.2%

9.8%

12%

19.6%

Persuasion

0%

44%

21.2%

1.3%

16.7%

GOTV

66.6%

64%

38.7%

100%

67.7%

Voter ID

79.6%

43%

67.3%

80%

67.4%

Phone

Message
Issue

Negative
Positive

Purpose

Note; Cells represent the percentage of voters not getting any contacts
of the type listed
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Because ofthe mass of data
available each categoi,
percentage of voters
again there

is

received zero contacts within
a particular category.

significant variation

(see table 5,5).

their

who

Only

incumbent but

between

2% ofthe voters

fully 57»/„

their

in

districts but also

CAO

some form of direct

Neither of these findings

is

Once

patterns

tailed to receive a direct
contact

I

Overall, however, voters

incumbent than from the challenger

likely to receive

some emerging

of OHOI voters missed out on
hearing from

congressman during the campaign
from

summarized by ihe

is

in

the district.

were more

from

their

likely to

hear

Voters were also more

contact from a Republican than from
a Democrat.

surprising, even in a small

sample

like this one.

are better funded than challengers
and Republicans tend to spend

Incumbents

more than

their

Democratic counterparts.

Looking

at

the categories by

"TYPE"

GOTV or door-to-door efforts which
for turnout,

is

MESSAGE"

now
it

is

clear that mail

is

more prominent than

might indicate that direct contact, once a medium

primarily a persuasive medium.

Moving on

to the category

named

appears that voters are not being overwhelmed with
issue information.

Nearly half ot the voters

38.6%

it

in

these four districts received no issue contact at

failed to get a negative piece while only

19.6% received no

all.

positive

Only

name-ID

contact.

The emphasis on
distribution

by purpose.

mail, a primarily persuasive

67%

medium,

of the voters received no

is

also reflected in the

GOTV or

ID contact

the campaigns while only 16.7% missed out on a persuasive contact.
direct contact,

one ot the prime

elite

voter mobilization tools

studies, primarily a persuasive and not a turnout
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mechanism.

is,

It is

at least in

at all

from

clear that

these case

The predominance of incumbents
and Republicans
as well as the

measure the

mode

is

is

six for

letters to all

the

dominance of persuaston matl

modes

is

the

mean

clearly seen

of direct contact,

by looktng

at

mode -

a

persuasion contacts. This
captures the challengers
decision to mail ntne

Republicans

in the district.

However, what

not the four measures which

manage

is

to reach

interesting

when looking

two or more

ind, cates that, in

above two mode often remains zero
or one.
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at

but the

any given category, a

of voters received one or fewer
of that type of contact. Even
is

the

very sensitive to strategic
considerattons. In Mat^land
for example, the

overwhelming majority of zero or one
which
plurality

is

as a source

in

cases where

Presented by Distric"
Variable/State

MD

^
Mode

Mean

OH

Mode

Mean

PA

Mode

Mean

CA

Mode

Mean

Mode

Total

Mean

nicuniDBncy
3.14

Inriimhont

1.31

1.00

1.41

0.00

0.00

1.12

0.00

1.16

0.00

1.70

0.00

1.82

0.00

0.00

5.19

5.00

2.32

0.00

1.16

0.00

1.70

0.00

1.33

0.00

1.48

0.00

5.19

5.00

2.82

0.00

0.73

0.00

0.60

^0.00

0.41

0.00

1.05

0.00

5.50

4.00

3.12

0.00

0.87

1.00

0.78

1.00

0.62

1.00

0.00

0.38

0.00

2.10

1.00

0.95

0.00

0.00

0.49

0.00

3.28

4.00

1.54

0.00

0.00

1.78

1.00

1.51

1.00

1.65

1.00

1.00

6.69

7.00

3.28

2.00

0.00

0.00

0.43

0.00

0.20

0.00

0.44

0.00

1.48

narty
1.31

0.00

3.14

1.00

1.12

1.41

0.00
0.00

Type
0.24
3.80

Phone

0.34

0.00

0.02

0.00

6.00

2.08

0.00

0.42

0.00

0.00

Message
Issue

0.94

Negative
Positive

1.00

1.68

1.00

1.83

0.00

0.36
0.69

1.49

Purpose
Persuasion

3.78

GOTV

0.47

Voter ID

0.20

If the

different type

modes

3.00

1.05

0.00

1.51

0.00

0.42

0.00

0.81

0.00

1.06

0.00

0.33

alert

us to the plurality of voters getting almost none of each

of contact the mean emphasizes those contacts that were concentrated on

groups of targeted voters.

emerge
voters.

0.00

as in table 5.5.

Although

state variation is again high, the

same patterns

Incumbents and Republicans put more contacts

The most common

contact type

was persuasion
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into the

hands of

mail with phone, door-to-door,

positive or negative with
issue contacts far
behind

^>.3

Who

is

Contacted?

What
literature

strategy,

vote, a receive mult, pie
coutacts and what voters
are ignored

on voter turnout, as well

distribution

specific voter groups.

campaigns

a

number of working hypotheses

of campaign contacts

This distribution

on campaign strategy and the

is

availability

is

the

a function

mean number of contacts going
of targeting which

of data. As discussed

pursue the dual goal of holding
onto

oi'ten

The

our discussion of direct
contact targeting,

and implementation, suggests

The

voters.

as

'

a

in

in

turn depends

chapter four,

base while attracting undecided

Interactions between base and
undecided furnishes the material for
varied

strategic themes.

A

campaign may

raid its

opponent's base or lake a stance that

alienates supporters while adding
additional votes elsewhere.

about when and

how

to contact base

strategic side but there

strategic element

m

is

While making judgments

and undecided voters, targeting displays

also a large budgetary element in
such decision.

its

While the

targeting focuses on getting the right
message into the right hands

the budgetary element looks to save
scarce resources by directing contacts to likely
voters.

to

Any

given contact needs to balance both elements.

hypothesis that people with a history ol voting

without such a history.

turnout predictor,

is

like education, race,

available on the voter

file,

file

becomes

a substitute for

and income. Age, another strong
so

we would

contact older voters more frequently than younger ones.
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more contacts than those

will receive

Past voting history on a voter

standard turnout predictors

This suggests the

A

expect campaigns to

review of the contacts

'»•

I

—

selection vaiiable gioiip
illustrates the dual
nature of targeting.

age ngu,es ,n,o ,ssue
,„a,„„gs.

As

a

Social .Security and that
single prog, an, has

conlhct over the years.

„u,e,-

pr

Older citizens are also more

them to make sure then contacts

an issue target group and

a

I’ohtical party also serves

members vote
study,

in

75%

unaffiliated virters.

the one

,n,e,c.s,ecl

share of partisan

vote so campaigns

get into the hands of likely
voters

holh a strategic and budgetary
purpose,

67%

Thus, age

is

l-arty

In the fotir districts

under

of the voter universe turned out.

turnout for Republicans;

Many

Grannn, "Ah would nevah

measure of voting propensity,

the election year tinder study,

translates into a

|.|nl

likely to

higher rates than do nonparty
memhers.

at

,ts

„.i,

Dentocra.s .out.nely accuse
Kepuhheans of want,,, to gut
g

cut iny tnonnna's check.”

I'oth

On

efeens a.e n,o,e

ovided nnn e than

Social Security and
Reptdrhcans routinely respond,
like

target

„,

72%

for

Democrats and

44%

fins

for the

people claim to be independent and,
when defending that

choice, like to say they "vote the

man and

not the party"

A more

accurate expression

for independents might be, "Don't
vote for either".

Party also plays a major role

out a base vote.

Even with

m

strategic calculations that look to
solidify or turn

the assumption that

some campaigns

will target

independents as easily identifiable swing voters the
combination of turnout efforts and
targeting by voter history should put

more contacts

registered with one party or another.
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into people's

hands

who

are

'< 'S

may

also poss.ble .hat

cancel one another out.

appeahng heavily to

its

all

of these

effects will no. exts.
at

For exatnple.

base, as

tf

one

ti.ne and. in fact,

a campaign follows a
strategy of

Donald Devtne did

,n

Maryland

CD 05

1994 then

in

,

.here will not be

much of a

relationship

between pas. voting history
and age. The

blanket mailings to
Republicans will cancel out
the age and voter his.0.7

effect.

Strategic choices will
influence the concentration
of contacts but those
strategic choices
still

take place

relationships

in

the context of modern
campaign targeting.

between age. voter

history,

and patly

will

One or more of the

hold tnte.

In

summa^. we

can

expect the distribution of voter
contacts .0 take on many
guises, but regardless of
the
nnx,

we

tunnel

might also expect .0 find patterns.
Such patterns

more contacts

to older voters;

will include strategies
that

frequent voters, and party
members.

combination of group factors depends
on strategic and
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tactical

Which

campaign decisions.

«'

bfolt:

'

represent

h, v„,e.. A,e, P..
P...,.,

means based on samples amounting

Table 5.7 shows the

iiiean

to

number of contacts by

5%

of each base

the voter demographic groups

of age, voter history, party, gender
and the presence of a telephone.
presidential and off-year election

means

for the

Because the

combined

districts

file

were

of

all

all

is

provided for the

eight

file

file.

as a whole.

A

breakdown by

Looking

first

to the

campaigns some general patterns emerge.

chosen to represent a mix of strategic situations the
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fact

some

that

general patterns

still

emerge

is

interesting.

contacts than younger
voters. Although
the

Older voters receive
more

move from one age group

dramatic the difference
between the youngest
group and the oldest
full

contacts.

Less dramatic, hut

still

is

to another

not

is

more than two

noticeable are the differences
between party and

voting histooi. With pany.
independents are less likely
to be contacted than
are either

Republicans or Democrats.

The case of voting
combined

in

the

"TOTAL"

histoiy

more complex. Looking

is

column, people

who

voted

one more contact, on average,
than those voting
change takes place between voters
who voted
or

more

voted

in

elections.

two

In fact, the

elections.

of mail to the universe who

The

who

newsletter would no doubt find

in that election.

its

way

into the

tension

vote

series

in

who

the election

of articles written

in

in

its

However, most of this

one election and those voting

in

two

to peak with voters

way

is

who
when

caused by attempts to balance the
chance

will participate

with attempts to send a piece

in live

into the

of the

last five

hands of very

tradeoff,

when

If for

who

example,

will turn

However,

is

sure to vote and reaching the universe of
people

in targeting is

who

examined

in

a

990 by William Daly, President of Voter Contact Services,
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it

out to vote

targeting to save money,

The tradeoff involved

if

elections that

likely voters.

hands of the majority of people

question.

1

is

had voted

The most important

between reaching a voter who
will

no elections

will participate in the election
,n question.

sent a newsletter to those

find

four elections receive
nearly

mean number of contacts tends

of sending a piece of mail to a voter

would not

campaigns

This non-linear relationship
highlights the tension involved

targeting using voter history.

you

in

in

in

at all eight

and Professor Ro.er,
Hughes of ,he University
of Colorado
likelihood

of sending a piece of
mail

.he percentage of
people

from the studies

who

that there

Iowa Democratic Prima^

is

vote

to a person

who

who

will

vote a

The study
"hit".

a distinct tradeoff
between

for example, a piece

of mail

hit

that

and cover.

went

then refers to

It

get a piece of mail the
"cover".

calls the

It is

evident

In the

1988

to voters

who had

participated in the 1984 and
.986 primaries reached voters
participating in the 1988

primal^

slightly

over

60%

those turning out for the

voted

in the

finely

total cover.

988

election.

30%

that mailing only

covered

38%

of

Conversely, a mailing sen. to
those

who

had

84 and 86 general elections
covered

1988 primaoi but only

more

1

of the time. However,

91%

of those turning out to vote

in

the

of those receiving that particular
piece of mail voted. The

tuned the targeting the higher
the

hi.

rate

of any mail piece but the lower
the

Consultants are usually aware that
targeting by past voter his.oiy

is

ve^

useful in ensuring that a piece
of mail gets into the hands of
a likely participant but they

are cautious lest their selections
be so complex as to miss large
numbers of other
electoral participants.

The

voter history on turnout

is

tension between

hit

and cover may explain

not stronger and appears to level
off after

Strategic distinctions also emerge from
a review of Table 5 1
.

where the Republican campaign chose
little, if

There

any, relationship

is,

work almost

issue.

1992.

.

In

its

the effect of

elections.

Maryland,

base, there

The

was

party.

targeting a freshman Republican, social security

result is seen in the targeting priorities.

v. Cover
Quoted with permission of the authors.
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in the

The strongest

is

history.

however, a strong relationship between the number
of contacts and

William Daly and Robert Hughes. "Hit
Study.

exclusively on

two

between the number of contacts and age or voter

Pennsylvania, where labor

major

to

why

was

In

a

relationship

1988 and 1990 Elections". Unpublished

appears to be between
age and the number
of contacts.

65 show a mean number
of contacts
California, with

history

show an

precincts, there

its

is

1

voters over

four times that of
voters under 25,

m

means

a flatter pattern

In

Ohio 01, with most of the

among

exception ofCalifornia, none
of the

number of contacts received
by

efforts focused

of the variables because

all

demographic groups within each
precinct received a
slight

Pennsylvania 2

highly targeted and
intense direct mail
campaign, both age and
voter

increase

,s

that

In

districts

a male and the

I,

all

of the

he number of contacts

shows

a difference

on

different

With the

between the mean

mean number of contacts
received by

a

female.

No,

surprisingly,

of a telephone.

There

one of the strongest

is

a tautology involved here

those without a phone cannot
receive
highlight the distinction

and

practitioners,

I, is

relations

between

GOTV calls.

GOTV and

to the differences

is

that

of the presence or absence

GOTV is a
Still, this

persuasion.

phone driven

near tautology does

They have

between these two

effort so

different purposes

activities to

which

we now

turn.

5.4

Turnout and Persuasion Differences

We

might expect

GOTV and

GOTV was usually a partisan effort

persuasion to

in

show

different distribution patterns.

our case study while persuasion contacts
were

often targeted by precinct, age, or
voter history.
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J:d

Co„,ac,s for Vo.er Demographic
Groups by Persuasion

b/cOTv""

As expected
members

the strongest variation occurs between party

(see table 5,8)

Overall,

independents received a mean of

contacts while Republicans received 0.7 and Democrats 0.3
all

of the

districts

where there were

members and nonparty

GOTV efforts.
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What

.01

GOTV

This pattern

is

is

repeated

in

most surprising about the

d.str.bu„on of

GOTV

contacts

is that,

even when looking

at eight

campaigns,

different strategies, the
overall pattern points
strongly to older voters
rs,

voters, and party

members

receiving

GOTV

lower turnout, nonparty
members. Even
to those
2)

most

GOTV from

likely to turnout.

contai
acts

more

is

mcely highlighted

in

You need

You need
who are part
3)

You

l«se

GOTV to

need

GOTV

You need

if

make

sure favorably inclined
voters don't simply
si

ticket.

you have

significant voter support

among people

ot neither Democratic nor
Republican base constituencies.

GOTV

that are historically

if your support constituency
includes voting groups
^
^
low in turnout.

GOTV

if

turnout manipulation

is

the only

way

to

election.

Ot these
targeted

to

an article on

Campaigns and Elections magazine.

vote tor the top of the

4)

more frequent

encourage turnout gravitate

thalyou da
5)

using

frequently than younger,

efforts designed to

Tins pattern

all

rationales for

non-voters.

rather than non-voters.

Even

GOTV only numbers 4

and

win your

5 indicate that efforts

GOTV efforts appear to be targeted

may be

to infrequent voters

Non-participants do not even get the benefit of
an extra nudge

to the polls.

It

turnout shows a strong party prejudice and
weaker relationships to age and

voting frequency, persuasion shows an even greater
number of possible patterns. The
overall effect,

voters get

when looking

at

the eight campaigns together,

two more persuasion contacts than younger

is still

voters.

the same.

Older

Frequent voters also get

Ron Fauchcux, "Do Yon Need GET-OUT-THE-VOTE" Can,paigns ami
Elections Magazine^
Oclober/November 19%. pp 54-55.
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more contacts than do
around two or three
t.mes as

many

infrequent voters hut
w,th the

elections.

same nonlinear

Oddly enough, voters w.th

a

phone receive nearly two

persuasion contacts than
do voters without a phone

presence of a phone

is

another stand

m

for the stability

pattern, peaking

It

could he that the

measures so often associated

with higher voter turnout.

e staik differences in the
persuasion patterns between
states,

Maodand show

almost no dift'erence between
the number of persuasion
contacts

received by older voters while
California and Pennsylvania
both
the

number of contacts

strategic calculations.

as

we move up

the age groups.

This

show strong growth

may

more

in

well be a result of

Both Maiyland and Ohio were
otTyear races while California
and

Pennsylvania shared the spotlight with
the presidential race. Social
Security
likely

Ohio and

persuasion piece to be mailed to
senior citizens.
salient in a presidential year,

It is

is

the most

possible that the issue

serving as one of the few national
issues

in

is

the

congressional arsenal. Likewise, neither
Maryland or Ohio shows any more
persuasion

contacts for frequent than infrequent
voters.
frequent voters are contacted
tor persuasion.

voters receive

more

In tact, they display

often, relatively speaking, for

California and Pennsylvania both

more contacts

show some

than infrequent voters.

the lower voter turnout forces candidates
to target

hard to get infrequent voters to the polls

in

an odd pattern:

GOTV

than they are

indication that frequent

Again, in a non-presidential year,

more

likely voters.

It is

simply too

off-year elections.

Maryland, while not showing an age or

a frequent voting pattern

does show a

strong party distribution tor contacts with Republicans
receiving 6,5 contacts on

average to 2.3 and 2,5 for Democrats and independents respectively.
Ohio
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is

the

exception ,o the party
™|e. There

however, no pany
reg.strat.on

,s,

destination of Repubhcan
or Detnocrat

low pnntary
electorate.

turnouts, independents

ass.gned by

result

prt.a^

Oh.o

patttcpatton.

all

District 01

independents so they both
relted

betng a flattening out
of other demographtc
patterns

deference to the geographic,
as opposed to demographic,
nature of the targeting.

5.5 Battle

Ground Voters

Although campaigns concentrate
on turning out

the.r

own

supporters they also

focus on persuadable voters
and. occasionally, members
of the opposite party.

uncommon

for both

campaigns

to target the

candidate to try to shore up his
or her

campaign.

p

The
Because of

make up 60% of the Ohio
Congressional

Neither campaign could
afford to target

on precnct targeting with
the

m

,s

in

Two

own

same "swing"

base

in

voters, nor

not

unusual for a

response to raids from the other

campaigns competing for the same
voters creates a

suasion and turnout.

is

I, is

Republicans received twice as

many

battle

ground

for

contacts from their fellow

Republicans and Democrats over three
times as many contacts from
Democrats as from
Republicans (see table 5.9) This pattern
holds tme

in all states

except California where

the Republican campaign went to
great lengths to target swing
Democrats.

information from an opposing source
clear that that information needs
to

is

often a factor

come from

contact.
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in

If

changing a partisan's vote

a source other than

campaign

direct

it

is

Table 5.9

Mean

Party

MD R

MD D

D voters

1.09

2.04

R
1

voters

voters

6.9

1

43

Den.ocn,itic Contacts by
Party

OH R
0

~OHD

”~PAR

0.87

1.01

0.15

2.85

0

l.o4

1.29

1.66

r2.14
0.6

Allhough neither party expends
much

PA D

CA R

1.8

5.5

0.49

5.5

0.6

3.6

Overall, both Republican
and

Main R

Main D

2.2

1.84

0.6

4.3

0.36

2.7

1.77

1.77

etlbrt in reaching out
to

opposite party, both Republicans
and Democrats do work
voters.

CD D

at

members of the

contacting independent

Democrats produced a mean
number of .77
1

contacts to independent voters.
they both pay

some

Although candidates pay more
attention to panisans.

attention to independents.

important normative question They
are

less likely to

Democrats and therefore more malleable
journalist, politicians, and

identifiable

academics

all

Who

these independents are

an

vote than are Republicans or

to elite voter turnout efforts

and because

view independents as the most
readily

swing vote.

Forty one percent of the independents
on the base
contacts (see Table

at all

is

5.

10)

In tact,

45%

tile

receive from 0 to 2

of the independents on

trom any campaign.
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tile

received no contact

Although

of the other

in

Califonna non-aligned
voters were included

districts

the cantpaign, in

under study they were
largely tgnored.

0-2

44.6%

3-5

53%

44.2%

\2.Z%

14.9%

6-8

8

25%

0

19%
22.9%

0.9%

PA

Main

95.7%

41.3%

3.3%

37.6%

1%

33.9%

Cells represent percent of
independents
calculated using the eniire
univers^for

”l3.1«/o

0

8.1%

eceivina a aivpn mi

es are

each disl"

Even though independents

among

independents received

a like

list

3 to 5 contacts

amount. This

calculations and registration law.
partisan

are frequently ignored,
there

,s

the districts. In Ohio
congressional district Oi for example,

independent voters received from

In

Campaigns

while only

some

variation

44.2% of the

3.3% of the Pennsylvania

result is at the intersection

of strategic

Ohio, the lack of party registration
produces a

ot Republican and Democrats
based on their past primary participation.

These primai7 participants are usually
taken, and
are forced to concentrate on the

contrast, therer are very

registration in

larger

all

Table 5.10: Percent of
Contacts by Range for
Independents by State
MD
OH

Range

Over

in

on of the

group of party

few independents
parties.

registrants

As

in

rightly so, as highly partisan.

unknown group of independents.

Pennsylvania because state law encourages

a result, candidates must focus

whose

partisanship

1
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In

is

more resources on

not so tightly defined as

in

a

Ohio.

1

Table 5.11:

Number

Mean Number

of Elections Voted

The

results in table

of Cont acts Received
by liidepende iits by

5,

with even more concentration
average, three times as
noticeable

jump

two or more
relationship

every

in

the

many

mirntr the distribution of contacts

1

in

among

is

mean number of contacts when comparing
those who voted

in

who

voted

history,

in less

than

two

elections.

voter contact targeting.

Once

older,

party

is

removed

more frequent

least likely to vote, independents,

as a factor

voters.

it
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that

cluster

is

evident

in

independent

clear that

Even among

campaign communications

likely to turn out to vote.

is

in

a

In fact, the

and the mean number of contacts

except Pennsylvania where only age appears
as a factor

independents most

voters only

Likewise, there

elections with those

communications reach

all

Voters over 65 receive, on

contacts as do voters 25 and under.

between age, voter

district

the hands oflikely voters.

Age and

campaign

group of voters

around those

5.6

Summary
strategy guides d.rect
contact, but strategy

tact, cal

district.

concerns

Still,

The antoun, and

itself is

of direct contact

nt.x

is

bounded by budgetary and
d.fferent

from

despite the demographic
and strategic differences
there

n of contacts

in the

hands of those already
most

likely to vote.

is

a distinct concen-

This concentration

might be related to another
pattern that emerges from
the tables and that
direct contact as a persuasive

medium although even

district to

is

the use of

GOTV eflfons are directed

toward

likely voters.

The concentration of contacts
with

likely voters is

manifested

of contacts among the important
swing group of independent
obsenier would expect
efforts are

GOTV eflfons to concentrate on

most often directed

at party

voters.

in

the distribution

An

outside

partisans but even persuasion

members. Republicans and Democrats
are

equally likely to contact independent
voters and equally unlikely to
contact
the opposite party.

Independents receive

counterparts and they receive almost
no

among independents
among

all

is

less

members of

persuasion contacts than do their
partisan

GOTV efforts.

The

distribution

of contacts

even more skewed toward older, more
frequent voters than

it

is

voters.

When

It

comes

to voter contact the rich

to vote, young, infrequent voters

who

campaign information or

to the polls.

a

nudge

do indeed get

richer.

is

least likely

are independents are the least likely
to receive

However, lurking behind

the question as to whether direct contact
has any effect on turnout at

the distribution pattern

Those

of little concern.

If so, then the lack

toward infrequent voters reinforces a host of other
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all.

this analysis is

If not, then

of information directed

factors reducing turnout.

CHAPTER

6

turnout and voter contact
voL

as

Republican polling firm
newsletter

The
because

it

is

d,s,ribu,ion

of d.rect contacts stud.ed

turnout patterns.

However, there

before the issue becomes
clear:

we

among

is

Do

l.kely voters

is

important

contacts mfluence turnout.

little if any

Most research paradigms
increase voter turnout,

mechanisms

merely reinforces current

a second quest, on that
needs to be addressed

to those already predisposed
to vote will

find that direct contact
has

calls are

the prevtous chapter

the campaign technology
most closely associated with
voter turnout and

the concentration of
direct contacts

of contacts

in

effect

model

little

distribution

normative difference

will

campaign communication

assume

that direct mail

will

and phone

that reduce the information
cost to the voter by providing
data

the candidates and the election,

if voting

direct contact can serve as a
reminder

choice

is

is

of an incumbent record.

a nearly exact mirror in

contact voters based on the same variables
often used

If

we

look

in

its

at the act

efforts to identify

academic

of

political

analysis.

and

Looking

voting behavior through one of the academy's
many demographic and psychological
lenses the discussion of targeting paints
a picture of direct contact which reinforces
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on

a retrospective act of judgment,
then

voting as a the end result of complex
demographic, psychological, and
interactions, then direct contact

if

on turnout.

predict that direct

A cost/benefit

make

A skewed

at

performance with a

third.

Studies

in

voting behavior, whether
they study turnout or

voter choice; or whether
they use rational choice
theoi^. cognitive
processing,
retrospective voting, or
prospective voting models

campaign

will successfully

electoral cleavages.

all

predict

some

possibility that a

impart communications
based around already existing

In addition to the
electoral cleavages,

campaigns also know

that

voters approach an election
with a measurable
predisposition to participate.
Campaigns

know

and target accordingly. Any

this

effort to ascertain the
effects

of campaign

contacts on turnout must also
take this predisposition into
account and control for
6.1

The Relationship
In Its

the

of Direct Contact and Voter
Turnout

most simple form the research
question

number of campaign

turnout for the election

term "C"

in

direct contacts.

in

is

whether turnout increases with

Where Vhdep

question and must be

the formula equals the

represents the probability of

some number between 0 and

number of contacts received by

group. The function (b) represents the
amount of change

each additional contact. This simple
statement might be
turnout as a function of direct contacts

Formula

As

it

6.1:

in

I

,

The

a given voter or

the probability of voting for

illustrated

by visualizing

or:

Relationship Between Contact and Turnout:

Vhdep = b(C)

discussed earlier both the number of contacts
a voter receives and a given

voters probability ot turnout are also effected by
past voter participation, age, and party
affiliation.

history,

Any

analysis of the effect of contacts

and party

Formula

6.2:

on turnout must include age, voter

affiliation as control variables.

Full

Model.

Vhdep = b(0)+b(I)(A)+h(2)(PT)+ b(3)(PA)
146

Where

ted by b(l)(A) and
by past turnout as
represented by b(2)(PT).

P
is

the relationship
includes the intercept
b(o) as well as terms
for age as

represented as b(3)(PA)^

analysis. (Log,t)..>o

affiliation.

direct contact while
controlling for age, past

The model

will

be tested using

Before developing the model,
however.

control vanables in turn

One demograph.c

- Age

figures into the targeting

.

charac.erist.c that

research as a turnout predictor
that also appears on the
voter
age.

party term

Together, these lunct.ons
create a model with
which to

examine the relationship of
turnout and
voter turnout and party

The

logistic regression

look

w,ll

is

at

each of the

important

file a,

,n

academic

an tndividual level

scheme both as another turnout
predictor and

is

as

an ideal voter block for specific
message deliveiy. Nearly every
campaign studied sent
at least

one mail piece to seniors

Security,

Likewise, age

is

detailing

campaign positions on Medicaid and
Social

a key variable in predicting
turnout.

models run using only age as an
independent variable suggest
increase in age there

will

decrease

from

a

3%

that for every

increase in the probability of voting.

Although

other control figures are introduced
to the model

it

is

one year
this figure

consistent

district to district.

Logit

mu

when

is

Preliminary logit

IS

one ofa family ofgeneral linear models
(GLM's). GLM's include linear regression.
and Loglmear modeling. Logit is called for

tiple linear regression. Probit.

because the dependent
dichotomous variable the distnbution of errors
may not be normal and

medtmrl'values cannot be interpreted as
predicted
probabilities thus ruling out a multiple
regression model
analysis,
requires the assumption of multivariate normality
‘
of the
independent variables for the prediction rule to be
optimal. Logistic regression analysis requires
fewer
assumptions. Because logit is designed for data with
a dichotomous dependent variable, which
in this case
IS whether they Uirned out to
vote or not. it makes good

m

statistical sense.

However, a

logit coefficient is

the estimated effect ofa unit change in the
independent variable on the natural log of the odds
ratio and
difficult to understand in probabilistic terms.
1 will therefore employ
a procedure to

understood probabilities.

See Miller and Shanks. The

is

produce more readilv
•

New American

Voter.
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Research on voting behavior
generally uses age,
education,

mcome, and other

psyoholog.cal and demographic
factors as independent
variables

Unfortunately such information

any consultants,

on the voter

file

rely

on census

,s

is

summary

maintained

is

lines.

in the social

relying

As one

past behavior"

at the individual level

and

it

is

current.

direct mail consultant said,

"The best predictor of

Reliance on past behavior for
prediction

is

general

sciences as well.

on voter history

much, "Did the contact

as a control variable the
question

affect turnout^", as

it is,

the voter's current predisposition
to vote^"
IS

variable for the rnformation
used by

often old data, or data
estimated from old data, and
often imperfectly

future behavior

By

,s

if

Instead they use the past
voter history contarned

to provide a convenient

matched to precinct

knowledge

not available at the
.ndividual voter level and
few,

data.

scholars in research Voter histoy

Census data

political efficacy.

not so straightforward.

There are

becomes not so

"Did the contact affect turnout given

How to

five elections

Because the dependent variable represents the
1994

include voter history in the model

coded onto each base
election in

file.

Ohio and Mainland and

the 1996 election in California and
Pennsylvania the other elections need to be
defined

by

their distance in time

from the actual election

year.

The following

table

the naming conventions for voter history for
each election available on the
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summarizes

file.

Hllilc <1.1:

There are

m

the model.

V;iri:i|,to

for,,-

f,„. |,;ieclion
lli.sloi-y

pr.ssihic way.,

„fc„n,h,„,„g ,„e vo,er hi„o,y
a, a comrol variable

Ihrst, all ol'lhe election,

may he added

some combination of elections which
seem
ntodel.

Third, a smgle

election,

used.

in

which

Finally,

moderate

snmmaiy

a voter

mo.,t explanatoiy

had iH,n,ci,,a,ecl leading up

combinations and the depetident variable show

variable.

show

llnal

m

until the

to the

number of

general election

may be

Test models using only voter histoiy
that

using "Total Elections" as a

provides the best explanatoiy power as
an independent

a bivariate model, the impact of voter
history

However, age and voter

model. Models

will

example of the power
people

may be added

Second,

Preliminary models run to assess the dilTerenl
combinations of voter histoiy

that,

strong.

0-,*;

individually.

into three categories, .such
as non-participants,

participants, and high participants.

from

model

variable "Tote” .summarizing the
total

wders may be coded

iluantitative variable

to the

who

had voted

on predicting turnout

histoiy arc highly correlated

be evaluated

in

greater depth

in later

id'

past voter histoiy as a predictor

in

three previous elections

were people who had not previously voted.
149

were

.so

age

is

included

is

veiy

in

the

sections but, as an

of turnout,

42% more

in

PA CD2I,

likely to turnout than

In the previous
chapter

bers of the same party.

.ndependents.

that voter contacts

In general, party

The importance of party

contacts requires that

has on turnout.

we saw

it

were more often directed

members received more
contacts than

as a factor in the
distribution of campaign

be used as a control
variable when looking

at the effects

contact

Party will be entered into
the model as a categorical
variable using the

category of independent as the
base.

The following

The 1994
the

1

996

elections ,n

tables present the results

Ohio

CD

elections in California

what the implications
including a

dummy

for our

01 and

CD 01

from Logit models within
each

Ma^land

CD 05

and Pennsylvania

model are

for a

variable for presidential election
year.

the models for each district to
answer the question,
will

CD

21

,

first,

Finally,

combined sample of all four

probabilities for voting at each
variable level will be

question

are presented

The

”

Do

followed by

we

well.

will see

districts

partial effects

examined as

while

and the

After presenting

contacts affect turnout^

be refined by examining the effects
of different types of contacts.
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d, strict.

”

that

Table 6,5 below summarizes
the coefficients,
standard errors, and

of the

logit

model using

total contacts, pas,
elect.on histo^. age.

as predictors of the
dependent variable, participat.on

Table

6.2t

in

Causes of V.tee Tueuou, by
Age, Voter Hlsto.^, Party,
and Contacts:

The

coefficient represents the

dependent variable for each one

partial effect" in the final

unit increase

column.

The

is

and age

details the

independent variable.
represent the increase

Party

in

The

change

is

in

of the independent variable. This

full

model

is

coefficients indicate that

That

is,

partial effects

hard

of the variables

as they increase, so does the

column

in that probability

all

for total contacts, total

from one

unit to another

of the

included as a categorical variable and the
partial effects

voting probability over the base category of
independent.

we

focus

will

in

the election in question between

for Ohio, as well as the other districts, is presented in
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two values of an

Appendix

4.

It is

much of

Partial effects represent the difference in the
predicted

probability of a person voting

The

freedom.

the log of the odds of the

column, and future derivations of similar numbers, to
which

the rest of our analysis.

OH

converted into a more readily understood

have a positive relationship to voter turnout.
probability of voter participation.

®

amount of change

to understand in probabilistic terms
and

this

and party membership

the 1994 general
election,'"

N=11333. Percentage of Cases
Correctiv Predirtpri ttv
rnTc
‘Significant
ignificant to the .05 level. Full
model preLted
presented in AppInVix
Append^^^^^^
4

elections,

partial effects

independent variable with
case held constant

the ,nodel held
constant, ,n this

,n

the empirical mean.

at

In the table

of the Cher variables

all

above the

9«/„ partial effect
for

age represents the difference

probability of votmg between
a 25 year old voter and
a 60 year old voter.

,n

Thu,

the

wh.le

holdtng the total number of
contact, past vot.ng histo^
and pa„y n.embership
vanables
at their

mean, 60 year olds were

9%

more

l.kely to turn out than

were 25 year

olds.

Party membership has a
venr strong relationship with
the probability of voting.

Democrats are

22%

strong party effect

and Republicans

is

an

registration required.

For

political

artifact

On

29% more

likely to

of party registration law

a voter

file,

voters do not

purpose, those who voted

in

vote than independents.
in

come

Ohio. There

with a party

is

field

This

no party
defined

the Republican primary are
coded as

Republican with the same process
followed for Democrats. Thus, the
mere definition of
party encompasses past primary
voter participation. This kind of
registration system

makes

it

more

difficult

and expensive for candidates to define
and target a group of base

or persuadable voters.

For the variable on voter history the
measure compares voters who had not
participated with voters

having voted

had not voted

in

in

who

had participated

two previous

elections

any previous

election.

were

two previous

in

37% more

Age, party membership, and past election
related to the probability of voting but

contacts increases the probability of voting by 2%.

The

effect of elections is non-liiic;ir

and peaks

at two.

Those

vote than those

as expected,

contact'^

who

are strongly

In Ohio, receiving three

Direct contacts, the only variable

The

decreases after two elections allhongli each additional election
(up
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likely to

history,

what of direct

elections.

in

increase in the probability of voting

to five) represents

an increase.

the model under the
control ofthe campaign,
does not have as strong
an effect as

de.og.ap,„c

var,a>„es, „a,

i.

.

p„„,.a„y

,„,g,„flea„,.

A ,wo

percent increase

,

-urnout. especially a.nong
the right voters, can
easily swing a close
elect, t,n

Table 6

3

below stnnmarizes the

lelevant

model mlbrmation

for

Maryland

Congressional District 05.

Table

6.3:

Causes „f Vote.- T„n,„„, by Age,
Voter History, Party

Variable

Coefficient*

Partial Effects**

0.01

0.82*

~e%

0.01

0.01*

39%

0.01

-0.3*

0.06

-0.34*

Tt%

0.11

-1.54*

0.09

N-17264. Percentage of Cas es
Correctly Predicted

Once

—

~SE

0.09*

-

74"/,

again, past election history has a
very strong effect on a person's

probability of voting.

Those who had voted

two

in

past elections had a

probability of voting in the 1994 election
than did those
at all prior to

party.

In

the 1994 race.

However, there

is

probability of voting.

electoial participants

It is

-

in

who

had voted

28%

in

in

greater

no elections

of

increase in the

Maryland party membership indicates

possible that

39%

a striking difference in the importance

Ohio, party membership indicated an average

probability of voting while

district.

anti Contacts: IMI)

a

7%

decrease

in

the

Maryland, independents are more active

possibly due to the high

number of federal employees

in

the

Federal employees have the financial, educational, and
psychological

characteristics of high turnout voters but may, as a group,
be discouraged from partisan
affiliation.

This

is

highly speculative and

more
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analysis

would be needed

to develop a

more

definitive answer.

years old

show

Age has

the expected impact.

a 7»/„ higher probability
of voting than those voters

probability of participation
also increases with the

receiving three contacts were 6o/.

contacts

-

Those voters who are

an indication that

in

more

likely to

Mainland,

who

number of direct

go

sixty

are 25.

contacts.

The

Voters

to the polls than those
receiving no

political elites

were able

to affect turnout

with multiple contacts. Table
6.4 below begins to examine
the 1996 election

districts.

Starting with Pennsylvania
congressional district 21.

Table

6.4:

Causes of Voter Turnout by Age,
Voter History, Party and
Contacts: PA

Variable

1

Coefficient

0131 wOMldol2>

SE

0.03“

voier nisiory

0.63‘

Age

r

Democrdtic

o.or
0.05“
0.31*

Coilbldflt

-0.96

jM- itjf H. reiueniage or
**

Not Significant.

0.02

3%

0.02

"31%

0

~6%

0.07

1.1%

0.07

5.3%

0.08

cases Correctly Predicted

‘Significant to the .05 level. Full

Once

- 73%
model

Model Chi Sq 3040.91 with 5 degrees of freedom.
presented in Appendix 4

.

is

again, the effect of voter history stands
out with a 3

probability of turnout between voters

who went

who

is

have yet to go to the

voters were

6%

more

polls.

Age

showing
a

falls

a small

to the polls in

1%

two

difference in the

elections and those

consistent with the previous models.

likely to participate in the election, in
this case, the

than were younger voters. Party membership

Pennsylvania

Partial Effects

still

Older

1996 general,

has a fluctuating effect and

well between the extremes of Maryland and Ohio with
Democrats

1.1% increase

more robust 5.3%

in

voting probability over independents and Republicans

relative increase.

increase in the probability of turnout

Contacts show some

among

voters
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who had

effect.

There

is

a

3%

received 3 contacts over

those

who

had received 0 contacts.
However, even

insign, f, can,

from a poht.cai perspective,

remembenng

that the Pennsylvan.a
race

th,s small effect,

is statistically

which

insignificant,

was decided by fewer than

„
1

is

,s

no.

worth

100 votes and the

Democrafic candidate had scheduled
three contacts to moderate
l.kelihood voters

-

but

ran out of money before
the final contact could
be made.

The most

TV

coverage efF.ciency

shows the
Table

intense direct contact efforts
took place ,n the h,gh

6.5;

distr.ct

of California Congress.onal

coefficients, standard error,

and

01

.

cost and

low

Table 6.8 below

partial effects for the
California district

Causes of Voter Turnout by Age,
Voter History, Party and Contacts:

Variable

Coefficient

~SE

0.15*

0.7*

Age

0.003**

Democratic

-.

Republican

1010 ***

0.0065

9.7%

0.0174

34%

0.0034

2.5%

0.0631

'
'

-1.4%

6.5%

-1.27

Percentage of Ca ses Correctly PrpHirtoH

700 /

Again, past voter history shows a strong effect
on the probability of voting.

and Democratic are not
probability of voting

change from 0 to

statistically significant.

6.5% over

of contacts on voter groups
a sample

is

the base category of independent registration.

it

pulled using

district results

The

of voting by nearly 10%.

and examining the effects of specific types

might be useful to examine the coefficients produced
all

four

districts.
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Age

Being Republican increases the

3 direct contacts increases the probability

Before comparing the

when

CA

Partial Effects

0.0589

0.411*

Coiibtdnt

N=14848.

district

TV

This combines the various strategic

approaches and allows for the
inclusion of

a variable designating
presidential or

non-presidential election.

Table

6.6:

Combined

Causes of Voter Tin- noiit by
Age, Voter History, Party
amt Contacts:
file

Variable

Coefficient*

SE

0.065*
0.74*

Age

Hartial Effects
"

0.006

4%

0.015

0.007*

35%

0.001

0.182*

~5%
”

0.049

3 6%
.

Repuhliran

0.384*

0.037

0.483*

0.037

-1.599*

lM-22830.

included

history

With

in

still

all

tile

-

74

3

7% MnHol

r'hi c....

%

.54 with six

follows the general trend of the
districts

the model are significant and

all

All

degrees of

of the variables

are related to increased turnout.

Voter

has a strong infiuence as does the newly
added variable for presidential year.

other things held constant, voters

year were 9

9

~b.063

Percentage of Ca ses Correctly Predicted

The combined

7.3%

“

in

the

two

elections held during a presidential

% more likely to turnout than those voting during the two non-presidential

election years.

Before comparing the

districts

and discussing their differences

it

might be useful

to pull together the partial effects from each
table before embarking on a

discussion.
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more

detailed

Table

6.7;

Variable

1

otal

Comparison of

OH

CoDlacts

MD

O//0

'~NS

NA

INJA

NS=Not
voting

in

NA=Nc>t

£iignificant

2 elections;

A,;

Tt%

"31%

"34%

6%

-.7%

30.8%

Main

3%

7%

26%

compared
campaign
in the

IS

~

~NS

-1.4%

ri.3%

6.5%

35%
""5.5%

3.6%
7.3%
^

~NA

“na

~9%

Applicable. Parti 3l effertc rf^nroeAni

^tlTt?

=
old voter;

^

ptesioUXIn'oST^TeSr

is

~4%

~3%

Republican = the change in probability
compared to an inritno h
Ptobaottitv tot tnose voting fn a

There

Districts

~PA~

39%

11%

Among

“

~6%

I\Jo

Age

Partial Effects

Democrat and

r;,,~''S rntp^O

4

a striking difference between
the consistency of age and
voter history as

to the inconsistency of party
and total contacts.
situations represented these

two independent

Despite the variety of

variables

show

a steady

and,

case of past voter history, dramatic
influence on the probability of turnout

also consistent across

other three

all

four districts although

This difference

districts.

may

The

is

is

a

little

higher

in

Ohio than the

not be due to any unique political
or social

factors but because of the structure of the
data.

Ohio records and the missing data

it

Age

Age

is

not available on

skewed toward older

many of the

voters.

contrast between age and voter history on the
one hand and total contacts

and party on the other

is

not as mysterious as

it

looks.

The

participation might be seen as consistent across the country.

California has similar

life

experience to a voter

in

effects

A

Pennsylvania.

of age or past

sixty year old in

Likewise, a voter

who

has gone to the poll twice before will be more likely to vote
than a non-voter no matter

where they

live.

The

effect of direct contact,

regarding the campaign as a whole.

If

however,

we assume
157

that

is

a part of a larger question

campaigns

effect turnout, then

it

is

the can,pa.gn as a whole
which might capture that
effect. Thus, the
effect of direct

contact on turnout will
increase with the overall
percentage of campaign
resources
directed toward contact and.
for the most part,
that

,s

the case.

The most

intensive

direct contact effort, that
taking place in California
congressional district 01,

greater than that of the smallest
contact effort, the one carried
out by David

Steve Chabot

Ohio congressional

in

01

district

To

,

particular

total

to

The

campaign

campaign

on turnout.

on voter turnout but

one particular aspect of campaigning,

turnout which,

at

a

Mann and

it

reflects strategic

and

greater the allocation to direct
contact, the greater the effect
that

activity has

effect

much

the extent that the effect
of direct

contact on turnout measures the
campaign effect on turnout
tactical choices.

is

minimum, suggests

It is

it

gauge from the data the

does appear that the greater the
allocation

in this

that

difficult to

case direct contact, the higher the

campaign

efforts themselves can motivate

the electorate.

Party might be thought of as more
comparable but,
definitions of party, the term "Republican"
and
things.

In

Maryland,

Ohio

it

in elections

choice

--

is

fall in

already low while

in

file

different

based on primary participation. In
In one, party

the other

it

is

is

defined by voting

a matter of personal

unrelated to the act of voting.

Although
of the

is

simply a question of voter registration.

is

with voter

"Democrat" might mean very

for example, the party designation

where turnout

at least

in

effect varied

every

from

district

2%

in

contacts raised the probability of turnout the strength

Ohio to 10%

the middle of the spectrum.

probability of a Keystone Stater by

in California.

The change from zero

3%

Maryland and Pennsylvania

to three contacts raised the

but increased the likelihood of a Marylander
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V0 .,„g by a more
substantial 6%,

Why

the difference.

The data does not allow

contprehensive testing of
hypotheses regard,
ng the d.fference anrong
at the probability

patterns^

ofvot.ng

Table 6,8

at

each level of the independent
variable

for any

d.striots but a

may

reveal

looh

some

summarizes the probability of
an individual voter
participating

,n

the election ,n question for
each level of the quantitative
independent variables voter

histow. age, and total contacts
while holding

Table

6.8:

all

of the other variables

at their

Pfobability of Voting by Total
Contacts, Voter History and

thfinriPnpnHpn'i'*^'"
the independent variable.

mean.

Age

'"epresent a probability of voting in the election in
question for each level of

Models are presented

in

Appendix 4
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Table 6,8

on ,he

effec,

is

similar ,o ,he partial
etfecs .able 6,7 bu.
provides

of .ncremental increases.

The

firs,

th.ng ,o note

is

more informa, .on

the different starting

points of the 1994 elect.on
and the 1996 elect.on.
This d.fference

is

illustrated in the

voting histoo. rows. In
Maryland and Ohio, both 1994
races, a person

voted

,n

a past elect.on had a

However,
and

47%

in

30%

probab.lity

who

of showing up for the
1994 general.

1996. for the California and
Pennsylvan.a races, non-voters

probabil.ty respec.vely of
showing up at the polls.

consistent with the

known

had not

These

show

a

41%

results are

turnout differentials between
presidential and

non-presidemiai years. Despite the
different starting points the
effects of pas, voting

were consistent across

districts.

likelihood of voting by between

Participating in even one previous
election raised the
1

7%

and 20%, By the time a voter had
participated

four previous elections his or her
participation

in ftiture

elections had

become

in

a near

certainty.

Keeping the
total contacts.

Age

increases between

presidential and off-year difference in

is

1%

presented

and

3%

in

ten year increments.

for each decade.

voter's probability of turnout only increases
by

where each decade sees an increase of nearly
turnout.

3%

Although the numbers look small from

are quite significant

where the age

effect

when comparing
is

The

The low

1%

mind

is

us consider age and

probability of voting

in California

where

per decade and the high

per decade

a

let

in

is in

Ohio

the probability of

decade to decade movement they

older and younger voters.

Even

in California,

the weakest the probability of a 65 year old
participating

higher than the probability of a 25 year old voting. In Ohio
the difference
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a

is

is

4.5%

nearly 12%.

Direct contact also
affects turnout

In

Oh.o and Pennsylvania each
addit.onal

contact added about one
percentage point to the
probability of voting.
-hat small effect flattened
out after three contacts.

may

Ohio even

Tins indicates that n.ultiple
contacts

increase turnout but also
points to a saturat.on level
after which each
addit.onal

contact adds

effects

l.ttle

to the probability of voter
turnout. In Maryland and
California the

of direct contact are more
noticeable.

probability

first

In

of voting by about 2

few contacts

Maryland each contact raised
the

In

% while in California the effect was nearly 4%

leveling off to 2

for the

% as the voter reached the four or five contact level.

Evidently, direct contacts are also
subject to a law of diminishing
returns.
Direct contact increases the
probability of turnout less than
demographic factors

such as age, party
three contacts

affiliation,

from

is

and past voter

3% to 10%

contacts from either campaign.

more

7

histo.

.

In general, a voter

likely to turnout than a voter

of districts

future research.

is

too small to

One

who

California,

test

any hypotheses some factors suggest themselves
for

possible factor

where contact

is

the cost of television.

effects are

much

higher television costs.

costs,

Ohio CDOl and Pennsylvania

turnout.

receives no

Although the sample

The two

districts

strongest contact effects California and
Maryland, also have the highest
point.

receives

This district variation indicates that
complex local

factors also influence the turnout
effectiveness of direct contact.
size

who

even stronger than

in

TV

with the

cost per

Maryland, also has

Likewise, the two districts with the least expensive

This relationship between

CD 21

show

TV cost

TV

the least direct contact effect on

and direct contact effect suggests the

presence ot an overall campaign effect on voter turnout while controlling
for other
variables.

That effect might be spread out among
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all

campaign

activities including direct

contact, television, radio,
and free media

The higher

devoted to direct contact, the
higher the marginal

the percent of campaign
activities

effect of voter direct
contact

on

turnout.

With a small relationship established
between

direct contact

and voter turnout

the next group of questions
center on the importance of
different types of direct

contacts on different types of voters
direct contact

was divided

At the beginning of the data
collection phase

into four mutually exclusive
categories:

First,

contacts were

divided by source. There were two
definitions of "source".
Contacts were divided

between Republican and Democratic as
well as between incumbents and

challengers.

Secondly, contacts were divided by their
method of delivery. There were three
delivery

methods; phone, mail, and door-to-door.
The vast majority of contacts were delivered

by either mail or phone

Third, contacts

were divided by purpose. Again, there were

three purpose categories; voter identification,

were divided by
issue contacts.

their

message

type.

GOTV,

and persuasion.

Message could be

In the following chapter

we

will

types of contacts on different groups of voters.
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Finally,

contacts

positive, negative, or substantive

examine the

effects

of these different

CHAPTER

7

WHO DO WE ENCOURAGE TO VOTE?
Electoral politics has always
been about divtsion.

introduction were

all

about reminding the

Republicans or Democrats

government. Modern
ways.

-

and

in

much

rallies

described

they were different

that, unless vigilant,
the

politics is very

Deciming partisanship

faithtul that

The

-

in

the

they were

enemy would take

control of

the art of dividing the
electorate ,n ever finer

the electorate and the
concomitant rise of candidate

based organizations combined with
computer and communication
technology to create a

system which melded necessity and
capacity.

While much of this division

persuading groups of voters deemed
malleable, some of it

among

specific voter groups.

Choices regarding

how

provide the framework for direct
contact strategy.
direct contact strategies takes

by dividing up the contacts by

It

at

increasing turnout

at

to address base and swing voters

The

tactical

implementation of

their source, purpose,

if

method, and message. This

one type of contact influences turnout more

addresses such questions as whether incumbent
contacts increase the

probability of turnout

increasing turnout:

it“^

aimed

aimed

on a number of characteristics which
have been captured

chapter examines each categoiyi to see
than another.

is

is

more than

challenger contacts.

phones or mail?

Do

than frequent voters'^

is

more

of contacts on

different types

do non-voters get more motivation from

Do younger

effective in

negative messages depress turnout or increase

Finally, the chapter also looks at the effects

All other things being equal

Which

of voters.

direct contacts

voters respond to direct contact differently than

older voters?
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The Goals and Methods

7.1

of Direct Contact

Conceptually and professionally
direct contact rests on
a disttnction between
persuasion and turnout. This
divtsion

methods of delivery,

that

the post office whtle

GOTV

and

GOTV can

is

of phone and
efforts

less perfectly

mail.

mirrored

the

in

two primary

Generally, persuasion contacts
travel vta

move over

the phone or on foot.

also be carried out using
a door-to-door effort.

Both persuasion
a "less perfectly"

Still,

called for ,n the prevtous dtstinction
because there are such things
as persuasion

is

phone

more

the

all

and

calls

GOTV mail

Because the two dtchotomies are closely

interesting to revtew their effects

on turnout side by

destgned to tncrease turnout while
persuasion

ts

is

side.

related

After

tt

all,

will

be

GOTV

used to influence a person's candidate

choice and the method of contact
would seem secondary.'*"

Table 7.1 Change in Voting Probability for
Voters Receiving 0 Contacts with
Voters Receiving 3 Contacts for
GOTV/Persuasion/ID and Mail/Phone/Door to
Door Contacts
GOTV

PERS

Voter ID

Mail

Phone

Door

OH01

13.1%*

-15%*

15%*

NS

12%*

NS

MD05

NS

6%*

16%*

13%*

-6%*

NS

PA21

-11%*

NS

27%*

NS

13%*

-10.1*

13%*

NS

11%*

6%*

NS

CA01

NA

Note: Cells renrt>S(>nt tho norr'onl
•

'

^

'

^

M,

MIC \jixjuaui\ny ui

The
models

coefficients used to

Tor voiers receivrna 0 contacts anri vntprc

produce the probabilities

similar to those used in Chapter six with

removed from

voimq

significant at the .001

NS=ToI'lignmca^^^

the

number of total

levl NA=Not Applicable

in table 7.

1

are derived from

one exception. Total contact

model and various mutually exclusive groups, which add up

contacts, are added in

its

stead.

Table

7.

1

contains

two such

is

to the

divisions.

All of the models used to create the partial effects tables in this chapter arc
presented in

Appendix

5.

1

64

First, total

contacts.

efiforts.

contacts are divided into

GOTV,

persuasion, and voter
identification

Secondly, total contacts
are divided into mail,
phone, and door to door

Changes

in

the probability of voting
occurring

increased from 0 to 3

when each

type of contact

is

is

presented

For each change, the model
controlled for age.

voter history, and party

affiliation.

Again,

age and voter history were included
included using an empirical

from the data
looking

at

the

in table 7.

1

mean
First,

method of contact

this says is that

phone

methods of voter

calls are

contact.

of social

someone

in

in

the model as quantitative
variables.

Two

the effects on turnout are

consistent

rather than the

more

more

chapter

facts stand out

avowed purpose of the

when

contact.

What

effective at increasing turnout
than are other

First,

phoning

is

to that percentage

often

done on or near

was home

to

answer

it,

is.

in

in

this

election day

of the voting population for

Secondly, the mere presence of a phone

the house

six,

was

Party

Although the data does not provide
any clues as to why

and may well serve as a reminder

the fact that

base model explained

for Republican and
Democrat.

might be. two things come to mind.

such reminders are useful

in

like the

the house

whom
-

and

and of itself, a measure

stability.

Taking PA21 as an example, mail does not reach a

statistically significant level

but three phone contacts increase the probability
of turnout by 13%.

with the comparison between

GOTV effort was associated

GOTV and
with an

persuasion was not significant.

method of direct contact

tells

1

persuasion

1%

The same

decrease

in

in

the

same

This contrasts

district

where the

the probability of turnout while

pattern in repeated in every district as the

us more about the effects on turnout than does the

contact’s purpose. This emphasizes an important tactical point.
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It

may

well be that the

avowed purpose of the
least

when

voting

it

is

less

to voter turnout.

three of the four districts.

in

door to door
California.

data.

comes

contact

m

important than the method
of communicating

The telephone appears

Even

slightly less

the seeming anomaly of
Maryland

Unlike other

districts there

to have a strong impact

Phoning has a much greater

Ohio and Pennsylvania and

were no blanket

of an

—

at

on

effect than mail or

effect than mail in

may be due

to the structure of the

GOTV efforts undertaken by the

campaigns. Instead, the Hoyer
race identified favorable
voters via the phone and then
mailed to them to encourage turnout.

done by

mail,

had a very strong

moving from 0

affect.

effect

A

m

in probability

in

of voting when

16%. The low overall phone
is

all

effect in

due to the large number

the Prince George’s county portion
of Mainland

telephone number might be disconnected
or incorrect for a number of

reasons but almost

resides

is

change

identification contacts,

of voter identification efforts

of bad and disconnected telephones
05.

In fact, the

identification contacts to three

Maryland but the strong

CD

However, the voter

all

of them are related to notions of stability.
The longer a person

one place and does not

unlist or

change

his

number, he

will

tend to match

with a good phone. The more often a person
moves, has her phone disconnected,

changes numbers or

unlists

numbers the greater the chance

disconnected number. Stability

is

for a mistaken, or

highly related to turnout so places with a mobile

population tend also to have low turnout and a high number
of bad telephones.

Because the areas with bad telephones overlap with low turnout
effect

of phoning

is

masked and

actually

the revised Maryland figures indicate,

The worst
Bcrkely

in

shows up

as a drag

a specific case

areas, the positive

on turnout. However, as

where the phones are known

places for tclcplioncs tend to be urban college areas such as Cambridge

CA because they combine

MA and

highly mobile student populations with pockets or urban poverty.
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to

be good there

have a strong
effective ,n

is

a strong pos.tive
effect

on voter turnout

effect

poo,

voter turnout.

in

but. unfortunately,
this mechanis.n nray
be least

highly ntobile areas
most

voter .den, if, cation on turnout
voters early on

on voter turnout. Thus,
phoning appears to

in

need of turnout

,n

The nnpact of

effbr,

the other distncts
reinforces the notion that
identify, ng

an effort to ascertain their
vote preference

More expensive and more

is

associated with a higher

intensive than simple

GOTV call,

voter

identification efforts generally
represent multiple, coordinated
contacts.

Also evident from table
door-to-door

efforts.

This

is

who

is

1

the lack of any positive
effects on turnout from

certainly contrary to expectations.

consider a personal appearance

campaign contact; although,

7.

it

a, the voter's

must be

door

said, all

to be the

at

someone's door. Candidates are

urged to walk door-to-door whenever
time, fundraising, and

probability of turnout.

The

effects

Ohio, Maryland, or California,
decrease

campaign

in turnout.

Why

in table 7.

In

1

most powerful form of

campaign workers have met candidates

might no, benefit from personally
appearing

allow but, according to the figures

Most experts would

district

demographics

these efforts can even reduce the

of door-to-door efforts were not

significant in

Pennsylvania walking efforts were related to
a

10%

does door-to-door, presumably among the
most effective

tactics available, appear to decrease turnout
in Pennsylvania‘S

The answer may

well be in the coding of the data,

efforts in Maryland, Pennsylvania, and

of literature drops, not

Ohio shows

direct visits with tamilies.

relatively easy to ascertain the exact targeting

that

look back to the contact

most of them were

With mail and phone

of the

call

impossible to do so with a non-targeted literature drop.
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A

efforts

or mail effort, but

In

in the

it

is

it

nature

is

next to

Pennsylvania for example.

.wo of ,he "dooMo-door"

efforts

were blanket drops

and the Shenango Valley.
To code
Itsted as

th,s

file, all

drop was

in

good way
have read

voters Hv.ng

the windsh.eld wipers
of cars parked

those areas were

,n

it.

Such blanket drops
between so

who
in

church

on Sunday. The

lots

or no measurable impact.

m

Ohio.

why one

myriad strategic and

in

similarities.

Pennsylvania

no

who may

for the negative

Ohio CDOl,

In

CD 05

the

GOTV efforts had a

same type of effort had

little

Mail had increased turnout in
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and
It is difficult,

type has an effect

tactical choices

demographically and

like th,s.

called "door to door" eflforts
and turnout.

strong effect on turnout, while

California but not

really received the
literature let alone

low turnout areas may well
account

There are variations as well as

to determine

,n

response to a s.m.lar effon
by the Christian Coalition.
In a case

exists for determining

relationship

politically

it

when looking
in

come

at

contacts

at this level

one area but not

in another.

into play.

how

may be remarkable

Given

that

we

All

of detail,

of the

different every race

is

can find any consistencies

such as the generally positive effect direct
contact has on turnout; the power of

phoning, the efficacy of ID efforts and the seeming

7.2

the lower middle class
Eire City

having received the contact.
In the Shenango
valley drop campatgn
literature

was placed under

at all

on the

in

futility

of door-to-door drops.

Negative and Positive Contacts

Few

issues surrounding the conduct of campaigns
attract as

much

attention as

negative advertising. Observers journalistic, academic, and
elected decry their increase,
their content,

and

their effect

on voter turnout. Negative advertising

cause and result of the coarsening of our national dialogue
advertising on turnout

is

The

is

effect

seen as both the

of negative

also a hotly debated empirical controversy. Ansolabehere and
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Iyengar argue ,ha, negative
advert.sing lowers turnout.
Other scholars, such as
Darrly

West, argue that mistrust
of government
turnout than negative
advenising and
significant effect

on turnout

a, all

-

much more

is

that, in fact,

strongly associated with
lower

negative advertising has no

Because the contacts recorded
for

divided into negative, positive,
and issue contacts

we

th,s

can examine some of the

relationships between negative
direct contacts and voter
turnout. Table 7 2

summarizes the

Table

partial effects involved in
the types

7.2: Partial Effects of

Change From

Positive

OH01

MDOS

7%

PA21

-8

classical

Issue

NS

NS

%

6.3%

14%

%

- 11

15%

negative, and issue contacts. ‘Significant
to the .05 level.

The

model of democracy. Under such

NS=NoI signiS

good news

less

ability

is all

that

Aldous

of large numbers of

choices in the light of adequate information."'”

the issue information, which, presumably,

much

for advocates of the

a model, one might hold, with

Huxley, that "The survival of democracy depends
on the
realistic

%

8%

partial effects presented in table
7.2 are not

people to make

direct contacts

Negative

2

NS

CA01

of campaign

below

0 to 3 Contacts for Positive,
Negative, and

Issue Contacts
District

study were

Huxley would

It

appears as

if

find adequate, has

of an effect on turnout than do the negative attacks sent out
by the candidates

See Steven Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar, Going Negative (New York,
Free Press, 1995) and
Darryl West, Air Wars: Television Adverstising in Election Campaigns
1952-1996 2nd Ed (Washington,

DC,

CQ Press

1997); Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Dirty Politics: Perception, Distraction

(New York, Oxford UniversiW

and Democracy

Press, 1992)

Huxley, Aldous. Brave

New World Revisited.
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(1st Ed.

New

York, Harper and Brothers) p 58

or the posi,.ve pieces
,ou.,„g candidate background.
In ntos, cases, issue
ads had

issue ads had a negative
effect

come

on voter turnout. Only

,n

Ma^land

less

d,d tssue contacts

close to their positive or
negative counterparts.

Some of the

largest effects are reserved
for negative contacts

In Pennsylvania

and California turnout increased
14% and 15% respectively with the
addition of three
negative contacts to the voter's
stock of campaign information.
positive effect

least

on turnout

in

Maryland

albeit a slight one.

one exception to the possible
development of a

were not

statistically signiticam.

There

is little

room

They

also

had a

Ohio, again giving us

In

at

generalization, negative contacts
to believe that issue contacts
have

a strong impact on turnout while either
positive or negative direct contacts,
especially

negative contacts, do appear to increase
the probability of a voter participating

given election.

more than

Why

do contacts based on personal

issue pieces'^

humorous and dramatic

The presentation of human
presentation styles.

the voter into thinking about the campaign

cacophony. The

compete

level

To draw

in

much

is

is

seem

to motivate voters

characteristics lends itself to

at

work here

is

the ability to

more
draw

the face of a remarkable marketing

substantial.

Electoral messages have to

better funded and

more

frequently presented

peoples attention to their candidate they need to

present memorable material quickly.

readily than issue data.

What

of non-election noise

for mental attention against

private advertisements.

qualities

in a

People to remember personal information more

Also, information that

recall than textual or pedantic material.

is

presented as a narrative

Finally, insofar as

reinforcement of already held beliefs and opinions,
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it

is

is

easier to

campaigns are about the

the personal narrative, or the

personal attack, which

is

fitted to link

pnvately held behefs with
the differences

presented by two candidates.

7.3 Republicans, Democrats,
Challengers,

and Incumbents

Although the Republican campaigns
studied made more
the

Democrat

one.s.

perhaps refiect.ng their more
robust fitnd.ng, there

reason to believe that Republican
contacts

Democratic contacts. There
contacts will have

is familiar.

proportionally

is,

that

is httle

have more of a cumulative

will

however, some reason to believe

more impact than challenger

and research suggests
information

individual contacts than

contacts.

that

a prior,

effect than

incumbent

Incumbents are known

entities

communications are more believable when
the source of the

It is

also possible that

communication

more than incumbents because they

will benefit challengers

enter races as blank slates.

In other

words, a communication about a challenger
increases the stock of voter information

whereas a communication from an incumbent
may simply reinforce previously held
beliefs.

Table

Change

7.3:

in Voting Probability for Voters
Receiving 0 Contacts with
Voters Receiving 3 Contacts for Republicans/Democrats
and Incumbent/Challenger

Rep

Dem

Inc

Chall

NS

NS

NS

NS

MD05

8%

3%

3%

8%

PA21

7%

NS

7%

NS

CA01

11%

7%

11%

7%

OH01

•

zj
v/i vviimy lui vuierb receiving u
coniacts and voters
other things being equal. Control variables include age, total
elections, party, the number
I

receiving 3 contacts

all

democrats, incumbents and challengers.
.001 level.

NS=Not

All

variables included are significant to the

Significant

The Republican/Democratic dichotomy
Incumbent/Challenger dichotomy

in table 7.3,
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is

the mirror of the

but looking at them side by side highlights

the differences.

In the three districts

model, Republican contacts
had
contacts.

where party reached

statistical significance
in the

greater effect on turnout
than did Democratic

This sontewhat unexpected
result could arise
tbr,n the d.fferent
coalit.ons

needed for a Repubhcan,
as opposed

to a

Democrat, c. victo^. Republicans
need to

large, suburban voters
wh.le De,nocrats often
need to increase turnout
a,no„g poor and

working

class voters.

For example. DiNicola
focused attention on infrequent
voters

while English focused on the
outlying suburbs.

A
In

less clear pattern

two of the

emerges with respect to incumbent
and challenger contacts.

three districts where
candidate status reached the
level of statistical

significance incumbent contacts
had
other.

more

influence than challenger
contacts ,n the

In Pennsylvania, challenger
contacts

the coefficient

was

negative.

This

were not

may be due

performed by DiNicola's challenger
campaign.
high.

than

to the

statistically significant.

number of blanket

In fact,

literature

In California the difference

is

drops

also quite

Receiving three incumbent contacts
increased the probability of turnout
by more

12%

5.3%.

In

while the challengers contacts only
increased the likelihood of turnout
by

Maryland, the challenger contacts were
associated with a higher probability

of turnout and may simply

reflect the

Republican/Democrat dichotomy, Hoyer, the

Democrat and incumbent, targeted lower

probability voters than did Devine, a

challenger and Republican.

The preceding examination of the turnout
contacts

still

effects

of different types of direct

leaves open their effect on different voter groups.

that different types

It is

one thing to note

of contacts have comparatively stronger or weaker effects
but quite

another to note whether such effects are strongest among
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likely or unlikely voters.

How

do

direc, contacts affect
d.ffetent voter

groups. This broad
question

.ntportant to

,s

researchers looking at the
dyna.n.cs of turnout as
well as refornters
searching for an
elect, on

system that

w,ll re,na,n .nclusive

interests for fund.ng^

VCS.

An

examination of voter

as well as a quick glance

at

political practices

The following

file

orders over the pas, four
years a,

the targeting undertaken
by these eight campaigns,

overwhelmingly consist of age,
gender,

common

wlnle becoming less
dependent on pnvate

party,

and voter histoty selections.

have an effect on the distribution
of turnout

in

Do

such

elections?

section evaluates the effects
of direct contact on each of
these

commonly

targeted political groups by
selecting each subgroup
independently and testing the
effect

of direct contact on each group.
The same model used

earlier

reappears

in

each section

with one difference, the variable
chosen as a subgroup drops out
of the model, while the
other variables remain as controls.
party will

seme

are chosen.

contacts.

as an illustration.

Then, the model

is

An

examination of the contact effect on
turnout by

First,

only those voters within the party

in

question

run controlling for total elections,
age, and total

Party drops out of the model

One

possibility

is

that independents,

they are generally less likely to participate
than party members,
direct contacts than will Republicans
or Democrats.

will benefit

Alternatively,

because

more from

Republicans and

Democrats, by merit of their previous decision to
register with a party, may be easier
a

campaign

to

move

to the polls with an extra effort or two.

The second

possibility

for

is

supported by the data. In Pennsylvania, California,
and Maryland direct contact
increases the probability of turnout equally for
both Republicans and Democrats.

Independents do not seem to respond as

well.

In

all

three states, the relationship

is

either not statistically significant or substantially smaller
in magnitude than for either of
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the part,es^

harder to

,n Ohio,

move

none of ,he

relations,,, ps are
s.gn.ficant

independents are both

to the polls and less
likely to be recipients
of candidate efforts to

move

them.

Candidates also frequently
target by gender.
Sonte ,ssues are deemed
.nore
relevant to

men wh„e
that

men

or to

women

Anti-gun control mail for
example.

turn out at similar rates.

1952 79 »/„ of the men and 69
.

election,

1984 73 6

in

.

,

election.-

points,

in

.

3

This has not always been
the case.

% of the women self-reported voting in the

% of men and women reported voting ,n the

Roughly the same

results are

found

in

Ohio and Pennsylvania

the turnout

at a slightly

was

of

direct contact

within

identical for both groups,

women,

only district with a female candidate,
the female turnout was

studied, the effect

most recent

most recent

men and women was

higher rate than did

did contacts have a diiTerential
effect on

In

the four district samples
present

in each district, the turnout
percentage for

Mao-land, men turned out

Nor

often dtreced to

pro-cho,ce and educat.on
maihngs are often sent to
men. Research indicates

men and women

the study,

,s

2%

men and women,

m

2%

in

in California, the

above the male

rate.'®

in every district

on turnout for each gender showed the
same

direction and strength.
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^

^

^

UU V calls to their own members,

^

P‘^rties

generally do

ignoring independents. Models run which
included ID GOTV and
ersuasion as variaWes in place of Total Contacts
lent some support to this idea. The
coefficients were
much stronger for ID and
for independents but seldom reached
statistical significance.

GOTV

^

Conway, Margaret.

Political Participation in the United States.

(CQ

Press Washington

DC

’

1985) p 27

However, the equivalence
each of the

districts

under study

in turnout

percentages masks a shift of electoral power to women. In

women comprised

anv^vhere from

election day.
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6% to 9% more of the total

turnout on

7.4

Older and Younger Voters
ge

is

,he

demographic measure most
commonly assoc, a, ed with voter
turnout.

Within hmits, the older the
voter, the higher the
turnout. There are a
variety of

competing theories on why
categories.

might be so but the theories

this

fall

into

two

different

Generat.onal theories speculate
that the current group
ofolder voters went

Ihrough events of pol.tical and
drive to participate

historical socialization

in electoral politics.

older, by increasing stability
and

group of theories the
the process of

increases turnout.

of political socialization

movement through demographic
at rates

35%

their

Other theories speculate that
simply growing

community connection,

historical period

voters over 55 turned out

whtch tended to tncrease

stages.

is

In

one

key, in the other

it

is

In the four districts in
question

higher than voters 25 and under.

Because of

the higher probability of turnout
for older voters direct
contacts should have less of an
effect

on them than on younger

and there seems to be

little

voters.

room

Turnout becomes a near certainty as
voters age

for increasing turnout.
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Table 7,4 below summarizes
the results of two
models. Each model was
subset ot the samples for
each

The second

subset contained

state

The

district.

all

first

butl,

using a

subset consisted of all
voters 55 and over.

voters 30 and under.

Mean

No Contacts

3 S B Vo

Three Contacts

NS

.

78%

^

~NS

76.3%

47%

79.3%

~NS

NS

NS

NS

87%

44%

40.4%

86.9%

47.5%

81%

50.4%
90.5%

r

87%

28.4%

38.9%

73.7%

81.5%

Note: Cells represe nt the probabilitv
of votino at
H.vzuauimy oi lumoui wniie ho ding all
'CHiebenis me
variables at their
7 .
Significant. All other probabilities
statistically significant at the .001
level All moll^^^
age, voter history, and party.
Party included in the model as a
categorical ''^'•^ble,
variable using
usino lnHet.^*^H*
Independent as a base, and reporting
categories for
Democrat and Republican.

mMn

1 able 7.4

above presents three

as an example, with

variables held at the

all

for those 55 and over and under

This difference

Because of the higher turnout
difficult for

age cohort.

To

take Ohio

variables held at their mean, the
probability of turnout with

mean

tor voters 30 and over.

probabilities for each

is

repeated

in

is

every

for the older cohort

76.3% while

it

is

all

39.8%

district.

we

might assume

it is

more

contacts to increase their probability of turnout. The
data does provide

some support

for this thesis.

Neither Maryland nor Ohio produced

significant results in both age categories.

In the

statistically

two races which took place during

presidential year, direct contact does have a statistically
significant effect on the

probability of turnout for both cohorts.

176

a

In Pennsylva„,a,
,he

the older group, the
change

by

6o/„

change from 0 ,o

in

3 contacts

produced s.m.lar

results.

For

the nutnber of contacts
increased the probabihty
of voting

whtle the younger group
saw the shghtly larger, but
not trrelevant, increase
of

7%, This

effect

older voters by

was

intensified in California,

7,8%

but tncreases turnout

Three contacts increases
the turnout of

among younger

voters by

more 10,5%,

It IS

posstble that direct contact
has a disproportionately
greater effect on younger
voters.

There are a number of possible
reasons

for th.s impact.

First,

so likely to vote that any
additional campaign information
has

another

way of saying

They know when

about

how

campaign

little

or no effect. This

is

that older voters are already
integrated into the electoral
process.

elections are approaching, they
understand

they have had years of placing
disparate

Younger voters

older voters are already

bits

of information

how

to participate;

and

into a political context.

are correspondingly less
socialized into the electoral process.

Anxiety

and where to vote, combined with
a lack of informational contexts
makes

direct contacts

increases their

utility

more

useful sources of informafion and,
consequently,

as turnout motivators.

more normative importance when we

The notion of socialization takes on even

recall that older voters are

receive direct contacts from candidates.

much more

likely to

Younger voters may need them more

to

increase turnout but campaigns, for a variety
of reasons, are encouraged by our current

system, to direct contacts to the older voters

7.5

least

need a prod to the

polls.

Frequent and Infrequent Voters

Age may be
it

who

is

the most

common

variable used in academic studies on turnout but

not the best measure of voter participation available to
consultants.

turnout, they turn to past voter history.

To

predict

Past voter history captures the effects of age as
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WII .. 0,h..
_

t.«».

I.

id..»IVi„g

V«.„ who h.„
but voter history

proof that such a

habit exists.

Therefore,

we

is

should expect to see even
stronger

differences in the effects
of direct contact on frequent
and infrequent voters than
with

younger and older

voters.

There are many possible ways
of looking

For simphctty

I

have opted to consider

participated in only

participated in

district

one

two or more

Table

"frequent” and "mfrequent"
voters.

non-voters and

election to be infrequent
voters.

elections

were divided along these

subgroups.

all

at

lines

7.5, like table 7.4,

the probabilities of voting at
that level

is

all

voters

Any

coded as a frequent

voter

voter,

who have

who

has

The

files

for each

and models were run across
each of the

summarizes the
in

the

effects

of the model by presenting

model where each

variable

is

held at the

mean.

ran each model using a subgroup defined by the
number of elections voted. Models were
rim on subsets of voters who voted in 0,
1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 elections.
It was clear from looking at the
changes
the model as they moved from one subset to another
that the real difference was between those
who had voted in 2 or more elections vs. those who had \ otcd in or fewer
elections.
I

first

m

1
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The next ,wo columns

presen, the probahih.ies
of voting for each subgroup
a, ,he

infrequent voter" and
"frequent voter"

probability of turn-out* wNirho^lding
al^v
party, and total contacts. Constants
are
significant at the .05 level

level.

7hfmod
" oarh

m

incliiripri in

Direct contacts have a stronger effect
with,

once again, the exception of Ohio, where
the

significant nor appreciable.

little

among

impact

in

It

is difficult

to

tell

non-voters than

effects

when

GOTV,

the above models are run

in

nearly identical.

move

effort

why

contacts had

on persuasion and not

Ohio by substituting the number of

and Voter Identification contacts, the

significant tor both frequent and infrequent voters.

did not

voters

Ohio, Both campaigns targeted frequent
voters more than infrequent

In fact,

persuasion,

among

of contacts were neither

from the information

ones and both campaigns spent most of their time
and

GOTV,

represents the
controls for age, voter history,
significant. All other cells are

The

GOTV contacts are

coefficients for both

groups are

Evidently the mix of contact efforts and other campaign information

infrequent voters to the polls any

participating fellow citizens.
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more than

their

more frequently

‘lislricls Ilie coiiliicis
li,ul
llie

probabiliiy ol'tuinoui

'here

,s a

clKince

rhslmc, elVee,

onurnou, hy

n

,n

nearly

(Vaiucn,

7%

II,

e g,ea.e,s, d, lie, cnee

orinmonl hy

nearly

In

5.6%

w„h

12% aniong

slalisi,
itislically significant
cITect

Among

Maryland, Ihree eonlaels

."'Veriuen, volers increased Iry

•shows

voles

no

Lennsylvania,

,nnc.,uem voles, however

n, creased

an ndrermen, vrders

Ihe „rol.alnl„y ol
Unnou,

will, Ihe add, Mon
ol

among

Unee conlaCs, Cal.lo.ma

ihe ,ece„„ ol ilnee
coniacis ,„c,eas,ng

,nlVer|„enl

on

il,e

.nohalnlny

voles,

7.6 ( oiicliisioii

All coniacis aie „ol

emerging

Iron,

relalionsinp

di.sl,

ceiled equal

r-iven w,ll, dishrcl

each model enough genealizalions

helween dneci conlaci and

res .show vanalion

,„

vole, ,n„,o„l

each mdividnal model h„i

under study show any pallein

lo mail,

il

is

I

-dooi

al

ellorl.s,

positive atTecI

(

which

niighi

ol lhe

no, lhal Ihe

lhal disliicis as dilleenl
as Ihe

al

inceasing Inirionl lhan does mail

ones

Il

does nol appear lo do

,so.

he expecled lo he poweifnl

liirnonl lools,

In

In Ihis lighi,

in polilical

I'hone calls

increasing liirnonl no mailer wlial Ihe
purpose ol'lhe conlaci,

Door-lo

do nol have

a

at all

ontaels are also more potent

oiler the chance for

rillacks aie

,s

Ihe ,e,sulls

onilme

lowevci, one mighi Ihink lhal Ihe
inciease

inlonnalion alone would inciea.se Innionl.
heller

sinpiise

designed lo pei.snade vole, nol lo Inn,
Ihem onl

phones aie only doing Ihe, joh

woik

The

lo skelcl, an

in

at all

nearly, lelephone elToils woik heller
l'ailiie,ss

emegc

dilleences

more dramatic

slionger engines ol

al

increasing

presentation

liiiiioiil

liirnoiil to

the extent which they

Positive character pieces and negative

lhan issue communications

ISO

Likewise, Ihe

communication has more ofan
Voters prefer the devil they

effect

know on

on tuinoui when
election

it

comes from

the incumbent.

day and they must
ntr.t be more
motivated by

the familiar devil's
communications as well.
All voters are not
created equal

receipt

of campaign contacts has

those with a

of voting

For younger voters and
mlVequent voters the

a discernible mob.lization
etfect.

history, of past election
participation,

that candidate

communication has

turnout.
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Older voters, and

have already so developed
the habit

little if

any impact on their probability
of

CHAPTER

8

CAMPAIGNS AND THE HABIT OF
VOTING
television, that 3
8 years

add'd'-Tte'^etr

ago helped construct the
myth of another

F ^enn dy

"f

:r»rrrr
From

....

Slate

Magazine

International

'

He

r..u.., ...

News Summary

9/22/98

Research over the past forty
years has provided a wealth
of information on voter
turnout but veot
turnout.

little

about what

political elites

themselves can do to influence
that

Certainly journalists and
campaign workers believe that
political campaigns

directly affect voter
participation

I

am

writing this one day before
the

1

998 election

and one consistent stream of
commentai^ claims the election hinges
on the turnout

of Democratic and Republican
direct efforts

partisans.

of campaigns. Often, the

But even

this line

participation discussion focuses

national political stories on people's
predisposition to vote.

debate whether the Clinton scandal
or loyal Democrats.

An

of commentaiy

will increase the

logical

extreme

implies that

if politicians

of thought

directly links

on the effects of

turnout of Christian conseiwatives

alternative scenario has voters

this line

slights the

Typically, the analysts will

on both sides staying home

because they are sick both of scandal and
"negative campaigning"
Its

rates

in

general.

Taken

campaigns to depressed turnout and

ceased campaigning, turnout would increase.

There

is

a

notion contained within such beliefs that lend
power to this chapter’s opening quote.

Modern democracy

has

become more and more

participation.
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to

a matter of viewership and not

My goal

in this

project has been to
examine the effect of one
aspect of

campaigning, direct contact,
on voter turnout, and
has been motivated by
the belief that

campaigns can make a conscious
difference
participation.

how

they

fit

In this final chapter

in light

turnout and current trends

The

summarize

into the broader literature

the project's findings

8.1

I

in

in electoral

my

outcomes, including

project's

main findings and discuss

on campaigns and voter
turnout,

I

also

examine

of the larger questions
posed by the decline of voter

campaign finance reform.

Incentive Sirncture of Direct
Contact
chapter three

In

I

noted what has

participation. Simply put, even

moving

come

to be called the paradox
of voter

though most of the measures
associated with turnout are

a direction which would predict
an increase

in

decrease

in

Running

parallel to this

voter turnout.

is

The 1998
what

I

call

in

political

we

have actually seen a

elections had the lowest turnout
on record.

the paradox of voter contact.

suggests that voter contact increases
turnout, especially

However,

voting,

The evidence

among low

turnout voters.

campaign imperatives provide incentives
for campaigns to

concentrate direct contacts on voters
already

likely to vote.

This

is

the direct contact

version of the rich getting richer.

The

logic of campaign targeting arises from
a desire to get the right message to

the right people and to do so at the least
cost.

concentrate their contacts
are

more

m

Both desires lead campaigns

the hands of likely voters.

likely to vote, like seniors, are also the
target

Secondly, campaigns try to save
participated

m

money by sending

some

target groups

who

of issue specific direct contacts.

their

some combination of past campaigns.
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First,

to

message to those who have

Finally,

most

GOTV efforts are

directed at partisans,
leaving most
independents outside of the

four dtstncts undet
study
patterns

were

present.

direct contacts

at least

GOTV

universe.

In the

one, and often ntote
than one, ofthese
target,
ng

Seniors, treguen, voters,
and party .nentfters
received

more

from campaigns than
did younger, mtrequent
voting, and independent

voters.

The

distribution

of contacts would not be
an ,ssue

believe that contacts were
irrelevant to turnout,
but that

,s

if

there

is

small, ranging

from

one contact and the cumulative

effect

1%

to

4%

l.ttle

not the case.

contact does increase the
probability of turnout. The
change
single contact

was

,n

ground to

Direct voter

probabihty for each

but most campaigns
send out

more than

of a change from zero to
three contacts increases

the probability of turnout
anywhere front

2% to

7%, Although these numbers
ntay seem

small, the vast majority of
congressional turnover takes
place

in

elections decided by

similar margins.

Some
more

contacts work better than others

at

increasing turnout

etfective than are mail or
door-to-door etforts and multiple
calls

than single

calls.

delivered, are

Voters appear to respond to prodding.

more

ntotivational than are issue pieces.

ttirnout effect

of direct contact

is

more

effective

Personal messages, however

In a

negative mail or phone etforts were
particularly effective

Phones are much

in

number of the

districts,

increasing turnout

The

about the same for Republicans and
Democrats but a

decided edge goes to incumbents over
challengers.
All voters

do not respond the same way

to direct contact.

turnout tor voters thirty and under increases
by an average of

6%

The

probability of

for every three

contacts received but, for voters 55 and over,
that same number of contacts only
184

,

increases the probability
of turnout by an average
of 2,5%.

when looking

probabtlity

at

frequent and infrequent
voters.

of voting

turnout

8.2

among

similar pattern

is

found

Infrequent voters, defined
as those

for every three
contacts recetved

average increase of 1%.

A

Frequent voters show an
r

Campaigns can tncrease turnout
and they can most increase

those least likely to vote.

Implications for Research

Research on voting behavior
has concentrated on voter
resources and
characteristics.

The

of voting

act

is

seen as a function of a
voter's wealth or age
or

informatton resources or sense
of political efficacy. However,
such explanations do
little

to explain

why. when most measures
associated with higher turnout
have

increased, voter turnout has
decreased; or why. despite the
relative consistency of such
factors from cycle to cycle,
turnout varies.

arguing that the actions of political

elites

This study provides

need to be included

in

some grounds

any model seeking to

explain the fluctuations, be they
temporal or spatial, of voter turnout.
files

for this type of research

is

invaluable.

for

The use of voter

Researchers looking to isolate and

test the

efficacy of campaign activities should
contact campaigns ahead of time and
secure their

agreement to participate

in

telemarketing companies,

will

the study.

Early vendor interviews, especially
with the

will insure that

data will be saved.

allow the researcher to collect contextual
information

like

Campaign cooperation

TV, Radio, and

direct

contact expenditures. Telemarketing cooperation
will allow the researcher to measure
the actual contact record tor each individual
voter and measure that contact record
against voter turnout.

Most telemarketing companies maintain each response
185

next to

the voter record
including records for
bad number, disconnects,
and retlised.

If

combined with survey
information and precinct
voting returns a

link could also be
explored between candtda.e
choice and cantpatgn
acivities^ Not only
would ,nore
research involving the
use of voter files establish
links between cantpaign
act.vities and

turnout,

it

would

also provide

more .nformat.on about which
voters

are

left

out of the

information delivery process.

Researchers should add direct
contact informat, on to
turnout.

IS

Research ,n.o past

elect, ons cycles

related to voter turnout
fluctuations.

parttally overlaps the rise

historical

models of voter

might show that direct
contact expenditure

It is

at least

suggest,ve that turnout decline

of the candidate-centered
media campaign and the dechne
of

the party-voter-mobihzation
parad,gm.

Voter

files

represent an especially rich
and

diverse data set for the tracking
of direct campaign effects and
allow for the one to one
linking

of campaign action to voting
behavior.
Finally,

spending data.

any detailed study of actual campaign
It is

common

for researchers to plead for

obhv,ous to the costs of data collection

many FEC forms
it

is

I

surprising that

could not,

more

activity

in

at the source.

good conscience,

scholars have not

waded

exposes the paucity of

"more and

better" data while

As one who has

call for

much added

filled

out far too

complexity.

Still,

into the expenditure jungle.

Currently, only the Morris data presents
a detailed picture of campaign expenditure

based on

FEC

data.

Such research might be greatly

category code next to each expenditure entry.

computerize expenditure

data.

This

scale than the entry of all donors.

is

facilitated

by simply adding a

Additionally, the

FEC

might attempt to

no doubt a massive task but certainly smaller

There are a
186

lot

in

more donors than vendors. Perhaps

one explanation

for reform's focus

campaign donations.
campaigns by

8.3

on fundraising

is

the ready data aavailable
on

Better expenditure data
will flesh ouf the issues
surrounding

detailing outflow as well
as inflow.

Implications for Reform
In

1980 there were 204 firms
openly devoted to makutg
ntoney

the political campaign
process.

3500.

The 996 Carol Hess
1

political

The growth of campaign professionahsm
and

candidates

is

not a

new development so much

skill

of managers of the machine, the

part of

the professional marketing
of

as a rapidly accelerating
one.

portrait

some

resource dtrectoo- names

1937 John Dewey was worried
about issues being determined by
the

in

”

As

early as

habit, party funds,

of a candidate with

his firm jaw, his

lovely wife and children, and a
multitude of other irrelevancies,
determine the issues."

Distaste tor organized, electoral politics
politicians in general.

One hundred

adapted by Aaron Copeland as a
cynical chant to

is

a part of a deep and longstanding
distrust of

years before Dewey's comment, a folk
song, later

t|uintessential

American statement, presents

a musically

campaign and candidate trustworthiness:

Yes the candidate's a dodger,
Yes a well known dodger.
Yes the candidate's a dodger,
Yes and

dodger too.
meet you and treat you

He'll

And

I'm a

ask you for your vote.
But look out boys.

He's a-dodgin for a note.'®^

Today, the timeless concern over the power and morality of politicians,
melds
with concern over the state of campaign

Intciricw with Cnrol Hess;

Mnrch

3,

politics, its techniques,

and the consultants

1996

Dewey, John. The Puhtic audits Prohleins.

(Alliens,
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OH

Swallow

Press, 1927) p 122

who

bring expertise ,o bear
on ,he process.
d.s,as,e

The

ent.re polihcal
process

is

viewed with

by a majority of Americans,
Critiques of campaigning
concentrate on the

evils

and influence of money
and wha, are often seen
to be vacuous campaign
messages.

Many campaign
bought and sold and

more governmental

Nor
IS

IS

reformers would have the
electorate believe that
politicians are

that

improvement requires some
combination of less money and

regulation.

There

is

no doubt the many campaigns
are unsavo^.

there any doubt that any system
of campaign financing will
lead to abuse.

missing

many reform arguments

in

campaigns

democracy
rallying cry

a democratic system.

in

is

is

any appreciation of the

utilitarian side

The absence of a notion of the
campaign's

analogous to the absence of empirical
research into campaigns.

What

of
role in

The

of "get money out of politics" ignores
the very function of money
within

politics.

This research suggests that

campaigns,

is

It

m

turnout from

may sound

trite,

of the argument

given

one function of money, as funneled through

to increase voter turnout, a goal
shared by reformers as well as defenders

of the status quo. Clearly,
variation

at least

is

limits, try to

elite

are, at least partially,

Elections are arenas

communicate

their beliefs

in

forms of those communications,

in

which candidates, working within

and capacities to voters.

Massachusetts state representative

call all

district

The exact

but, at least in this paper,

some circumstances,

Communication costs money. To

Although

about communication. The logic

of communication, and how they work, are debatable,

I

some of the

district to district or election cycle
to election cycle.

campaigns
simple.

mobilization efforts account for at least

some

increase voter turnout.

of the households within a

one time would cost $20,000. To send
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effects

all

eholds

that

111

same

distiicl a letter

would cost approximately
$ 7,000.

A

1

approved Massachusetts

initiative

imposes a spending cap on
Representative

$30,000 ($ 8,000 for the prima^,
where there are almost no

recently

districts

of

1

general)

Even

if a

campaign put

all

races,

and $ 2,000 for the
1

$30,000 into direct contact, assuming
a campaign

could be run without a paid
manager, lawyer, or accountant,
that campaign could not

even send two pieces of mail or
make two phone

calls to district voters.

This

is

especially devastating in light of
the data in this study suggesting
that only multiple

campaign contacts increase turnout

The argument

that

campaigns are forms of communication,
and

communication costs money, seems unexceptionable,
but
to lead to the conclusion that

Alternatively,

is

good and

focuses attention not so

it

as the need for

money

much on

more money

the

the sheer

some minimum amount of funding which

incumbents alike to communicate
proceeds from the assumption
turning out voters.

out of politics so

that

The question

much

as to

their issues,

is in fact,

how money

It

seems

the better.

allow challengers and

their character,

campaigns have a valuable role

that arises

heretical.

amount of money, so much

will

and display

that

from the argument

is

in

not

to voters.

It

educating and

how

to get

money

can best be regulated to produce electorally

desirable results.

The notion of "electorally
attention in

desirable results"

is

campaign reform discussions. Although

theory of electoral democracy

1

would suggest

not one that gets a

lot

this is not the place to

that the notion

of "clean and

of detailed

develop a

fair"

This is assiiniing paid plioncs and dircci mail Presumably, vohmlccrs could make literature
drops and provide phoners for calling. This reliance on volunteers merely reinforces the already
overwhelming strenght of incumbeuts who can cultivate a core group of volunteers year round through
constituent work.
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elections

which

is

but one critenon. Others,
which are equally i.uporta„t,
include a process

facihtates turnout and
electoral change.

campaign money
persuasive

turnout.

- and,

mediums

in

th,s

perspective the linritat.on of

a related manner, the
fonneling of campaign

instead of

more turnout

specific

Secondly, the restriction of
campaign

elections need to facilitate
electoral change.
this

From

method, may serve

money

In a

to decrease

world of incumbent advantage,
and

study extends that advantage to
the efficacy of incumbent
communications, suggests

which

known

limits

spending benefits incumbents.

candidate with a constituent service
based organization will win.

efforts to turn out voters.

campaign spending on

If increased turnout is the
goal,

direct contact efforts are warranted.

the right kind of campaign spending

is

captured

in

money. Congressman Albert Winn of Maryland,
helped drive

district

proven

Any reform

world of zero spending, the better

In a

This study suggests that restricting
campaign spending

was

to purely

also violates the notion
that

that real challengers need
to outspend incumbents just
to stay even,'«

my

money

in

my

originally designed to do,

shorthand for

The

This notion of encouraging

Times

article

on

soft

quoted as saying. "Soft money has

money

district is largely

the past to be a low turnout area.

is

is

then policies that encourage

New York

voter programs. If we didn't have that

would go down,'"* Winn's

party strength,

a

may harm campaign

I'm sure the turnout in

African-American and has

picture of soft

money doing what

it

increase turnout through voter programs and build
local

quite diflerent from the prevailing view

political corruption,

Frank Sorauf rightly

where

soft

calls soft

money

money

has

become

"a term

of epic

There are numerous studies which show the enormous fundraising advantages of
incumbents.
See Paul Herrnson, Congressional

New York

Times, June

8,

Elections,', or Sorauf,

1998.

Money

National Edition Page

190

in

Congressional Elections.

A 12.

imprecision" but

efforts.

in

one of its incarnations

it

was intended

Current reform discussions
should focus

more on

redirecting

If,

it

back to

its

less

on eliminating

original intent.

beneficial to

democracy, then systemic reforms

the beneficial activities cheaper
relative to the alternatives.

discussion of campaign reform
limiting spending,

will actually

making

is

direct contact discussed.

ftindraising

more

soft

money back

the following specific topics for discussion

Reduce postage

The

costs.

Campaign reformers

in light

at

mail.

almost no

many

proposals, by

contact at

TV

all.

to

its

original purpose,

of this study's

1

propose

findings.

of any direct mailing

owned

not the federal government’’

is

often

radio and television

Reduced postage

the cost of direct contact vis a vis television and radio
and reduce the

the

same

It

would broaden the use of direct

time, broaden direct contact targeting.

will also give challengers the

of franked

in direct

largest single cost

pressure to target mailings to smaller groups.
contact while,

In fact,

in

aim to make

and providing access to free

often suggest that privately

Why

stations provide free air time.

would decrease

However,

will

two general proposals suggested above,
encouraging more

campaign spending and redirecting

postage.

difficult,

decrease the incentives to engage

In addition to the

I)

money and

soft

even for a moment, one can
accept the assumption that
certain kinds of

campaign spending are

time

GOTV

to facilitate party

same

Franked mail

is

benefit as incumbents

Reduced cost postage

who make good

political

use

restricted to non-political uses but incumbents often

target franked mail just like voter mail and use gender, age, and even voter history to

make

sure the right message gets into the right hands.
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2) Increase .he

number

proved the most effective
study received no
to

direct contact turnout

GOTV contact

make more phone

possibilities,

of election day phone

at a„.

calls to voters

ofvaiying

How m.gh,

non-partisan

benefit

GOTV, Some

GOTV calls to

from government subsidy.

and e-mail takes

its

why

of the voters

in

the

the campaign system
he statctured

legislative fiat to providing
parties

increase turnout

As

and

organizations, like Project Vote,
already

Surely this kind of activity would

the internet slowly

place as a voter contact method, will

to vote or can incentives be constructed
to insure a
Finally,

67%

phoning

ranging from reducing the
cost of phoning

through selective tax reduction, subsidy,
and

make

yet

In ,h,s study

before or on election day7
There are a number of

political plausibility,

organizations with fiinds for

medium

calls.

not have a governmental system

in

becomes
it

a viable political tool

to favor those already likely

more widespread message

place which

makes

delivery?

election day calls

reminding people of their duty to vote^ This
type of program, while technically simple

and cheap,

is political

dynamite

techniques to increase turnout

Still,

the notion of government using effective

worth debate and again, the increasing reach of e-mail

is

provides another cheap and simple method of governmental
communication. There
suggestion that government sponsored

3)

at

Make

sure the data

is

TV ads

do anything

readily available to

all

is

no

to increase voter turnout.

candidates

Voter

files

are

the intersection where the information requirements of democracy
meet privacy

concerns.

Before every election

campaign phone
from our
the

same

file.

call

back to

Still, this

my

1

get a few phone calls from people

firm's voter

list.

We try to

begs the question as to whether,

right to avoid a political

in

who have

remove the person's name
a democracy, people have

communication as they do a marketing
192

traced a

initiative.

This

is

siso reUued lo the nolio,,

25%

of nil nun, he, s

n,

ol'

unlisted

-

e units, ed

phone nun, bets.

In

sotne pa„s of, he eounbs,

Tins witiKh nwnI n„o the

ivate

p.

eal,„,

,

while

understandable, removes huge
parts of the populaee fron,
a type of pohtieal

eonununicat.on proven elfeCve
played out over access to vote,
the data available.

to

Any

n,

me, easing voter turnout

lile.

So.ne states resbret the access to
the

he modern campaign takes place

(whether the

first

was mama

McDonald's commercials
their

What

is

cm

dada

is

in a

it

a matter

of widening

by calling and mailing voters, especially those
voting, they can widen participation.

in

who

at least

Finally, the current political

A
Digit
listed

rcporl by Siincy

at

low many

low do eampaigns, with

one goal

common

to any

This study suggests that

Unfortunately, the current logic of our electoral

direct contact elTorts

olten spent on persuasion mail

aie not always directed

I

need to begin to develop the habit of

the electronic media or highly targeted direct contact etTorts.

GOTV

1

f,-y.

word

a compressed time frame, get heard

participation'^

system leads candidates away from broad based

is

or linn,

tile

son's third

of dispute) was french

they can do to help further

that

My

deafening arena.

did he see before the age of twc)-^

democratic electoral system,

to diiect contact

also

GOTV eirorts.

comparatively minor resources, expended

above the dm?

is

additional costs Iron, ,'estricted
access are inevitably passed on

campaigns and reduced party and campaign
I

fins prtvaey issue

those voters

atmosphere

is

The money

that

does go

I’hose resources that do go to

who need

one where

Sampling orCoimccticul,

and toward either

it

(('lioosing

is

the biggest

more

nudge

to the polls.

likely that the

amount of

between Directory Listed and t^andoin

Sampling in Light of New Demographic Findings, May 19, I9K9, conference report) comparing
and unlisted number households shows that unlisted numbers cluster among high and low incomes.
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campaign spending
political elites to

will

be restricted with

do what

little

concomitant decrease

a

in

the ability of

they can to increase voter
turnout.

This study indicates that
campaign communication increases
turnout.
note

-

is

the util.ty of phone calls
at tncreasing turnout

and some evidence the multiple

calls are

more

among younger,

and that the content of campaign
communication

misleading, but

no guarantee

that,

communication.

once

realized,

it

it

is

information none the

once found,

The

truth

desire for

would be

less,

would be

democracy

is

interesting.

those tools out of the hands of political

elites

their correct use.
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It

may

is

often

This type

have

at their

well be that the

empty and

once said that there was

The same

is

true of campaign

nearly universal but no one said that,

intellectually edifying.

disposal which can widen citizen participation.

encourages

Isaiah Berlin

call.

politicians

disposal to spread the habit of
voting throughout the electorate.
critics are right

tnfrequent voters

effective than a single

of campaign communication may
well be the most effective
tool

Of special

Our

We

politicians

do have tools

at their

should spend less time on taking

and more time structuring a system that

appendix a
DEFINITION OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE,

AND

ISSUE

CONTACTS

Differentiating positive, negative,
and issue contacts

was a two steDDroce^s Fire, „
for issue content. If a
specific issue, or group of
issues’
’
the primary topic of discussion,
the contact was defined was
as an issue contact.

script or mailing

.

was examined

prmary topic of discussion was the
background, history, or experience
of one of the
can idates, the piece was not
considered an issue contact. If the
communication
focused on the opponents background,
history or experience, or if the
communication was
comparison between personal characteristics
to the advantage of the campaign
producing the communication, it was
defined as “negative."
If the

WO

primary topic of discussion was the
background, history, or experience of the
candidate issuing the communication, it
was considered "positive". GOTV calls
which did
not criticize the opponent, or raise an
issue question were considered
positive as ^11
If tlie

Most of the mailings, phone calls, and door-to-door
scripts fell clearly into one of the
above categories. Some of the contacts mentioned
both a candidate's accomplishments
and an opponents opposition to those accomplishments.
Such pieces often called
"comparative" are a gray area. For purposes of this
study,

weight of the

if the

primary graphic or the

emphasized issues, it was coded as an issue piece. If
the primary
graphic or the weight of the text emphasized
candidate characteristics, it was coded as
text,

positive or negative.
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APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW DOCUMENTS
Document 1: Before interviewing anyone
associated with the campaign
each candidate sign the letter
listed below.

1

requested that

Mike Hannahan
P.O. Box 43
Amherst,

MA 01004-0043

Dear Mr. Hannahan;
This

letter

gives your permission to study

election cycle.

my campaign that took place

my

during the

1

understanding that you are researching
the campaigns voter contact efforts
and
will focus your research on direct
mail, voter id, and GOTV. I also
understand that I will
be allowed to review the written material
before it is submitted for publication
and request
any changes that may affect future campaigns.
IS

Sincerely,
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Thursday, November 05, 1998
<Contact:26>

<Company:25>
<Address 1:27>
<Address 2:28>
<Address 3:29>
<City;30>, <State;31> <Zip:32>

<Country:33>

Dear <Salutation:40>;

Thank you

for agreeing to speak with

me

about your campaign.

I

wanted

to write

sZmhir
The purpose of my

research

irect voter contact as

is to examine the effects
of direct voter contact.
any non-fundraising contact to an individual
voter

of persuasion or GOTV. Direct voter contact
includes door
p one calls. For a variety of reasons am concentrating on
1

July

1

and

mo'-e

I

def.ne

for the

to

door

efforts,

purposes

mail

aTd

efforts that took place

until the election.

from

intend to collect information on each individual
contact. After collecting the information
code the data back onto a current voter file and
examine the effects direct contact
had on turnout and persuasion.
I

Will

To accomplish

this

need

to discuss each individual piece of mail
or GOTV call. I
understand that detailed information is hard to recall after
a few years but anything that
can be provided will be helpful. I will be reviewing
campaign expenditure forms from the
FEC because the line item details of such reports may often be helpful in filling
I

in

specifics.

The questions

will cover the following general areas;

-What was your

role in the

campaign?

-Who were

the other key campaign players?
-What were some key campaign target groups?
-How did you feel about the race at the beginning?

-Did any other groups do direct contact on your behalf?
-Did you do any door to door efforts?
-Did you make any Voter ID, Persuasion, or
-Did you make use of persuasion mail?

GOTV phone calls?
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"'^

types of i„fon™tio„
abou, each

foy;:cirs:eirdi:rs^^^^^^^

,

"When Tn
did
It

^
k' contact
the
occur?

might help

if

you had around your

*.„ p™he

registration date, gender,
ethnic

group, or other targeting
variables.
-How many pieces did this group receive^

or phone calH

office any of the following
information

-Direct mail plans

— GOTV

plans

-Sample mail

pieces,

phone

scripts,

or

Door

to

-Polling information

"Names of people
-Names of people
Overall,
to

I

I

think the

responsible for the

Door

scripts

work

involved with the party or
independent expenditure groups
Initial

interview will take about one hour.
After that

complete the project with follow-up
phone

I

hope

to

be able

calls.

look forward to speaking with you.
Thank you again for your time and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Mike Hannahan, Vice

President, Voter Contact Services
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List of Interview Subjects:

Maryland Congressional

District 05:

George Nesterchuck, Campaign
Manager, Devine for Congress
^
Dr. Donald Devine, Candidate
Corey Alexander, Campaign
Manager, Hoyer for Congress
Don Powe.l, Operations Director,
Telemark Inc. (Hoyer Phones

Ohio Congressional District 01:
Shannon Jones, Campaign Manager,
Chabot for Congress
Jeff Herding, Campaign Manager,
Mann for Congress
Jeff Rusnak, Vice President. Burges
and Burges

(Mann Mail)

Brewster Rhoads, Political Consultant
(Mann Targeting)

Pennsylvania Congressional District 21:
Bob Holste, Campaign Manager, English for
Congress
Bill Peduto, Campaign Manager,
DiNicola for Congress
Steve Meyers, SCM Associates (English
Mail)
Jack Zadow, Grassroots Direct (English
Phones)
Jim Thompson, Political Director, COPE
California Congressional District 01:

Beau

Phillips,

Campaign Manager, Riggs

for

Congress

Paul Maslin, Hickman, Maslin, Maulin (Alioto
Pollster)
Harvey Hukari, Hukari Associates (Riggs Mail)

Donna Patterson, Patterson and Associates (get new name)
Shellie Garrett, Garret and Associates (Riggs
Targeting)
Paul Ambrosino, Ambrosino and Muire (Alioto Mail)

Tom

Pier,

Campaign Manager, Alioto

for

Congress
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Section

1.

Involvement;

Name:

Date of interview:

What was your

role in the

campaign?

How

long did you have that role?

Who

was your

pollster?

Who was your fundraising consultant?

Who was your direct mail

Did any one

else

work

consultant?

as a consultant

on the campaign?

200

Who? What was

their role

Section 2:
In July,

The campaign

overall.

what was your horserace
figure?

What was your

favorability?

Your Opponents?

What was your name

id?

Your Opponents?

Can you summarize

m a few words what you needed to do to win?

What groups

did you target for persuasion?

What groups

did you target for turnout?

Why did you

target particular groups for persuasion?

Why did you target particular groups

If you

1.

2.

for turnout?

can remember, what did you think your chances of winning
were

Poor
Fair

3.

Good

4.

Excellent

5.

No

answer

Section 3: Direct Mail Section:

201

in July?

What Did you use any

direct mail in the

campaign?

Lets talk about the direct
mail part of your campaign?

How many pieces
To how many
What were

did you send?

different target audiences?

those target audiences?

How many pieces did each audience get?
What

did you feel about the role of
direct mail in your campaign?

What percentage of your budget was

What

did you feel about the role of

What percentage

spent on direct mail?

GOTV

of your budget do you think

How many different pieces did you send

Now lets talk

in

your campaign?

was spent on

GOTV?

out?

about each individual contact

Contact Information Form:

RACE:

Date of recording:
Recorded by:
Contact name or description:

Approximate date contact was made:

Contact purpose:

Persuasion

Id

202

GOTV

Other

Specifically,

what did you hope

Contact type:

this contact

Mail

would accomplish?

Phone

Door

Target of contact: (describe

PROBE

to

Door

in detail

and

Other

PROBE for)

for:

Party

Age
Voter History

Geography

(precinct, town, county, other)
Precinct targeting analysis
(persuadables,

turnout etc)

Registration date

Gender
Ethnic Group

Group membership

Who

designed the piece of mail (or

PROBE

script, or

door-to-door program)

for:

Direct Mail consultant

Phone Bank Firm

(or volunteers)

Direct mail house:

Voter

file

Do you

Was

If so,

the

vendor:

have a sample of the mailing

same piece

sent to the

(script for the

phone

same universe again?

call or

Yes

door to door)

No

how often?

Would you

describe the contact as a

Name

ID

203

Issue

Negative

Other

Did the eontact win any
awards?

Yes

No
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appendix c

ELECTORAL AND SPENDING EIISTORY
Table A.l: Ohio
Year

CD 01:

1994

Rep.
Candidate

1990
1992
1994

1^.

UldCKWt^il

S. Grote*
S.

Chabot

$278,294
Grote

Table A.2: Maryland

CD 05:

Table A.3: Pennsylvania
Year

Rep.
Candidate

1990
1992
1994
1996

Tom
Tom

Ridge
Ridge

Dem

Rep Percent

1990
1992
1994
1996

Phil English

Ron

Riggs

F.

Riggs

F Riggs

(1)

(iO

Percent

Rep Spending

Dem

68%
49%
51%

DiNicola

Candidate

D Bosco
D Hamburg
D. Hamburg

Dem
Spending

John Harkin
Bill Leavens

F.

Dem

1996

None

Phil English

Rep.
Candidate
F Riggs (1)

CD 21:

Candidate

Table A.4: California
Year

1994

32%
47%
49%

CD 01:

Rep Percent

Dem

$361,712
$705,861
$450,795
$1,262,645

$15,800
$465,190
$478,871

1996
Percent

Rep Spending

Dem
Spending

43%
45%
53%
50%

(1)

M. Alioto
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42%
48%
47%
43%

n9

$251,662

‘R.i

$716,401

$647,532

$605 185
$1,390,399

$1,228,870

appendix d

BASE MODEES
Ta^ble A.5: Causes of
Voter

Turnout by Age, Voter Histo^,
Party, and Contacts:

Variable
Total Contacts

Voter History

N 11333. PercentaQe of Cases
Correctiv Predirterl 77®/
00, ,e«l, -s«„„ica„, a, 05
,e.e, Beginning Log
Likelihood

—

Table A.6: Causes of Voter
Turnout by Age, Voter Histoiy,
Party, and Contacts:
Variable

Coefficient*

Total Contacts

0.09*

Voter History

0.82*

Age

0 01

SE

.Exp (B)
0.01

1.09

0.01

*

2.27

.

Democratic
Republican

-0.34*

Constant

-1.54*

0.01

-0.3*

-srg'nton,
13470.

1.01

0,06

0.74

0.11

^'gniricant to the .001 level.

0.71

Beginning Log Likelihood 17264. -2
Log Likelihood with model

Table A.7: Causes of Voter Turnout by
Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts:
Variable

Coefficient

Total Contacts

0.03*

Voter History

0.63*

Age

SE

Exp

*

PA

(B)

0.02

1.02

0.02

1.87

0.07

1.05

0.07

1.36

0 01
0.05*
.

Democratic
Republican
Constant

-0.96

N=14974. Percentage
Significant.

1.01

0.31-

of

Cases

Correctly Predicted

*Significant to the .001 level.

0.08

-73%. Model

Chi Sq 3040.91 with 5 degrees of freedom.'**
Not

Beginning Log Likelihood 17310. -2 Log
Likelihood with model 14269.

Table A.8: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age,
Voter History, Party, and Contacts:

CA

Variable

Coefficient

Total Contacts

0.15*

Voter History

0.7*

Age

0.003**

Democratic
Republican
Constant

-.1010***

*Significant to the .001 level.

SE

Exp
0.0065

(B)

16

1

0,0174

2

0.0034
0.0589

0.411*

0.0631

1

0 9
1

5

-1.27
**Significant to the .01 Level

*Not Significant.

Likelihood with model 16318.
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Beginning Log Likelihood 14848. -2 Log

Table A.9: Causes of Voter
Turnout by Age, Voter History,
Party, and Contaacts:
Combined file

N=22830

n/uuwimoaeQ

^

ign,ficanl to the

001

level

Beginning Log Likelihood 23266, -2
Log Likelihood with model 18560
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appendix e

models by contact type and
voter

subgroup

Tables for
GOTV/Persuasion/Idcntification (Table
Table A.IO: Causes of Voter
Turnout with TOTV/p
^OTV/PersuasionA^oter
OH

7.1)

•

Exp

Identification:

(B)

0.054
1

17

1

23

n

fi4

0.044
0.041

0.028

2 17~

0.001
n ri7R

1.01

2.9

0.089

4 06

0.07

RTJnn
mg og
g
I

‘Significant to the .001 level

‘Significant to the .01 level

Likelihood 15540. -2 Log Likelihood
with model 11246.

Table All: Causes of Voter
Turnout with GOTV/PersuasionWoter

MD

N~1 31 70.

Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted

-

74%.

Significant to the .001 level.

17264. -2 Log Likelihood with model 13438.

Beginning Log Likelihood

Table A.12: Causes of Voter Turnout with
GOTV/Persuasion/Voter

Variable

Coefficient

TypeGOTV

*-0 181

Type ID
Type Pers

*0.612
*0.013

Democratic
Republican
Constant

Identification:

(B)

0

0.061

0.038

Age

Exp
0.037

*0.472

Voter History

N=14280.

SE

Identification:

-0.125

*0.538

1
1

6

0'^

0.016

1

fi4

0.001

1

01

0.08

0.083

*-1.03

Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted

0.022

0 882
1

71

0.081
-

74.14%. ‘Significant

17310. -2 Log Likelihood with model 14196.
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to the .001 level.

Beginning Log Likelihood

Table A.13: Causes „f
v„(er Turnout with
(;OTV/l> ersuasion/Votcr
Identification:

CA

N=13999.

Percentage of Cases Correctly
Predicted
Log Likelihood with model
12577

-

79%

Significant to the .001 level.

Beginning Log Likelihood
16318.

Tables for Mail/Phone/Door-To-Door
(Table
Table A.14 Causes of Voter
Turnout with Mail/Phone/Door

Total Contacts:

le

J

OH

Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted 76.74%.
‘Significant
og Likelihood 15540. -2 Log Likelihood
with model 11268.
.

eginning

to

Variable

Coefficient

Mail

‘0.189

Door

to

SE
-0.096

Door

0.004

Voter History

‘0.825

Age

‘

Democratic
Republican
Constant

0.052

for

(B)
1.2

0.908

0.05

0.019
0.011

for

‘Significant to the .001

»"o^ included

Exp
0.029

Phone

Door Included

to the .001 level,

•»

7.1)

1

2.28

0.001

1.01

0.064

0.716

0.129

0.516

‘0.333
*-0.661
‘-1.73

0.105
,.^'“^;centage of
-2

Cases

Correctl, Predicted

-

74%.

Log Likelihood with model 13443.
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-Sigrtificant to the .001 level

Beginning Log Likelihood

1

7264

N=14280.

Percentage o, Cases Correct,,
Predicted

Beginning Log Likelihood 17310.

-2

-

74 ,4%.

-Slgnlticant to the 00, level

'Significant to the .05 level.

Log Likelihood with model
14191.

to

N=13999.
Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted
-790/0. ‘Significant
Beginning Log Likelihood 16318. -2
Log Likelihood with model 12577.

to the

Door Included

001 level

'Significant to the .05 level

Tables for Positive/Negative/Issue
(Table
Table A.I8: Causes of Voter Turnout with

Variable

Coefficient

Voter History

*0.782

Positive, Negative,

*0.197

Negative

**-0.18

Issue

**-0.134

Age

*

Democratic
Republican
Constant

SE

0.012

*1.05
*1.34

7.2)

and Issue Contacts:

Exp
0.027

Positive

for

(B)

2.18

0.037

1.21

0.067

0.829

0.056

0.874

0.001

1.01

0.074

2.86

0.078

3.84

*-2.07

0.071

N 11333.

Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted

Beginning Log Likelihood 15540.

-2

-

76.14%. ‘Significant

Log Likelihood with model 11247.
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to the .001 level.

‘Significant to the .01 level

Table

A

19:

MD

N-13170.
-Significan,

Causes of voter turnout
with

Percentage of Cases Correctly
Predicted
,.e 05 ,e.e,
Beginning Log

Positive, Negative,

74 ido/

,

LiLe.ihood

.g

Table A.20: Causes of Vo.er
Turnout with

N 14280

Percentage Of Cases Correctly Predicted

-

and Issue Contacts:

75%.

Positive, Negative,

and Issue Contaets:

‘Significant to the 001 level

Beginning Log Likelihood 17310. -2
Log Likelihood with model 14070.

Table

A

21; Causes of Voter

Variable

Turnout with

Coefficient

SE

Voter History
Positive

0.688
-0.161

Negative

‘0.247

Issue

‘0.168

Age

‘0

Democratic
Republican
Constant

N-1 3999.

Positive, Negative,

‘0.332
-1.06

Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted

and Issue Contaets;

-Exp (B)
0.017

1.99

0.028

0.85

0.011

1.28

0 015

1.18

0.001

-0.086

‘Significant to the .05 level

1

0.06

0.917

0.065

1.39

0.079
-

79%.

16318. -2 Log Likelihood with model 12546.
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‘Significant to the .001 level.

Beginning Log Likelihood

Tables for Republican and
Democrat/Incumbent/Challenger
(Table 7.3)

fable A.23: Causes of Voter
Turnout Party ami Status of
Candidate: Ml)

N=13131.

Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted

Beginning Log Likelihood

1

-

74 15%. ‘Significant

7264. -2 Log Likelihood with
model

1

to the

001 level

‘Significant to the .01 level

3468.

Table A.24: Causes of Voter Turnout Party
and Status of Candidate: PA

N=14280

Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted

Significant to the .05 level.

-

73,24%

-51901110301 to

tire

.001 leyel

"Sigoilioaol to 10. 01 le,el

Beginning Log Likelihood 17310, -2 Log Likelihood
with model 14228.

Table A.25: Causes of Voter Turnout Party and
Status of Candidate:
Variable

Coefficient

Republican Candidate
Democrat Candidate
Voter History

‘0.167

Age

-

‘0.137

‘0.685

‘0.372

1

0.01

1

14

1

98

0.059
0.066

‘-1.33

18

'I

0 896
1

45

0.075

Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted
-2

(B)

0.001

-0.109

Beginning Log Likelihood 16318

Exp

0.01

0.018

“‘0.002

Democratic
Republican
Constant

N-13999.

SE

CA

- 79%. ‘Significant
Log Likelihood with model 12672.

212

to the .001 level,

“‘Significant to the 05 level

Tables for Age Cohorts (Table

7.4)
Table A.26: Causes of Voter
Turnout bv
^ Aee
K Voter History, Party, and Contacts:
55 Plus OH
’

Variable

Coefficient

Total Contacts

0.058“

Voter History

0.86‘

Age

-0.013‘

Democratic

1.03‘

Republican

1.7‘

Constant

-0.673‘

-Exp (B)

0.023

1.06

0.056

2.36

0.005

0.987

0.164

2.82

0.189

5.47

0.397

N 2649.

Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted

-

82%.

‘Significant to the .001 level.
“Significant to the .01 level

Beginning Log Likelihood 3162. -2 Log
Likelihood with model 2219.

Variable

Coefficient

SE

Total Contacts

Voter History

N-2705.

Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted

(B)

0.022

0.986

0.656

0.054

1.92

0.005

0.014

Democratic
Republican
Constant

-2

Exp

-0.013

-

1.1

0.158

3.01

1.33

0.128

3.78

-1.81

0.342

73%,

‘Significant to the .001 level.

Log Likelihood with model 2930.

Beginning Log Likelihood 3454.

Table A.28: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History,
Party, and Contacts*
55 Plus

MD

Variable

Coefficient

Total Contacts

“0.11

Voter History

‘0.841

Age

‘-0.037

Democratic
Republican
Constant

“-0.59

SE

Exp

(B)

0.046

‘-0.64

‘1.68

1

11

0.037

2 31

0.005

0 96

0.18

0 55

0.265

0 52

0.405

^3247

Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 80%. ‘Significant
Beginning Log Likelihood 3470. -2 Log Likelihood with model 2713.

to the .001 level. ‘‘Significant to the 01 level

Table A.29: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts:
30 and Under

MD

Variable

SE

Coefficient

Total Contacts

0.022

Exp
0.05

(B)

1.02

Voter History

‘0.694

0.05

2

Age

“‘0,03

0.013

1.03

Democratic

0.047

0.134

1.04

Republican

0.236

0.26

1.26

Constant

‘-2. 31

N=2530. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted

0.36
-

72%.

‘Significant to the .001 level. “‘Significant to the .05 level.

Beginning Log Likelihood 3276. -2 Log Likelihood with model 2945.
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Table A.30: Causes of Voter
Turnout by Age, Voter History,
Party, and Contacts:
55 Plus PA

SignSioanttotte 001 te,e7

Log Likelihood with model 3251.

-2

Beginning Log Likelihood 4125.

Table A. 31: Causes of Voter Turnout
by Age, Voter History, Party,
and Contacts:
30 and Under PA

N 2807.
-2

Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted
Log Likelihood with model 3739

«

55 Plus

-

74.14%.

Significant to the .001 level.

Beginning Log Likelihood 3861

and Contacts:

CA

Variable

Coefficient

Total Contacts

‘0.15

Voter History

Age

SE

‘0.783
‘-0.027

Democratic
Republican
Constant

0.228

Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted
-2 Log Likelihood with model 2970.

fB1
1

16

0.032

9

1ft

0.004

0 97

0.153

‘0.78

N=4566.

ExD
0.015

1

0.354

0.287

0.353

87%.

‘Significant to the .001 level.

-

25

2 18

Beginning Log Likelihood 3980

Table A.33: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party,
and Contacts:
30 and Under CA
Variable

Coefficient

Total Contacts

‘0.158

0.014

Voter History

‘0.402

0.048

Age

1.49

‘-0.05

0.013

0.95

Democratic
Republican

‘-0.46

SE

Constant

N-21 95.
-2

Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted

-

LU

XQ

s
1.17

0.119

0.63

0.1

0.117

1.11

0.15

0.336

63%.

‘Significant to the .001 level.

Log Likelihood with model 2803.
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Beginning Log Likelihood 3042.

Tables for Frequent and Infrequent
voting subgroups

Variable

Coefficient

SE

Total Contacts

-

Voter History

*0.64

Age

*0.008

Exp

(B)

0.017

0.985

0.07

1.89

0.002

Democratic
Republican
Constant

1.35
1.76
-1.87

N 5245.
-2

0.01

Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted
Log Likelihood with model 5773.

-

0.11

3.85

0.1

5.83

0.1

74%.

Significant to the .001 level.

Beginning Log Likelihood 6360.

Table A.35: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age,
Voter History, Party, and Contacts:
Infrequent Voters OH
Variable

Coefficient

Total Contacts

SE

0 986

0.74

0.05

2 09

0.01

0.002

0.64

0.1

Age
Democratic
Republican
Constant

-2

Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted
Log Likelihood with model 5436.

(B1

0.017

Voter History

N 6088.

Exd

-0.013

-

1.1

0.09

-1.74

0.16

79%.

*Significant to the .001 level.

1

01
1

9

3 01

Beginning Log Likelihood 6246

Table A.36: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and
Contacts:
Frequent Voters

MD

Variable

Coefficient

Total Contacts

***0.065

Voter History

SE

Exp

(B)

0.031

1.06

*0.824

0.037

Age

2.27

*0.003

0.002

Democratic
Republican
Constant

*-0.8

0.146

0.44

*-0.81

0.188

0.44

**-0.57

0.207

N-7229.

Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted

***Significant to the .05 level

-

84%.

1

*Significant to the .001 level. **Significant to the .01 level.

.

Beginning Log Likelihood 6388. -2 Log Likelihood with model 5722.

Table A.37: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts:
Infrequent Voters

MD
SE

Variable

Coefficient

Total Contacts

*0.102

0.03

1.1

Voter History

*0.487

0.06

1.62

Age

*0.015

0.002

1.01

Democratic
Republican

**-0.227

0.075

0.79

0.157

0.75

Constant

*-1.64

N=5927.

-0.27

Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted

Beginning Log Likelihood 7894.

-2

Exp

(B)

0.121
-

63%.

.

*Significant to the .001 level. **Significant to the .01 level.

Log Likelihood with model 7680.
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Table A.38: Causes of Voter
Turnout by Age, Voter History,
Part>, and Contacts:
Frequent Voters PA

N=8340.

Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted

Significant to the .05 level. Beginning

-

860/0.

‘Significant to the .001 level.

Log Likelihood 6664.

-2

“Significant to the 01 level

Log Likelihood with model 6078.

Table A.39: Causes of Voter Turnout by
Age, Voter History, Party, and
Contacts:
Infrequent Voters PA
Variable

Coefficient

Total Contacts

*0.074

Voter History

*0.245

Age

*0.007

Democratic
Republican
Constant

N-5940.
-2

SE

Exp

(B)

0.021

1.07

0.05

1.27

0.001
-0.03

0.08

0.96

0.08

1.31

*0.271
-0.721

Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted

-

56%.

*Significant to the .001 level.

Beginning Log Likelihood 8218.

Log Likelihood with model 8105.

Table A.40: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter
History, Party, and ContactsFrequent Voters CA
Variable

Coefficient

Total Contacts

**0.036

Voter History

*0.935

Age

SE

(B)
1

0.012

*0.01

Democratic
Republican
Constant

Exp
0.05

0.154
*0.389
*-1.7

03

2 54

0.002

1

0.109

1

16

0.116

1

47

01

0.194

N-7985.

Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 89%. *Significant
Beginning Log Likelihood 5482. -2 Log Likelihood with model 4901.

to the .001 level.

**Significant to the 01 level

Table A.41: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts:
Infrequent Voters CA
Variable

Coefficient

Total Contacts

*0.197

0.008

1.21

Voter History

*0.41

0.057

1.5

Age

SE

0.002

Exp

0.002

(B)

1

Democratic
Republican

*-0.24

0.07

0.78

*0.39

0.07

1.47

Constant

*-1.34

0.09

N-6014.
-2

Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted

-

66%.

.

Log Likelihood with model 7556.
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*Significant to the .001 level.

Beginning Log Likelihood 8330.

APPENDIX
DISTRICT MAPS
The

district is within

Ohio and contains

AND REGISTRATION FIGURES

Hamilton County

the

below. Cincinnati has

towns

47%

OH CONGRESS (U) = 01
COUNTY / CITY
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31

Report Total

Figure

1

listed

of the voters

TOTAL
VOTERS

CHEVIOT CITY
CINCINNATI CIT
DEER PARK CITY
FOREST PARK Cl
MT. HEALTHY Cl
12
NORTH COLLEGE
15
ST. BERNARD Cl
17
SILVERTON CITY
23
COLERAIN TOWNS
24
COLUMBIA TOWNS
26
DELHI TOWNSHIP
27
ELMWOOD TOWNSH
29
GLENDALE TOWNS
30
GOLF MANOR TOW
31
GREENHILLS TOW
32
GREEN TOWNSHIP
34
LOCKLAND TOWNS
36
MIAMI TOWNSHIP
37
MIAMI HEIGHTS
39
SPRINGFIELD TO
44
WOODLAWN TOWNS
45
LINCOLN HEIGHT
HAMILTON
02
03
04
05
11

F

5968
173715

REP

VOTERS

DEM
VOTERS

1328
19949

36448

19

13568
4694
6452
3426
3787
30198
1446
20169
1741
747
2385
2994
39104
3145
3817
4624
22816
2203
2567
349585*

349585

Ohio Congressional

758

IND

VOTERS
3882
117318

1

3

15

1658
887
1328
611
458
7344
299
6447
214
174
248
904
14066
372
808
1670
5907
162

2676
758
1065
490
1029
3765
288
2640
160

9234
3049
4059
2325
2300
19089
859
11082
1367
401
1507
1738
20928
2239
2601
2557
13262
1396
1726

172
630
352
4110
534
408
397

3647

64859*

645
817
61792*

222934*

64859

61792

222934

24

District 01

217

:

1994

COUNTY
02
05
09
17
19

ANNE ARUNDEL
CALVERT
CHARLES
PRINCE GEORGE'S
ST. MARY'S

Report Total

TOTAL
VOTERS
48639
36971
56001
164771
37939
344321

Figure

2.

REP

VOTERS
20559
15330
22735
40884
13848

113356

Maryland Congressional

218

District 05:

DEM
VOTERS
20904
16884
26366
98435
19517
182106

1994

IND

VOTERS
7176
4757
6900
25452
4574

48859

COUNTY

TOTAL
VOTERS
57127
33165

REP

VOTERS
26988

DEM
VOTERS
25355
13045
87668
34395

4784
2032
11955
5679

160463

24450

BUTLER
CRAWFORD
ERIE
MERCER

164024
68239

18088
64401
28165

Report Total

322555

137642

10
20
25
43

Figures. Pennsylvania Congressional District 21: 1996

219

IND

VOTERS

COUNTY
08
12
17

23
28

48

49

DEL NORTE
HUMBOLDT
LAKE
MENDOCINO

NAPA
SOLANO
SONOMA

Report Total

Figure

4.

TOTAL
VOTERS

VOTERS

12784
78126
29654
46229
63198
68541
31795

4760
24191
10240
13432
22694
22485
11039

330327

108841

REP

DEM
VOTERS
5391
35791
14502
22770
30185
33329
15505

2633
18144
4912
10027
10319
12727
5251

157473

64013

California Congressional District 0 1

220

IND

VOTERS

:

1

996
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